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to the understanding of student cognition, the field currently wrestles with four problems.
There is a lack of consensus regarding construct definition, a disconnect between
psychological investigations and personal epistemology’s philosophical roots, a failure to
integrate work from developmental psychology, and difficulties in measuring personal
epistemology. This dissertation combines work from both philosophy and developmental
psychology with personal epistemology research to put forth a conceptual model of
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the strengths of past research. Development is described using four ordered positions, and
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data, and provided mixed support for the underlying model. Educational level was
probabilistically related to participants’ epistemic and ontologic cognition.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
If education were simply a matter of transmitting knowledge from the learned to
the learner, it would be at best a logistical problem. However, education is not merely an
exchange of knowledge from professor to student, but rather a constructive process where
individuals come to know in their own ways, and what is taught is influenced by their
prior experiences and beliefs (Phillips, 1995). Alexander and colleagues (1998)
emphasize that “often unvoiced theories, beliefs, or biases that may unwittingly penetrate
the soul of the educational enterprise” (p. 97) can have a tremendous influence upon what
is learned. Indeed, they claim, “one of these quiet but powerful frameworks is the
epistemological beliefs that students…hold” (Alexander, Murphy, Guan, & Murphy,
1998, p. 97). Educational psychologists describe epistemological beliefs as “beliefs we
hold about knowledge and knowing” (Hofer, 2000, p. 3) that can influence students’
construction of knowledge. Psychologists have adopted the term “personal epistemology”
to describe how individuals think about knowledge, and how these beliefs influence their
learning and understanding of the world. This area of research has its roots in
philosophical epistemology, a branch of philosophy that examines what knowledge is,
and how it can be established (Pollock & Cruz, 1999; Williams, 2001).
Both philosophical epistemologists and psychologists study how individuals
discriminate between knowledge and other kinds of beliefs, intuitions, and speculations.
Philosophical epistemologists have long been fascinated by the question of what
constitutes knowledge qua knowledge, as opposed to other kinds of beliefs (Pollock &
Cruz, 1999; Williams, 2001). Most philosophers define knowledge as justified true belief,
and seek the sufficient justifications for elevating a belief to the status of knowledge.
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Other philosophers question whether it is even possible to have sufficient justification to
claim knowledge, a stance called skepticism (Given the varied terminology of the field as
well as this dissertation’s reach into three separate research areas, personal epistemology,
developmental psychology, and philosophy, a glossary is provided after the appendices of
this dissertation). Epistemological inquiry is generally restricted to more-or-less objective
claims about the world, such as whether one can know that a fire truck is red. Issues of
morality and aesthetics are generally viewed as outside the realm of philosophical
epistemology because it is difficult to justify claims of this type as “true” or “right”
(Pollock & Cruz, 1999).
Psychologists are not interested in any “right” way to establish justification.
Rather, psychologists are intrigued by the many ways in which individuals think about
knowledge, and how those beliefs about knowledge influence learning (Hofer & Pintrich,
1997). These epistemological beliefs can influence how a student both constructs and
uses knowledge. For example, people will act in ways that are congruent with their
knowledge, and are less likely to abandon knowledge claims in the face of competing
evidence (Alvermann, Smith, & Readence, 1985). Therefore, students’ beliefs about what
is and is not knowledge can play a powerful role in what and how they learn.
Personal epistemology researchers have also examined people’s beliefs about
knowledge’s characteristics in general. For some, knowledge is a simple collection of
facts, whereas for others it is more like a web of related concepts. Some people may
believe that only those things that are unchanging can be considered knowledge, whereas
others may believe knowledge is dependent upon context (Schommer, 1990; Williams,
2001). In essence, people can have beliefs about the nature and structure of knowledge.
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These beliefs about knowledge’s character can influence how people decide what claims
are and are not worthy of being considered knowledge. Personal epistemology
researchers assert that learners’ core beliefs about the nature of knowledge and knowing
influence both how they go about learning and what they are capable of understanding
(Hofer, 2004a; Hofer & Pintrich, 1997, Schommer, 1990). They claim that certain beliefs
about knowledge and its nature are more availing (Muis, 2004), or helpful, than others,
particularly in the college years when the subject matter of learning becomes dense and
complex and students have less help from others in structuring the knowledge they are
expected to learn.
Thus, on the one hand there are philosophers studying epistemology to determine
the criteria by which knowledge can be discriminated from belief. On the other hand
there are psychologists who are studying all the different ways people think about
knowledge and knowing, and how those beliefs influence learning. However, before the
relations between these two fields can be examined, another more important question
must be asked. How relevant is all of this work to the actual processes of learning?
The Importance of Epistemology to Learning
Although usually somewhat vaguely stated, almost every research article in the
field of personal epistemology begins with some description of how important the
research is to understanding how students learn. Psychologists claim the study of
personal epistemology is important because it will “help us better understand the teaching
and learning processes in classrooms” (Hofer & Pintrich, 1997, p. 133). King and
Kitchener (2002) wrote:
The theoretical foundation…is grounded in two major assumptions, that students’
understanding of the nature, limits, and certainty of knowledge affects how they
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approach the process of learning, and that their epistemic assumptions change
over time in a developmentally related fashion. (p. 55)
Schommer-Aikins and Easter (2006) also highlight the perceived importance of
personal epistemology research: “Bear in mind that the study of personal epistemology is
important because it is likely that it plays multiple roles in students’ learning and problem
solving” (p. 412). Kuhn (2005) states that students who do not progress beyond absolute
ideas of right and wrong will see “little point to expending the mental effort that the
evaluation of claims entails” (p. 32). Beyond education, Kuhn and colleagues (Kuhn,
Weinstock, & Flaton, 1994) have shown that jurors’ level of epistemological
understanding is related to their ability to assess alternative verdict choices and ultimately
their level of reasoning about cases. Yet there currently exists more theory than research
regarding exactly how personal epistemology influences learning and thinking.
The suggestion in most work on personal epistemology is that naïve personal
epistemologies handicap learning by limiting a student’s ability to fully grasp the
complexity and interconnectedness of knowledge. A simple example would be college
students who struggle in history classes because they believe every question in the
content area has a definite answer (VanSledright & James, 2002). These students may
struggle to grasp questions of subjectivity, narrative, and sourcing in history because they
have a more basic belief about knowledge that is getting in the way: the belief that the
world, particularly its past, can be objectively known. Students who see all knowledge as
factual would have little incentive to critically examine their own interpretations or those
of others.
This issue has recently received national attention after the passing of a Florida
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state law that declared, “American history shall be viewed as factual, not constructed,
shall be viewed as knowable, teachable, and testable” (Florida Education Omnibus Bill,
H.B. 7087e3). Historians and teachers have been concerned about this law specifically
because it suggests that history is composed of facts, and that one need not consider
alternative interpretations of those facts. Thus, students are being taught to have a
simplistic view of historical knowledge, wherein interpretation and justification are not
relevant. As one teacher put it, “If you just require students to memorize information,
that’s not the best way to create active citizens...we’re just creating little robots” (History
News Network, 2006).
Thus, one of the main concerns of educators is that a failure to develop a more
sophisticated personal epistemology than that implied in the Florida bill will leave
students without the skills necessary to make good judgments about knowledge claims
both in and out of school. Some educational psychologists believe that a better
understanding of students’ personal epistemologies will point the way toward
interventions designed to help those students adopt more beneficial beliefs. Those more
availing beliefs, in turn, will then allow for more sophisticated learning and evaluation of
knowledge claims (Hofer & Pintrich, 1997).
Early Theories of Personal Epistemology
One of the first people to examine people’s personal epistemologies was Perry
(1970, 1999). He interviewed college students at Harvard regarding their beliefs about
knowledge, and found that in general students fell into one of four groups. Dualists saw
the world in black or white, right or wrong terms, and had complete trust in authority
figures’ ability to provide knowledge about the world. Multiplists had lost faith not only
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in authority figures, but also in the possibility of knowledge. These students felt there
were no “truths” and that knowledge did not exist. Instead, every person’s opinion was
equally valid. Perry used the term relativists to describe those that progressed beyond this
stage. Relativists acknowledged that absolute knowledge might not be possible, but that
criteria could be used to judge the probability of knowledge claims being true. Finally,
the last position in Perry’s model was commitment to relativism, where the student chose
a set of criteria to use to judge knowledge claims, while acknowledging that others might
choose different criteria. What made Perry’s work so intriguing was that he claimed a
majority of students entered college as dualists, and few made progress past multiplicity
before graduating.
Perry’s claims regarding the naiveté of college students raised numerous
questions, including whether incoming freshmen were adequately prepared to think in the
relativistic ways their professors expected. The predominance of multiplistic thinking in
college seniors also called into question why the college experience was not more
effective in nurturing mature thinkers. These concerns, among others, led to over 30 years
of research into what has come to be known as the field of personal epistemology, or how
students think about knowledge.
Studying Personal Epistemology
Today, there is much interest in personal epistemology, yet the field continues to be
quite fragmented, with varying definitions and models of students’ beliefs about
knowledge and knowing. For example, in one of the first comprehensive reviews of the
literature on personal epistemology, Hofer and Pintrich (1997) wrote
In all this research there is very little agreement on the actual construct under study,
the dimensions it encompasses, whether epistemological beliefs are domain specific
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or how such beliefs might connect to disciplinary beliefs, and what the linkages
might be to other constructs in cognition and motivation. (p. 89)
Five years later, this well-received journal article lead to a book on personal
epistemology, also edited by Hofer and Pintrich. The introductory chapter of that book
stated:
In providing updated looks at each of the five main models of personal
epistemology, we hope that the reader will be able to gain perspective on both
their commonalities and their differences, and to engage questions that have
concerned those doing research in this field. First and foremost, are these
researchers addressing the same construct…is it worthwhile or possible to
consolidate the theoretical work that has developed in this area? How might we
achieve greater conceptual clarity? (Hofer, 2002, p. 6)
Two years after the publication of this book, a special issue of the journal Educational
Psychologist was published, solely devoted to personal epistemology. In that issue, Hofer
(2004a) stated “the existing research programs lack a unifying terminology” and that the
goal of the issue was to “sharpen the conceptual understanding of personal epistemology”
(p. 1). In the same issue, Bendixen and Rule (2004) stated, “Currently there is neither a
unified model of epistemological understanding to guide research, nor a single model that
clearly articulates the relationship between personal epistemology and how
epistemological beliefs change and develop” (p. 69). An examination of recent articles on
the topic reveals researchers continuing to dialogue about what should and should not be
considered “personal epistemology” (e.g., Schommer-Aikins & Easter, 2006).
Thus, almost ten years after the call for at least more definitional clarity, if not
some integration of disparate models, the field of personal epistemology remains
fragmented and difficult to follow, with authors using different terminology and
disagreeing at a fundamental level regarding the very constructs to be studied. For
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example, there continues to be a debate as to whether personal epistemology is a
unidimensional or a multidimensional construct, and whether the phenomenon is domain-
general or domain-specific (see Pintrich, 2002, for a discussion of both of these issues).
At least each of these models uses a common word: epistemology. Unfortunately,
even the appropriateness of this term has been called into question. Kitchener (2002) in
particular has taken the field to task for sloppy operational definitions. He points out that
the definition of “epistemology” is literally translated as the study or theory of
knowledge. Therefore, to suggest that students have a “personal epistemology” is akin to
saying that college students are philosophers, studying how knowledge can be justified. It
is unlikely that personal epistemology researchers intend this. Other confusing terms
include “epistemological beliefs” (Schommer-Aikins, 2004), which is literally translated
as beliefs about the study of knowledge, and “epistemological theories” (Hofer &
Pintrich, 1997) which, taken literally, means “theories about the theory of knowledge.” In
addition, there is also concern with the use of the term “availing” (Muis, 2004) to
characterize more “sophisticated” or “advanced” kinds of epistemic cognition. Availing
may not be the most accurate description as it is not clear that the most “advanced”
beliefs are helpful in every situation. Cognitive flexibility theorists (Feltovich, Spiro, &
Coulson, 1997) suggest that the demand characteristics of the situation may dictate
whether a more complex or simplistic view is most helpful. Therefore, it may be most
accurate to describe more “advanced” beliefs in personal epistemology as “adaptive” (Dr.
P. Karen Murphy, personal communication, May 11, 2007).
In the strictest sense, these terms do not adequately convey their authors’
meanings. There is a tremendous difference between having beliefs about knowledge and
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studying them, but these terms conflate the two. This is not merely a semantic issue. As I
will show, the failure to clarify the terminology in personal epistemology research is a
symptom of a greater problem, namely that psychological work in personal epistemology
has borrowed the language, but not the lessons, of philosophers (Buehl & Alexander,
2001). A closer reading of the philosophical work in epistemology can help clarify not
only the terminology used in personal epistemology research, but also the constructs that
should be included in this area of study. It may also be able to shed some light upon the
degree of domain-generality versus specificity in personal epistemology.
Developmental psychology theorists (Chandler, Hallett, & Sokol, 2002) have also
criticized the current models and findings of personal epistemology research. In
particular, they claim that most personal epistemology work has focused too much on
college students and ignored important research regarding children’s theory of mind (e.g.,
Chandler, Boyes, & Ball, 1990; de Rosnay & Hughes, 2006; Flavell, 2004; Flavell,
Flavell, Green, & Moses, 1992; Krettenauer, 2004). This research contributes to the
discussion by debunking the findings of personal epistemology researchers who claim
that incoming college freshmen see the world solely in objective, black and white terms.
There is a great deal of developmental psychology research demonstrating that college
students, as well as much younger children, do in fact think in more subjective ways than
researchers such as Perry would expect.
For example, theory of mind researchers have found that teenagers are able to
articulately argue both sides of the debate about the legal driving age (Boyes & Chandler,
1992), and that young children understand that cats like cat food but humans do not
(Flavell, Flavell, Green, & Moses, 1992). Yet, Chandler and colleagues (2002) correctly
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note, “almost no one who writes about the epistemic development of college students
gives any indication of also having read the literature on children’s so-called theories of
mind” (p. 157). The irony here is that this critique came about in a chapter in Hofer and
Pintrich’s 2002 book on personal epistemology, and yet it still has not received much
attention. Nonetheless, I believe that any model of personal epistemology must be able to
align with the research findings within the theory of mind literature, and at this point
none do so, with perhaps the exception of Kuhn and Weinstock (2002) who allow for the
possibility of more sophisticated epistemic cognition in populations younger than college
age.
Finally, in addition to these concerns, the field of personal epistemology
continues to struggle with measurement (Pintrich, 2002). Qualitative methods for
measuring personal epistemology are time-intensive and often utilize data collection and
analysis protocols with relevance only to a specific model, making it difficult to
determine whether they have any validity outside of their narrow research context.
Quantitative measures of both personal epistemology as well as theory of mind have been
plagued with concerns regarding their reliability and validity (Clarebout, Elen, Luyten, &
Bamps, 2001; Hallet, Chandler, & Krettenauer, 2002; Wood & Kardash, 2002). Concerns
about whether personal epistemology should be measured at the domain-general or
domain-specific level are also relevant here (Buehl & Alexander, 2001, 2005; Buehl,
Alexander, & Murphy, 2002). Thus, it is not hyperbole to say that the field of personal
epistemology is in something like a quagmire, with major controversies regarding
construct definition, scope, terminology and measurement.
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Purpose and Significance of this Dissertation
Given the strong level of interest in personal epistemology research, this
dissertation addressed the concerns of authors both within and outside of the field of
educational psychology. Researchers in personal epistemology have frequently lamented
that the various models in the field seem to have significant overlap. Nonetheless, these
models have yet to be satisfactorily integrated due to both terminology differences and
researcher intransigency (Hofer & Pintrich, 1997; Pintrich, 2002). The focus of personal
epistemology might be more clearly defined if researchers attended more to the work of
philosophers. Buehl and Alexander (2001) as well as Murphy (2003) are psychologists
who have attempted to do this. In addition, evidence from theory of mind research
(Chandler et al., 2002; Flavell, 2004) suggests that the models within personal
epistemology must be incomplete if they cannot explain epistemic cognition in students
younger than traditional college age. Finally, there remain problems regarding the
psychometric qualities of measures of personal epistemology. Aside from technical
concerns regarding the actual items used to measure the constructs, there are fundamental
conceptual questions such as whether personal epistemology is domain-general or
domain-specific, and if it is domain-specific, at what level of specificity? It is not
surprising that measures that ignore these controversies have weak psychometric
properties.
I suggest that a new model must be advanced to address these concerns. The
model must have a solid, interdisciplinary conceptual foundation, drawn from the work of
philosophers, developmental psychologists, and educational psychologists. With such a
foundation, attempts to measure the constructs within the model will be more likely to
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have strong psychometric properties, as well as to provide evidence regarding the
domain-generality or specificity of students’ beliefs about knowledge upon which
research and teaching practice can be based.
The Conceptual Model of Epistemic and Ontologic Cognitive Development
In this dissertation, I theoretically derived and empirically investigated a new
conceptual model of students’ beliefs about knowledge. This conceptual model combines
the numerous models of personal epistemology with the thinking of philosophers and the
findings of developmental psychology researchers. In addition, it addresses a major
problem found in both educational psychology and developmental psychology: the
measurement of these constructs (Pintrich, 2002). By integrating philosophical
epistemology and theory of mind research with personal epistemology, I could more
clearly and accurately define the phenomenon of students’ beliefs about knowledge and
their development, leading to more reliable and valid means of measuring those
constructs. In addition, I provided empirical evidence regarding the issue of domain-
generality versus specificity by examining students’ beliefs about knowledge within two
domains. My conceptual model is tentatively entitled the Epistemic and Ontologic
Cognition Development Model (EOCDM).
Briefly, my conceptual model addresses both epistemic and ontologic cognition
because I believe the two areas are confounded in current research. Epistemic cognition is
thinking about knowledge and knowing. Ontologic cognition, on the other hand, concerns
individuals’ understanding of reality. Ontology is the study of existence, and the basic
categories and relationships that define that existence (Teichman & Evans, 1995). Many
models of personal epistemology, including the work of Schommer (1990) and Kuhn and
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Weinstock (2002), include individuals’ beliefs about whether knowledge is simple or
complex, and certain or changing. These questions are not epistemological; they are
ontological, having to do with characteristics of objects in the world. A simplistic
ontological view is that external objects are fixed and separate entities, and knowing
about them requires only a list of their qualities, with the belief that this list will never
change regardless of time or context. Models of personal epistemology that define these
beliefs as epistemological make a definitional error as well as a conceptual one. My
model categorizes these beliefs as ontological and separate from epistemological ones,
allowing for more flexibility in describing how individuals view both knowing and
knowledge itself, as well as providing a stronger conceptual foundation for the creation of
a measure of this model.
A Measure of Epistemic and Ontologic Cognition
A pencil-and-paper survey measuring the constructs in my model of epistemic
and ontologic cognition was developed. This survey was informed by past research into
personal epistemology, philosophy, and work from developmental psychology,
specifically the theory of mind. Issues concerning the survey included whether to use
items from other pencil-and-paper measures of personal epistemology, how to address
concerns about domain-generality and specificity, and whether to include a measure of
Piaget’s (1972) theory of cognitive development with the survey.
Items From Other Personal Epistemology Measures
Schommer’s (1990) Epistemological Questionnaire (EQ) is the most commonly
used paper-and-pencil measure of personal epistemology. Variants of this measure exist,
but the only one to receive significant attention is the Epistemic Belief Inventory by
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Schraw and colleagues (Schraw, Bendixen, & Dunkle, 2002). Numerous researchers have
expressed concerns about the reliability and validity of both of these measures (Clarebout
et al., 1998; Greene, Azevedo, & Hancock, 2006; Wood & Kardash, 2002). These
concerns, plus the differences in the conceptual model underlying these other measures as
compared to the one for this dissertation, precluded using them in this dissertation.
However, individual items from these measures were examined for possible inclusion in
the measure for my conceptual model.
Domain-Generality and Domain-Specificity
The issue as to whether epistemic cognition is domain-general or domain-specific
remains a controversial one in the field (Buehl & Alexander, 2001, 2005; Buehl,
Alexander, & Murphy, 2002; Hofer & Pintrich, 1997). Most unidimensional models of
personal epistemology advocate for domain-generality, or independence. King and
Kitchener (2004), for example, continue to claim moderate to strong domain-
independence in their model. Schommer and Walker (1995) also provide empirical
evidence for the domain-generality of the constructs in their model.
While Hofer (2000) found evidence predominantly supporting the domain-
generality of her epistemological theories, there was some indication of separate domain-
specific beliefs as well. Buehl, Alexander and Murphy (2002) created a survey of
epistemological beliefs in mathematics and history, and used confirmatory factor analysis
to evaluate models positing both domain-generality and specificity. They found that the
model allowing for domain-specific beliefs had the best fit, but allowed that correlations
between the factors suggested the presence of overarching domain-general beliefs as
well. This finding was bolstered by the work of Buehl and Alexander (2005) who found
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that, using cluster analyses, epistemological beliefs grouped into interpretable profiles
within domain, and that when these profiles were characterized as sophisticated or not,
that participants’ profiles across domains were statistically significantly correlated.
Students tended to have a similar level of sophistication across history and mathematics,
suggesting the possibility of a superordinate domain-general epistemological belief.
Within the theory of mind literature, Chandler and colleagues (2002) have also suggested
the possibility that both domain-specific and general epistemological beliefs work in
concert, for example with an overarching skepticism of authority mitigated by trust in the
work of natural scientists.
Thus, many of the major models of personal epistemology (Baxter Magolda,
2004; King & Kitchener, 2004; Perry, 1970; Schommer & Walker, 1995) covered in this
dissertation advocate for domain-generality, yet recent research and models suggest that
students’ beliefs about knowledge have domain-general and specific aspects (Buehl &
Alexander, 2001, 2005; Buehl, Alexander, & Murphy, 2002; Chandler et al., 2002). It
would therefore seem important to assess the domain-generality or specificity of the
constructs within my conceptual model. Therefore, to allow for such an investigation, my
measure included similarly worded items for two academic domains. I predicted that
domain-specificity would be found, and empirically tested that hypothesis through factor
analysis methods similar to those used by Buehl and colleagues (2002).
Measures of Piaget’s Formal Operations
Finally, given that my model builds off of work from developmental psychology
(Chandler et al., 2002; Hallet et al., 2002), and the fact that many of those models claim
that advanced epistemic cognition is not possible until Piaget’s (1972) stage of formal
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operations, the inclusion of a measure of Piaget’s theory was considered. Unfortunately,
paper-and-pencil measures of formal and concrete operations suffer from problems of
reliability, validity, and excessive length (Patterson & Milakofsky, 1980; Pratt & Hacker,
1984; Santmire, 2004; Stefanich, 1983), thus precluding their use in this dissertation. This
is clearly not a current area of measurement development. This resulted in an inability to
disentangle the potentially confounding influences of age, cognitive ability, and
experience with academic domains. Future research will be required to investigate these
phenomena and their influence upon epistemic and ontologic cognition.
Summary
To measure the constructs in my model, I created the Epistemic and Ontologic
Cognition Questionnaire (EOCQ), with items assessing student beliefs in multiple
academic areas. The design of this instrument took into account research in psychology
and philosophy, as well as built upon the work of other quantitative instruments and
research findings from the field of personal epistemology. The measure was written such
that a test of domain-specificity could be performed, in the hopes of providing additional
evidence regarding this controversy. However, a priori attempts to make an instrument
capable of adequately assessing my model and the domain-specific hypothesis were also
bolstered by a pilot study that was conducted, and revisions based upon the results of this
pilot were made.
Pilot Study and Measure Revision
A pilot study was conducted to examine participants’ interpretations of my
measure of epistemic and ontologic cognition, the EOCQ. Thirteen participants
completed the measure while thinking aloud, or verbalizing their thoughts. They were
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also asked specific questions after completing the measure. Participants were audiotaped
and transcripts of these recordings were created to assess the measure and modify the
items as needed. Major findings were that middle-school students could only understand
items in regards to two of the four academic domains, and that while in general the
participants responded as expected to many items, numerous items did require revision.
In addition, an examination of literature concerning folk understandings of words such as
“knowledge” informed the language used in the final dissertation version of the EOCQ
Middle-school students had no background knowledge regarding physics and
political science. One student simply could not speculate as to what these domains might
include, whereas the other two guessed incorrectly. As such, these domains were dropped
from the EOCQ because the same instrument and items must be used with each age
group if comparisons are to be made. This left mathematics and history as the academic
domains to be investigated.
In the final version of the EOCQ, a majority of the items from the pilot version
were revised in some way. Some of the revisions were fairly minor, such as rephrasing
negatively-worded items from “I don’t automatically believe everything I learn in math
class” to “I believe everything I learn in math class.” Other items on the pilot clearly
were interpreted differently than intended, such as “To do well in math class, the main
thing you need to do is memorize facts.” This item was supposed to tap whether
participants recognized that there is a constructivist aspect to mathematics. However,
numerous pilot participants disagreed with this statement not because they believed in
constructivism in mathematics, but because they thought formulas were different than
facts, and were just as important. Therefore, this item was changed to read “To know
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math well, you need to memorize what you are taught.” This item better measures
whether individuals believe that knowledge in mathematics is simple, requiring only
memorization, or whether mathematics knowledge requires deeper processing.
The language of the items was also examined more closely. Alexander and
colleagues (Alexander & Dochy, 1995; Alexander et al., 1998) have found evidence that
individuals from high-school students through faculty members have implicit definitions
of “knowledge,” and that these definitions differ in some ways from other terms such as
“beliefs.” In general individuals most often described these two concepts as having
significant but not total overlap, with knowledge seen as more objective and beliefs as
more subjective, but no less important. Knowledge was most often defined using terms
such as “know” and “facts” whereas definitions of beliefs most often included the words
“believe,” “true,” and “values.” Given these findings, it was important that the survey
instrument utilize terms more associated with knowledge, and not beliefs. As such, in the
final dissertation version of the EOCQ, the terms “true” and “truth” were removed from
many of the pilot items.
A more complete description of the pilot and subsequent changes made to the
final dissertation version of the EOCQ can be found in Chapter 3.
Hypotheses and Research Questions
With this dissertation I sought to investigate the epistemic and ontologic cognition
of students in middle-school through graduate school. The first step was the creation and
administration of the EOCQ, which was designed to measure the constructs in my
proposed conceptual model (the EOCDM). The viability of my EOCDM was examined
through testing the reliability, construct validity, and discriminant validity of scores from
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the final, post-pilot, version of the EOCQ. I used a factor mixture statistical model to
investigate these claims, which tested both the validity of the conceptual model as well as
whether the proposed developmental sequences were supported by the data. In addition,
this technique allowed an investigation of the controversy regarding domain-generality
versus specificity.
Specifically, my first hypothesis was that there are three latent constructs that
comprise epistemic and ontologic cognition, and that the items in the EOCQ would
adequately capture these constructs. I also hypothesized that these constructs are not
strictly domain-general or specific, meaning that in the statistical model separate factors
for these three latent constructs were needed for both ill and well-structured academic
areas, such as history and math respectively (Frederiksen, 1984). I also predicted that
scores from my measure would be reliable.
Assuming that the EOCQ adequately captured the three latent factors within each
domain, I next hypothesized that students’ scores on these latent factors, within domain,
would fall into one of four predictable patterns, or positions as they are called within the
conceptual model. In the conceptual model, students progress through these positions in a
specific order: first realism, then either dogmatism or skepticism, followed by
rationalism. This progression through the positions of model is hypothesized to begin
sooner for ill-structured domains (Frederiksen, 1984), such as history, than for well-
structured domains, such as mathematics. This difference in progression has been
supported by previous research into children’s theory of mind (Hallet et al., 2002).
By using a factor mixture approach with a single latent categorical factor for both
mathematics and history position, the statistical model tested whether the scores on all six
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latent factors supported these positions. While only a longitudinal study ranging over
several years could fully test the developmental aspect of the conceptual model, this
cross-sectional dissertation can present initial evidence of the model’s adequacy. Because
my conceptual model states that an individual’s EOCDM position in mathematics should
be no higher than that individual’s position in history, the participants’ predicted
positions in both domains, using the factor mixture statistical model, was examined to
test this hypothesis.
Finally, I hypothesized that educational level would predict EOCDM position, as
most personal epistemology models suggest that exposure to educational experiences is
positively correlated with more adaptive beliefs (Buehl & Alexander, 2001). The specific
research questions and hypotheses necessary to test these claims were as follows:
Research Question: What evidence is there supporting or refuting the EOCDM
based on the construct and discriminant validity and reliability of scores from the
EOCQ?
Hypothesis 1: The statistical measurement model, which allows all latent
factors (simple and certain knowledge, justification by authority, and
personal justification dimensions) to covary, will have an acceptable level
of data-model fit according to Hu and Bentler’s (1999) criteria.
Hypothesis 1a: The construct reliability of latent factor scores
derived from the measurement model will have a Coefficient H
value greater than or equal to .7.
Hypothesis 2: Domain-specificity will be found, with items for history and
mathematics loading on separate latent factors.
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Hypothesis 3: The hypothesized factor mixture statistical models will have
an acceptable level of data-model fit. The fit of these statistical models
will be compared to alternative factor mixture statistical models positing
more positions, as well as ones positing fewer positions, as well as models
with less restrictive assumptions. Procedures and criteria for factor
mixture model fit as outlined by Lubke and Muthén (2005) will be used.
Hypothesis 3a: The construct reliability of latent factor scores
derived from the factor mixture model will have a Coefficient H
value greater than or equal to .7.
Hypothesis 4: For a majority of individuals, their conceptual model-
predicted EOCDM position within history will be equal to or higher than
their conceptual model-predicted position for mathematics.
Hypothesis 5: Educational level and EOCDM positions in history and
mathematics will be probabilistically related, with higher levels of
education predictive of higher positions within the EOCDM.
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW
The model I am proposing draws upon the work of numerous other researchers.
As such, it is important to clearly review the literature to illustrate both how my model
builds upon this work as well as how it makes a new contribution. However,
nomenclature varies across researchers and fields of study. Researchers use terms such as
“personal epistemology” (e.g., Perry, 1970, 1999), “epistemological beliefs” (e.g.,
Schommer-Aikins, 2004), and “epistemological theories” (e.g., Hofer & Pintrich, 1997).
This difference in language can be confusing, but for the most part each term comes from
a common core of ideas regarding individuals’ beliefs about knowledge.
To promote clarity through consistency, I will adopt the following terminology
conventions. When discussing the work of educational psychologists in general, I will
refer to the area as personal epistemology. This is consistent with the terminology used
by Hofer and Pintrich in their 2002 book as well the special issue of Educational
Psychologist that Hofer (2004a) edited. When reviewing the work of specific authors in
this tradition, I will utilize their terminology. For example, Schommer-Aikins (2004) uses
the term “epistemological beliefs” so I will refer to her model as such. The philosophical
literature is more consistent in utilizing the term epistemology, and I will follow that
convention. Finally, when referring to my own model, I will use the term Kitchener
(2002) recommends: epistemic cognition. My model reclassifies certain aspects of
personal epistemology as ontologic cognition, as well.
This literature review covers numerous approaches to the study of epistemic
cognition, and the first of these can be loosely classified as unidimensional or monolithic
models including the work of Perry (1970, 1999), King and Kitchener (2004), Baxter
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Magolda (2004), and Kuhn (Kuhn, Cheney, & Weinstock, 2000). These researchers view
personal epistemology as a single construct. The work of Schommer-Aikins (2004) and
Hofer and Pintrich (1997) can be classified as multidimensional models, suggesting there
are numerous independent dimensions, or factors, that comprise an individual’s personal
epistemology. Disagreements persist amongst these researchers, and I believe a closer
look at the philosophical study of epistemology can help resolve these disagreements. A
full review of the philosophical literature is well beyond the scope of this dissertation.
However, a solid understanding of how philosophical thought can inform psychological
work can be reviewed relatively briefly. Finally, I include developmental psychology
literature regarding theories of mind and developmental differences before outlining my
own model.
Thus, this literature review seeks to bring together work from educational
psychology, philosophy, and developmental psychology to better understand epistemic
cognition. I believe the integration of work from each of these fields leads to a more
complete model that can both accommodate the disparate findings of the authors
mentioned previously as well as resolve some long-standing disagreements regarding the
definition, development, and measurement of epistemic and ontologic cognition.
Inclusion and Exclusion Criteria
The field of personal epistemology is growing quite quickly, and seems to
currently be a focus of numerous educational researchers (Hofer, 2004a). However, with
any burgeoning area of research, interest brings a proliferation of models, studies, and
viewpoints regarding the construct itself as well as its relations with other constructs of
interest. Yet, personal epistemology research continues to struggle with construct
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definition and scope (Hofer & Pintrich, 1997; Kitchener, 2002). Given the somewhat
broad scope of literatures reviewed here, it is important to clearly identify the criteria by
which models and studies were chosen for inclusion in this dissertation (Boote & Beile,
2005).
The models of personal epistemology reviewed include those considered most
prevalent in the field. The choice to include Perry’s (1999) model is an easy one, as it is
widely considered the basis of the field itself (Hofer & Pintrich, 1997). From Perry’s
work, numerous models have sprung. These models, such as King and Kitchener’s
(2004), Baxter Magolda’s (2004), and Kuhn’s (Kuhn, Cheney, & Weinstock, 2000) are
included because they are the ones most frequently mentioned in reviews of the area.
Hofer and Pintrich’s (1997) influential review of personal epistemology covered each of
the models mentioned previously in detail, and their subsequent 2002 book included
chapters by each of the researchers as well. In addition, a recent special issue of
Educational Psychologist (2004) included chapters by all of the aforementioned authors
except Kuhn (see Table 1 for a comparison of these models).
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Adapted from Hofer & Pintrich (1997)
a Kuhn’s model varies across different domains, the general pattern is shown here
b Most models concede that only a relatively small percentage of adults ever achieve
these levels of development
Schommer-Aikins’s (2004) model of epistemological beliefs has also been quite
important, appearing in the aforementioned reviews, books, and special issues. In
addition, her model is distinct from the others, positing independent dimensions of
personal epistemology, as opposed to the more monolithic or unidimensional models of
Perry, King and Kitchener, Baxter Magolda, and Kuhn. Schommer-Aikins was also one
of the first to create a pencil-and-paper measure of personal epistemology (Schommer,
1990) and her instrument, or variants of it, has been used in countless studies since then.
This quantitative approach to measuring personal epistemology is distinct from the
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interview-based, qualitative measures used by the other researchers cited previously, and
has both its strengths as well as its challenges. Hofer and Pintrich (1997; Hofer, 2004b)
attempt to both redefine the parameters of the construct of personal epistemology as well
as encompass many of the aforementioned models, thus it is important to review their
model here.
Unfortunately, all of these researchers have struggled with the measurement of
personal epistemology (Wood & Kardash, 2002). For the most part, qualitative
approaches have been used to measure the unidimensional personal epistemology
models. These studies have often involved interview methods with thick description of
those interviews, with some research programs spanning up to 25 years (Baxter Magolda,
2004; King & Kitchener, 2004). While rich in detail, these studies have not connected
personal epistemology to other aspects of education, short of describing how students
struggle with the complexity of learning at the collegiate level. Therefore, given both the
relatively narrow reach of these models into the rest of educational research literature as
well as my belief that the models themselves do not adequately capture the construct, I
will only cover a selection of studies by these authors. Instead, I will focus upon
describing the models and how they inform my work.
I have also decided to limit my review of Schommer-Aikins’s (2004) model to a
select number of studies. Schommer-Aikins’s model, due to both its compelling nature
and the quantitative measure’s ease of administration, has spawned a wealth of studies by
both the Schommer-Aikins and other researchers. Some of these studies have focused on
validating measures of the model, and others have attempted to demonstrate relations
between the model and other educational psychology constructs of interest such as self-
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efficacy (Greene, Azevedo, & Hancock, 2006) and self-regulated learning (Paulsen &
Feldman, 2005). However, there are concerns regarding the reliability and validity of
scores from Schommer-Aikins’ instrument (see Clarebout et al., 2001; Schraw, Bendixen,
& Dunkel, 2002; Wood, Kitchener, & Jensen, 2002). Therefore, my coverage of studies
utilizing Schommer-Aikins’s model and measures will be limited to those that have as
their primary purpose the clarification of the model and the investigation of those
measures. Studies that assume that Schommer-Aikins’s model and measures are
sufficiently validated (e.g., Paulsen & Feldman, 2005) will not be reviewed.
Given that an accurate operational definition of the construct is still a contested
issue, I will review the philosophical literature on epistemology to help clarify meanings
and the scope of the discussion. While a thorough treatment of all of the variants of
epistemological theorizing is beyond the scope of any review in educational psychology,
how philosophers outline the scope and limits of epistemology can help with definitional
issues in the educational psychology literature (Hofer & Pintrich, 1997). In addition,
philosophical thinking regarding the central questions of epistemology will prove helpful
in supporting my decision to focus my psychological investigation of epistemic cognition
upon justification, a process that has received relatively little attention compared to other
dimensions within the psychological literature.
My forays into literature beyond educational psychology also extend into
developmental psychology work on the theory of mind. Chandler and colleagues (2002)
have convincingly established the importance of integrating personal epistemology and
theory of mind research. Again, a thorough summary of the vast theory of mind literature
would require its own full literature review. However, I will summarize this work in
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preparation for both an explanation of how it helps integrate the aforementioned personal
epistemology models as well as how I believe the philosophical literature can be used to
elucidate the measurement of Chandler’s model, which to this point has proven difficult
(Hallet, Chandler, & Krettenauer, 2002).
Thus, the criteria for inclusion and exclusion of studies within this review were
based on the need to provide theoretical and philosophical support for a new model of
epistemic and ontologic cognition tested in this dissertation. Although empirical research
is included, it is not a focus of this review. Instead, my goals are to outline current
problems in the field concerning the definition the construct, the scope of its influence,
how epistemic cognition develops, and the problems researchers have had measuring the
construct and its development, including the issue of domain-generality versus
specificity. I then use key aspects of each area of literature I review to present my own
model, in an attempt to both clarify previous problem-areas in the field as well as provide
new directions for research and understanding. I turn first to a review of Perry, and the
models that most closely follow his work.
Unidimensional Models of Personal Epistemology
William Perry’s Scheme of Intellectual Development
Perry (1999, 1970) developed one of the first models of students’ beliefs about the
nature and origins of knowledge. Perry intentionally called his model a “scheme,” and
termed each division of it a “position” rather than the more common term “stage.” This
choice of nomenclature reflected Perry’s belief that students’ development was dynamic,
and their positionality toward knowledge in a constant state of flux, with only occasional
periods the could loosely be considered “stages.” Based on interviews with mostly male
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Harvard students conducted in the 1960s, Perry and his colleagues developed a model of
intellectual development with four main positions: dualism, multiplicity, relativism, and
commitment to relativism.
Dualists see the world in terms of absolutes (Perry, 1999). Statements are seen as
being either right or wrong, with authority figures as the conveyors of knowledge.
Through hard work and obedience, the dualist believes knowledge can be acquired. The
dualist clings to the belief that knowledge is factual. Students transitioning between
dualism and multiplicity acknowledge that authority figures can disagree, but believe that
those disagreements are either due to confusion or the fact that some key piece of
knowledge has not been discovered yet. The multiplicist has lost faith in authority and
knowledge in general, claiming that all beliefs are equally valid and impossible to either
substantiate or refute. For the multiplist, there are no authority figures. In transitioning to
relativism, the student sees knowledge as contextualized, with subjective but defendable
standards established for evaluating knowledge claims, and these standards may vary
across people or groups. Thus, the relativist acknowledges a role for justification, but
does not see the appeal to authority as sufficient. Finally, a student in the final set of
positions, categorized as “commitment to relativism,” adopts a specific set of standards
for justification and accepts responsibility for evaluating knowledge claims based upon
those standards.
According to Perry, cognitive disequilibrium facilitates movement through these
positions. Much like how it is described in the work of Piaget (1972), Perry believed that
individuals have beliefs about knowledge, and that changes in these beliefs occur due to
disequilibrating experiences. Thus, new experiences are either assimilated into the
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student’s current epistemological position or force an accommodation of that stance.
These accommodations can, over time, accumulate to such a degree that they force
movement from one of Perry’s positions to the next.
Work on Perry’s model continues (see Knefelkamp’s introduction to Perry, 1999
for a review), and includes the incorporation of more diverse samples, more formalized
coding schemes for the interviews used to measure personal epistemology, and greater
clarification of the relativist position as different than the kind of vulgar relativism
eschewed by philosophers and psychologists alike (Gamache, 2002; Williams, 2002).
Perry’s model has also been criticized, in particular its upper positions, which seem to be
less focused on issues of people’s understanding of knowledge and more on emotional
issues like commitment.
Perry’s model has also proven difficult to measure (Hofer & Pintrich, 1997).
Perry found that most college freshmen were dualists, with very few displaying advanced
multiplicity or relativism by the end of the collegiate experience (Perry, 1999). It is
curious that college students do not seem to make much progress through the model
during what is commonly considered a time of tremendous maturation both cognitively
and socially. The seeming failure of college students to develop to more advanced levels
in the model has caused some to question the model’s validity (Chandler et al., 2002).
Nonetheless, the model has spawned a generation of researchers and a multitude of
derivative models. Indeed, it has been said that much of the work done by researchers
following Perry has been nothing more than a renaming or elaboration of his original
positions (Chandler et al., 2002; Hofer & Pintrich, 1997).
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King and Kitchener’s Reflective Judgment Model
King and Kitchener (2004, 1994) began studying Perry’s scheme in graduate
school and from his work developed their model of Reflective Judgment. In their model,
epistemic cognition concerns the limits, certainty, and criteria for knowing. For King and
Kitchener, “epistemic cognition allows the monitoring of problem types and the
evaluation of proposed solutions” (King & Kitchener, 2002, p. 38) including whether a
solution even exists. In particular, King and Kitchener have focused on how late
adolescents’ and adults’ epistemological assumptions influence their judgments regarding
controversial, or ill-structured dilemmas such as whether news reporting is trustworthy
and if nuclear power is a safe form of energy. These situations are ill-structured because
they are designed to be intractable using logic alone, and necessitate that individuals use
other means to determine the most reasonable decision or course of action. King and
Kitchener (2004) say ill-structured problems are defined by two features: they can neither
be defined nor solved with a high degree of certainty. Well-structured problems have
clear answers that can be agreed upon by most if not at all people. Their work has been
applauded for expanding upon Perry’s upper positions (Hofer & Pintrich, 1997).
While there are in fact seven stages in the King and Kitchener model, there are
three overarching levels that provide a sense of its structure (see Table 2).
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Table 2
King & Kitchener’s Model of Reflective Judgment
Stage View of Knowledge Concept of Justification
Prereflective Thinking Absolutely certain,
attainable through direct





Quasireflective Thinking Uncertain, individual Individualistic or context-
specific
Reflective Thinking Constructed, interpretations





The first level, prereflective thinking, is very similar to Perry’s dualism. In the stages
within this level, there is no differentiation of problems into well and ill-structured,
instead, the knower assumes knowledge to be certain and that definitive answers exist for
all questions. At first, justification for knowledge is seen as irrelevant, as people see an
“absolute correspondence” (King & Kitchener, 2004, p. 6) between beliefs and reality.
Development through this level is evidenced by an individual’s acknowledgement that
some beliefs are dependent upon personal opinion. However, people in this level continue
to believe that eventually most opinions will be reconciled through an appeal to an
authority that has direct access to an unchanging reality.
Movement into the second level of King and Kitchener’s model, quasireflective
thinking, comes with the recognition that knowledge is uncertain, and that definitive
answers often do not exist. This is very similar to Perry’s multiplicity position. People in
this level see evidence for justification as either idiosyncratic or context-specific, with
little to guide them in choosing to believe one knowledge claim versus another. Solutions
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to ill-structured problems are seen as completely dependent upon one’s point of view. An
important distinction between prereflective and quasireflective thinking is the source of
justification moving from external authority figures to the individual’s own construction.
In the reflective level, people recognize the contextual and constructed nature of
knowledge. With ill-structured problems, justification for one’s beliefs is created through
an evaluation of different arguments, a determination of the weight of various kinds of
evidence, and an assessment of the effectiveness of the solution. In addition, judgments
are considered tentative, with reevaluation possible depending upon new experience or
information. These people are able to articulate and use their standards of justification to
evaluate knowledge claims while still acknowledging that all knowledge is probabilistic,
not definite. Standards of justification can include testimony from authority, but only
after that authority has been critically evaluated.
Like Perry, King and Kitchener’s model is developmental, with reflective
judgment as the endstate. In King and Kitchener’s research, few individuals beyond
doctoral students have approached this endstate (King & Kitchener, 2004). Movement
through this model occurs as people interact with their surroundings, constructing their
own understandings and meanings that spur change in their epistemological assumptions,
through a process much like cognitive disequilibrium. With each level of the model, the
complexity of thought increases. However, King and Kitchener do not endorse
universality, or applicability of their model across cultures, a common claim of other
developmental theories.
In addition, King and Kitchener purposefully choose to use the term stage, as
opposed to Perry’s term position, to describe the various aspects of their model. They
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argue for a specific interpretation of the word “stage” that allows for both a dominant
stage response as well as responses from adjacent stages coming directly before or after
the dominant in their developmental sequence. They present research (King, Kitchener, &
Wood, 1994) that individuals have both a dominant stage-response as well as a tendency
to respond to some ill-structured problems with a response characteristic of an adjacent
stage. To best capture this, they advocate for an overlapping waves approach, with each
stage’s wave representing the probability of a response indicative of that way of thinking.
However, they do not believe this is evidence of domain-specificity, particularly given
the fact that a high percentage of individuals’ responses to ill-structured problems can be
characterized within one stage. Instead, they call this a complex stage model.
King and Kitchener’s model has mostly been tested using interview methodology.
The Reflective Judgment Interview (RJI) consists of semi-structured questions about
controversial problems such as the accuracy of news reporting. Using the RJI, they have
found that increased age and educational attainment predict higher levels of reflective
judgment (King & Kitchener, 2004). Two interesting findings are that people do not
show differential levels of reflective judgment across types of dilemmas until reaching
graduate school, and that in general social sciences doctoral students displayed higher
levels of reflective judgment than doctoral students in the hard sciences (King &
Kitchener, 2002). Undergraduates have been found to display uniform levels of reasoning
across types of ill-structured problems, and this effect has been consistent across majors.
However, there have been concerns that these studies have not had the statistical power
necessary to find the relations they seek (Wood et al., 2002). In terms of their overlapping
waves approach, King and Kitchener have found that the modal response for individuals
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changed as they expected, showing development over time and education. They had
begun work on a quantitative instrument but, after much research, decided that they could
not “produce an ‘objectively scorable’ [sic] version” of the RJI (Wood et al., 2002, p.
289).
Like Perry and others, King and Kitchener found that most college freshmen
displayed epistemological thinking at the lowest levels, prereflective, with movement into
quasireflective thinking by students’ senior year. Overall effect sizes have been estimated
to be almost one standard deviation from freshman to senior year (Pascarella &
Terenzini, 2005). Criticisms of the model include the finding that only advanced doctoral
students display the highest levels of epistemic cognition, and the researchers’ focus on
ill-structured problems in their measures, as opposed to including well-structured
problems as well (Hofer & Pintrich, 1997). Finally, as with other personal epistemology
models, there has been little research regarding the relations between reflective judgment
and educational outcomes, such as classroom performance and study strategies (Pintrich,
2002).
Baxter Magolda’s Epistemological Reflection Model
Another researcher in personal epistemology whose work derives directly from
Perry is Baxter Magolda (2004). Initially seeking to develop a better measure for Perry’s
model, she became intrigued with differences in responses between men and women,
although her later work has somewhat de-emphasized this gender focus (Baxter Magolda,
2001). Overall her Epistemological Reflection Model (EPM; Baxter Magolda, 1992,
2004) focuses on people’s assumptions regarding the nature, limits, and certainty of
knowledge. According to Baxter Magolda, by constructing meaning from their
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environmental context and experience, individuals form and continually reevaluate their
epistemological assumptions. She views epistemological development as movement from
simplistic to more complex assumptions regarding knowledge, facilitated by the
interaction of those assumptions with experiences in the world. It is important to note that
Baxter Magolda believes epistemological development is directly influenced by a
person’s context, thus some environments prompt movement through ways of knowing
faster than others. Interestingly, she has recently said that she believes undergraduate
education tends to stall students’ development, leaving them stuck in what she calls a
state of transitional knowing (Baxter Magolda, 2004).
Baxter Magolda has developed and refined her model over the course of a 20-year
longitudinal study involving the same small group of students from a mid-Western liberal
arts college. The model includes four “ways of knowing” that are very similar to Perry’s
positions in both content and developmental progression. These ways include absolute
knowers who see knowledge as certain and authority figures as the arbiters of truth,
followed by transitional knowers who begin to doubt authority and the certainty of
knowledge in some contexts, such as the humanities (Baxter Magolda, 2004).
Independent knowers see knowledge as uncertain and no longer trust authority, looking
to themselves as the source of knowledge. This way of knowing is similar to Perry’s
multiplicity, in that the only means of justification seems to be “because I think it’s
right.” Baxter Magolda found that few college students achieved this way of knowing,
and those that did were seniors. Most participants in her longitudinal study entered
independent knowing as a result of work experiences after college. Finally, very few
participants ever became contextual knowers, or those who judge knowledge claims
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based upon their own context and rationality (Baxter Magolda, 2004). These participants
found a balance between their own views and those of others, mirroring Perry’s
relativism and King and Kitchener’s reflective stage.
Recently, Baxter Magolda (2004) has moved toward examining how individuals
construct a personal epistemology that allows for self-authorship, or the ability to learn
from disequilibrating experiences while maintaining a commitment to their own beliefs
and sense of self (Baxter Magolda, 2001, 2003, 2004). For example, a person with a
strong belief in evolution may benefit from discussions with a creationist, but only if that
person is able to balance person commitment and sense of self with an openness to new
ideas. She now views the various ways of knowing as steps toward positioning the self as
the arbiter of right and wrong, while still allowing for the exploration of and learning
from other’s viewpoints. With this understanding comes a commitment to taking
responsibility for one’s beliefs and identity.
Baxter Magolda’s longitudinal study of the same small group of students from
one Mid-Western college is unique in its duration, now at almost 20 years, but has been
criticized as being too focused on a single sample and lacking in methodological diversity
(Hofer & Pintrich, 1997). Its key contributions are in exploring epistemological
development beyond the college years, and recognizing the importance of balancing
personal conviction with openness toward different perspectives.
Kuhn’s Epistemological Thinking Model
Kuhn’s (Kuhn & Weinstock, 2002) model revolves around the basic idea that
epistemological maturity is a balance of objectivity and subjectivity. In the beginning,
children see all knowledge as objective. Then, with development, all knowledge is seen
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as subjective. Finally, the endpoint of development is when knowledge is seen as a
balance between subjectivity and objectivity. This progression is articulated in Kuhn’s
four-level model. Levels are differentiated on four variables: the nature of one’s
assertions, whether reality is knowable, the source and certainty of knowledge, and the
role of critical thinking as means of establishing justification.
For example, children up to about age four are in the first level of Kuhn’s model,
realism, and see assertions as copies of a reality that is directly knowable, where
knowledge is certain and derived from external sources, making critical thinking
unnecessary (see Table 3). For realists, objectivity is the norm. Absolutists, children from
about age 4 through adolescence, still believe that reality is directly knowable and that
knowledge is certain and comes from external sources. However, because absolutists now
see assertions as facts, rather than copies of an external reality, they see critical thinking
as the manner by which disagreements between people can be resolved. Thus, to an
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For the multiplist, everything changes. The multiplist view, generally not seen
until adolescence, contends that assertions are opinions about a reality that is not directly
knowable. Knowledge, previously seen as something external to the knower, becomes
subjective and therefore uncertain. Interestingly, like the realist, multiplists do not value
critical thinking about arguments and positions, but in this case this is because they
believe there are no “correct” answers to be discerned. Finally, the evaluativist sees
reality and knowledge much in the way the multiplist does, but now recognizes that
assertions are judgments based upon critical thinking. This level represents an integration
of the subjective nature of knowing with the objectivity of critical thinking used to
support one’s judgments about that subjective reality. According to Kuhn (1999, Kuhn &
Weinstock, 2002), few individuals actually reach an evaluativist epistemology, with
many remaining in the multiplist level and some even becoming mired in absolutism for
life. As Kuhn has said, the parallels between her model and others’, including Perry, are
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clear (Kuhn & Weinstock, 2002).
One major difference between Kuhn’s model and the ones previously reviewed is
that Kuhn differentiates amongst different areas of knowledge. The scenarios she asks
participants to judge vary from the very subjective, such as taste or aesthetics, to the
seemingly more objective, phenomena she calls physical facts (Kuhn & Weinstock,
2002). The progression from an absolutist to multiplist viewpoint occurs earlier for the
more subjective domains, such as aesthetics, and with time spreads to the more objective
such as physical science. This developmental progression across domains is reversed in
the move from the multiplist level to evaluativist, with the reintegration of objectivity
occurring first with the more objective domains.
Kuhn has used both interview methods and a shorter, more objective instrument
to measure epistemological thinking (Kuhn & Weinstock, 2002). Each measure presents
participants with two viewpoints, and then asks whether only one viewpoint could be
correct or whether both could be true to some degree. This question discriminates
between absolutists and other more adaptive levels. Participants answering that both
could be true to some degree are then asked whether one viewpoint has more merit, to
discriminate between multiplists and evaluativists. The shorter measure includes 15 items
of this sort. Kuhn and colleagues have not attempted to measure realist epistemological
thinking.
Kuhn and colleagues have found that participants with more education are less
likely to score as absolutists, and evaluativist thinking is more common in the domain of
taste than it is in the domain of physical fact. Kuhn’s hypothetical ordering of taste,
aesthetics, values, social facts and physical facts from subjective to objective was
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supported by the data, but the values category did not develop in the predicted manner
(Kuhn, Cheney, & Weinstock, 2000). Specifically, while the other domains developed in
a relatively consistent order in the transition from multiplist to evaluativist, some
participants remained multiplistic when it came to value judgments. Kuhn and colleagues
(2000) suggest that values may be qualitatively different than the other domains.
Nonetheless, across all groups and content areas, evaluativist thinking is not very
common except among the graduate students.
Interestingly, Kuhn has found that participants younger than college age think
predominantly in an absolutist manner in both subjective and objective domains. These
findings have caused others to question whether Kuhn’s measures are accurately
capturing the epistemic cognition of young people (Chander et al., 2002). For example, it
seems unlikely that teenagers would see all knowledge, including such subjective ideas as
the legal drinking age, as certain and deriving from external sources.
In terms of their instruments, in Kuhn and colleagues’ (2000) original study, their
15-item measure was not tested for reliability. Validity was examined by categorizing
individuals using this measure and the longer epistemological interview, with a 73%
agreement. In another study, a panel of seven PhDs in education, science education, and
the history of education were given the measure, and each scored as evaluativists or
multiplists in every domain, as expected (Tabak & Weinstock, 2005). Weinstock and
colleagues (2006), using the instrument with a different sample, found a Cronbach’s ! of
.71. Mason and Boscolo (2004) used this same instrument and found Cronbach’s ! for
the five domains to range from .65 to .90, with three below .7. They did not examine
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construct validity. In all, this measure has shown some evidence of moderate reliability,
but further study is needed to evaluate the validity of scores with different samples.
Kuhn’s model differs from others in that it directly builds from research on
developmental psychology (Carpendale & Chandler, 1996; Flavell et al., 1992) and in its
domain-specificity. In addition, it addresses epistemological thinking from a very early
age through adulthood. Other models of personal epistemology, such as those described
previously, are more focused on young adults and older. Kuhn (1999) makes an
important point, however, that children younger than four, who are realists, are not really
even engaging in epistemological thought. To the realist, “assertions merely duplicate
and reflect reality, they do not need to be evaluated” (Kuhn, 1999, p. 19) making the
question of epistemological thinking at this age “moot” (Kuhn, 1999, p. 19). Therefore, I
assert that any model of epistemic cognition, including the one formed and tested in this
dissertation, need not address the thinking of very young children, as it is not
epistemological in the way that the term is usually used.
Commonalities Among Personal Epistemology Models
These personal epistemology models do have much in common, including Perry
as their inspiration (Chandler et al., 2002; Hofer & Pintrich, 1997). As reviewed
previously, each of the models posits a general developmental sequence from a more
naïve position regarding the nature and source of knowledge to a more mature one where
positions and arguments are evaluated but the knower holds that any knowledge can be
proven incorrect based upon the weight of future evidence. They all cover beliefs about
knowledge’s structure and how individual’s beliefs about it progress from a dualistic,
right or wrong perspective to a more contextualized one. The progression is
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developmental in that the positions come in a set sequence from less to more adaptive.
Research into each of these models has found that students in college start in a very naïve
epistemological state, and show little progress by the end of college. Given that college is
often portrayed as a time of significant change, it is surprising that these authors have
found little development in students’ epistemic cognition. In addition, each of these
models has either depended upon interview methods using trained raters (Baxter
Magolda, 2002; King & Kitchener, 1994) or utilizes measures that have not been
rigorously tested (Kuhn & Weinstock, 2002). As such, the models do not lend themselves
to measuring the effects of interventions (Wood, Kitchener, & Jensen, 2002), and are
subject to concerns regarding interview bias (Hofer & Pintrich, 1997).
Differences Between Personal Epistemology Models
While very similar overall, each of these models does have distinguishing
characteristics. King and Kitchener’s (2004) model has been applauded for elaborating
upon the upper level of Perry’s scheme and focusing upon justification. Baxter
Magolda’s (2004) model has emphasized the individual and his or her growing sense of
self-authorship, or the ability to recognize the self as a legitimate arbiter of justification
claims. In essence, Baxter Magolda’s longitudinal research has given more depth to
others’ claims that relativism is a desired end-state for epistemic cognition. Kuhn and
colleagues’ (2000) model contributes to the personal epistemology literature by
introducing the idea that an individual’s beliefs about knowledge may vary depending
upon the perceived subjectivity of the content area. In fact, Kuhn’s model, with its
acknowledgement of a domain-specificity, can be seen as the most similar to theory of
mind work described later. Before leaving the educational psychology literature,
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however, multidimensional views of personal epistemology must be examined as an
alternative to those previously outlined.
Multidimensional Views of Personal Epistemology
Schommer-Aikins’s Epistemological Beliefs
In a radical departure from unidimensional personal epistemology models,
Schommer-Aikins (Schommer, 1990) proposed that students’ beliefs about knowledge
could not be described using a developmental stage model. Instead, she posited that
personal epistemology was a belief system comprised of five mostly independent
dimensions that could vary asynchronously (Schommer-Aikins, 2004). Three of these
dimensions were directly related to the nature of knowledge, a common theme in
personal epistemology models. In addition, she questioned the scope of these models,
suggesting that personal epistemology be broadened to include two dimensions
concerning beliefs about the nature of learning. She based this assertion upon research
done by both Dweck (Dweck & Leggett, 1988) and Schoenfeld (1983, 1985) whose work
illustrated that beliefs about fixed intelligence and the speed of knowledge acquisition,
respectively, were associated with student performance.
Therefore, Schommer-Aikins’s model can be seen as comprised of two different
categories of beliefs, those pertaining to the nature of knowing, and those pertaining to
the nature of learning (see Table 4). The dimensions categorized under the nature of
knowledge include the notions of certainty, structure, and source of knowledge, whereas
the nature of learning dimensions include student beliefs about ability and how quickly




Schommer-Aikins’s Model of Epistemological Beliefs
Nature of Knowledge Factors Nature of Learning Factors
Certain knowledge Quick learning
Simple knowledge Innate ability
Omniscient authority
The certain knowledge dimension represents beliefs about the stability of
knowledge, with those at the naïve pole believing that facts do not change, while more
sophisticated individuals believe that knowledge is constantly evolving. Beliefs about the
structure of knowledge are represented by the simple knowledge dimension, ranging from
a belief that knowledge is a collection of discrete facts to a view of knowledge as a set of
integrated concepts. Students’ beliefs about the justification of knowledge are captured
with the omniscient authority dimension, ranging from dependence upon authority for
“truth” to a reliance upon empirical evidence. As Schommer-Aikins has said (Schommer,
1990; Schommer-Aikins, 2004), these dimensions can be seen as deriving quite clearly
from Perry’s (1990) work. They are also similar to work on Cognitive Flexibility Theory
(Feltovich, Spiro, & Coulson, 1997; Spiro, Feltovich, & Coulson, 1996) reviewed later.
The nature of learning dimensions, fixed ability and quick learning, are two of
Schommer-Aikins’s additions to the personal epistemology literature. The naïve pole of
the fixed ability dimension represents the belief that intelligence is a trait that is set at
birth, whereas those at the more adaptive pole see it as capable of being improved and
changed. Finally, the quick learning dimension describes students’ beliefs about the
process of learning itself. Those with a naïve viewpoint believe that if they do not learn
some piece of knowledge or procedure within a short period of time, they will not be able
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to learn it at all. Beliefs at the more adaptive end of the continuum allow for the
possibility that learning can be gradual but achievable with effort.
As Schommer-Aikins’s research into her model has progressed, the meanings and
names of some of the dimensions have been altered slightly, but overall her model has
not undergone any radical changes. Perhaps the most substantive theoretical addition
suggested by Schommer-Aikins (2004) is that all personal epistemology research,
including her own, needs to be embedded within research into other psychological
systems. For example, in a recent article (Schommer-Aikins, 2004) she has advocated
studying how her dimensions interact with beliefs about ways of knowing (Belenky,
Clinchy, Goldberger, & Tarule, 1986) and self-regulated learning (Boekaerts, 1995).
Most recent research into her model has focused upon examining how epistemological
beliefs interact with other aspects of cognition and affect, such as ways of knowing
(Schommer-Aikins & Easter, 2006), self-efficacy and self-regulation (Bråten & Stromso,
2005; Greene et al., 2006; Paulsen & Feldman, 2005), to influence academic
performance.
Schommer-Aikins (2004) has stated that the contributions of her model to the
larger personal epistemology literature include her model’s incorporation of the nature of
learning factors, the idea of independent dimensions of epistemological beliefs that
develop asynchronously, and her development of one of the first quantitative measures of
epistemological beliefs. Indeed, Schommer-Aikins’s epistemological questionnaire (EQ;
Schommer, 1990) has proven to be both a means by which Schommer-Aikins can test the
validity of her model as well as a lightning rod for criticism of the model from others.
The lack of construct validity evidence for the instruments designed to test her model
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(Clarebout et al., 2001) has led to some questioning as to whether the underlying model is
an accurate description of epistemological beliefs (Greene et al., 2006).
Research on Epistemological Beliefs
The theoretical argument for Schommer-Aikins’s model has been made through
articles in journals such as Educational Psychologist (Schommer-Aikins, 2004). The
model has also been tested through an examination of the instrument designed to measure
it, the EQ, or some close variant of it (Bendixen & Hartley, 2003; Bråten & Stromso,
2004; Conley, Pintrich, Vekiri, & Harrison, 2004; Elder, 2002; Kardash & Howell, 2000;
Schommer, 1990, 1993; Sinatra & Kardash, 2004; Wood & Kardash, 2002). The
rationale behind these studies is that if the model is an accurate representation of the
dimensions comprising epistemological beliefs, then it should be possible to create an
instrument to measure those latent constructs.
The epistemological questionnaire. Schommer-Aikins designed the EQ to
measure each of the model’s five dimensions. Examples of items from the EQ are
provided in Table 5. Much of the research done on the EQ has investigated both its
factorial and criterion validity. Unfortunately, exploratory and confirmatory factor
analyses of the EQ, along with regression analyses to test its criterion validity, have
produced mixed results (Hofer, 2005; Wood & Kardash, 2002).
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Table 5
Examples of Items from Schommer-Aikins’s Epistemological Questionnaire
1) Most words have one clear meaning.
2) When I study I look for specific facts.
3) I don’t like movies that don’t have an ending.
4) Scientists can ultimately get to the truth.
5) People who challenge authority are over-confident.
6) Self help books are not much help.
7) Successful students learn things quickly.
8) If a person tries too hard to understand a problem, they will most likely just end up
being confused.
**Items from Schommer (1990) page 500.
In an initial study regarding the factor structure and concurrent validity of the EQ,
Schommer (1990) combined individuals’ scores on certain items into item parcels. Item
parcels are created by calculating mean scores on subsets of items and using that score in
the factor analysis, as opposed to the individual item scores. She hypothesized that
certain parcels would load on common factors based upon her epistemological belief
dimensions. Exploratory factor analysis (EFA) techniques showed limited support for
four of the five factors. Three item parcels loaded on the innate ability factor, but one of
these was not hypothesized to do so a priori. The same was true of the simple knowledge
factor. In terms of the quick learning and certain knowledge factors, only one item parcel
loaded on each. Two item parcels hypothesized to load on the quick learning factor did
not, and one hypothesized parcel did not load onto the certain knowledge factor. The
proposed omniscient authority factor was not supported by the EFA. While Schommer-
Aikins interpreted these results as supportive of her model, others have questioned this
conclusion (Clarebout et al., 2001).
In addition, two methodological decisions cast further doubt upon the results of
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this study. First, item parceling during scale construction and validation has been
criticized as it may obscure issues of double-loading and measurement error (Bandalos &
Finney, 2001; Wood & Kardash, 2002). In addition, because only select items were
published, rather than the entire instrument, it was not clear whether the items in these
item parcels had any face validity or sufficient content validity (Hofer & Pintrich, 1997).
Second, because a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was not performed, the construct
validity of the instrument is unclear (DeVellis, 2003). Overall, critics have suggested that
it would have been preferable to perform factor analyses on the items themselves, rather
than composites or subsets, and to use a separate confirmatory sample (Clarebout et al.,
2001; DeVellis, 2003; Pett, Lackey, & Sullivan, 2003; Wood & Kardash, 2002).
Nonetheless, in the same study Schommer (1990) regressed measures of academic
performance on factor scores in an attempt to establish criterion validity. Students high
on the quick learning factor produced more simplistic conclusions in an essay task. In
addition, students scoring high on the certain knowledge factor wrote their essays as if
their conclusions were factual, as opposed to being more subjective. No effect size
information was presented. These results suggest that high scores on these two factors are
associated with academic behaviors that are most likely not beneficial in a collegiate
environment.
A similar study (Schommer, Crouse, & Rhodes, 1992) attempted to replicate the
factors found in the first examination of the EQ as well as use scores on the EQ to predict
text comprehension, again among college students. In this study of the EQ, again using
item parcels, three of the four epistemological belief factors from Schommer-Aikins’s
1990 study were supported in the EFA: simple knowledge, quick learning, and certain
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knowledge. Item parcels did not load on the fourth factor as anticipated, so it was
renamed from innate ability to externally controlled learning. Using accepted metrics at
that time (Bollen, 1989), there was reasonable data-model fit for a CFA of these four
factors; it is not clear, however, whether or not the CFA was performed on a sample
separate from the one on which the initial exploratory work was done. If not, then it is
possible that both the EFA and the CFA findings were the result of chance relations in the
data (DeVellis, 2003).
In a second aspect of the 1992 study, aimed at providing evidence of the EQ’s
concurrent validity, Schommer and colleagues (1992) performed regression path analysis
using scores on the EQ factors and found that the simple knowledge factor had both
direct and indirect effects (mediated by test preparation) on exam performance, with a
total effect of -.19 (Schommer et al., 1992). Unfortunately, the measures of test
performance had low internal consistency reliability (Cronbach’s ! for the two measures
were .66 and .56), calling into question these results.
Some research into the EQ’s predictive and concurrent validity (Schommer,
Calvert, Gariglietti, & Bajaj, 1997; Schommer-Aikins & Hutter, 2002) has used
exploratory regression procedures such as forward selection. This practice has been
criticized as being too dependent upon data rather than theory (e.g., Pedhazur, 1997). In
essence, exploratory regression procedures are more likely to result in Type I errors due
to capitalizing upon chance relations in the data. Looking beyond this concern, the 1997
study found that the only epistemological belief that predicted students’ GPA was quick
learning, with an R2 of .06 for one cohort and .24 for another. In the 2002 study, only the
simple knowledge and certain knowledge factors had a statistically significant
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relationship with participants’ beliefs about a controversial issue, in this case whether
men and women differ in their communication styles. The R2 for these relationships were
all below .1.
The EQ has also been tested with non-collegiate populations, such as high-school
students (Schommer, 1993). Results showed support for the simple knowledge, certain
knowledge and quick learning factors, but the item parcels hypothesized to load on the
fourth factor did not do so. Consequently, this fourth factor was renamed from externally
controlled learning to fixed ability. Using forward selection to regress GPA on factor
scores, statistically significant results were found for all four subscales; unfortunately, the
R2 were all below .07, with two below .01. Such small effect sizes could be due in part to
the low internal consistency reliability alpha estimates for the subscales with these
participants, which ranged from .51 to .78.
While the aforementioned study examined the EQ and high-school students,
another study tested the factor structure of the EQ with 1,200 middle-school students
(Schommer-Aikins, Brookhart, Hutter, & Mau, 2000). For this study, the EQ was reduced
to 30 items. While four factors were hypothesized, CFA results produced evidence for
only three factors: certain knowledge, quick learning, and fixed ability. In addition, the
correlation between quick learning and fixed learning was .96, suggesting a possible lack
of discriminant validity between these latent constructs (Byrne, 1994). Again, the
researchers regressed GPA on the three factors using forward selection, and found
statistically significant results for fixed ability and quick learning. No effect size
information was reported.
Other researchers have attempted to modify the EQ to improve upon its
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psychometric qualities. Jehng and colleagues (Jehng, Johnson, & Anderson, 1993)
created their own items to measure the five dimensions in Schommer-Aikins’s model,
although they altered the simple knowledge dimension to be more reflective of beliefs
about the orderly progression of knowledge. The authors assessed the content validity of
the items by having them reviewed by educational psychology professors. Unfortunately,
survey results with students revealed factor reliabilities of .42 to .59, even after the
removal of ineffective items. Given that a measure cannot be valid without being reliable,
these findings provide more evidence that there are legitimate concerns about the validity
of scores from the EQ or measures derived from it.
In another study, Conley and colleagues (2004) adapted Elder’s (2002) variation
of the EQ for fifth grade students. They studied change in epistemological beliefs over
time in a hands-on science classroom. Their CFA, utilizing the actual items and not item
parcels, showed an adequate fit for a four-factor model including the source, certainty,
development, and justification of knowledge constructs. However, there was a lack of
discriminant validity between the source and certainty factors. On the two factors that did
show good discriminant validity, development and justification of knowledge, students
did not show any statistically significant pre- to post-test gains after controlling for initial
achievement levels among students. Therefore, while this study is encouraging for its use
of confirmatory methods, its results are somewhat limited in terms of their
interpretability.
Wood and Kardash (2002) have attempted to establish the factorial validity of
variants of the EQ by analyzing items rather than item parcels. They used principal axis
factoring to analyze items from both the EQ as well as Jehng’s version epistemological
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questionnaire (Jehng et al., 1993). Unfortunately, even when combining the best items
from both measures, Wood and Kardash only managed to extract 22.05% of the variance,
and only their Speed of Knowledge factor explained more than 4% of the variance in
college students’ GPA. This suggests that the underlying constructs were not measured
well by their indicator items. In their work, Wood and Kardash (2002) suggested that
other variables might be accounting for the relation between epistemological beliefs and
student self-reported GPA such as general verbal ability or need for cognition (Cacioppo,
Petty, Feinstein, & Jarvis, 1996).
Thus, the results of various exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses of the
EQ, along with regression analyses to test its criterion validity, have been negative to
mixed (Hofer, 2005; Wood & Kardash, 2002). The innate ability and simple knowledge
factors have shown the most consistency in terms of a priori item parcel loadings and
EFA results (Clarebout et al., 2001). However, the factorial validity of the EQ remains in
question, as the other proposed factors have not been replicated across studies (Bråten &
Stromso, 2005; Kardash & Sholes, 1996; Schommer, 1992, 1993; Wood & Kardash,
2002). In addition, it is unfortunate that many studies utilizing the EQ fail to perform any
CFA to test whether the model holds for that particular sample (Hofer, 2000). While there
have been some statistically significant relations found between certain factors and
academic outcomes, the small effect sizes have called into question their practical utility.
Therefore, the concurrent validity of the EQ has also not been established. The reliability
of these measures of epistemological beliefs have either been low or not been reported,
and numerous researchers have suggested that this needs to be addressed (Schommer-
Aikins, 2004; Wood & Kardash, 2002). Indeed, in most studies with reliability
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information regarding the EQ, the factor scores have had Cronbach alphas below the
common standard of .7 (Schommer, 1990, 1992; Schommer-Aikins, Duell, & Barker,
2002).
The epistemic belief inventory. Another group of researchers created the
Epistemic Belief Inventory (EBI; Bendixen, Schraw, & Dunkle, 1998; Schraw, Bendixen,
& Dunkle, 2002) in an attempt to address these issues concerning the reliability and
validity of scores using the EQ. The EBI was designed to measure the five factors first
outlined in Schommer’s (1990) model of epistemological beliefs. The EBI combined
some questions from the EQ with many newly created items. Analyses of the EBI’s
factorial validity used EFA techniques with the items, as opposed to parcels. Acceptable
levels of reliability (test-retest correlations ranged from .62 to .81) and factorial validity
for the theory’s five factors (simple knowledge, certain knowledge, innate ability, quick
learning, and omniscient authority) were found with undergraduate students.
Unfortunately, CFA techniques were not used to cross-validate the EBI. Summed factor
scores on the EBI did predict reading comprehension, but the R2 were all below .04,
providing weak support for concurrent validity. Other research on the EBI has found
acceptable CFA fit, but the measure’s reliability and variance extracted were both below
common metrics (Greene et al., 2006). This implies that the measure is still not
adequately capturing the constructs it purports to measure.
Summary of measures of epistemological beliefs. In general, measures of
epistemological beliefs have been plagued by a number of concerns. First, much of the
early research involved using item parcels in exploratory factor analysis to investigate
factorial validity. This approach does not investigate whether the items that make up the
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parcels are indeed valid indicators of the construct or the parcel, and thus parceling items
is not recommended when investigating an instrument’s validity (Bandalos & Finney,
2001; Hofer, 2000). While later work utilized confirmatory factor analysis methods with
the items themselves, there remain serious concerns about the stability of the factors
across studies, the lack of common variance to be extracted in the measures, and
reliability of these measures (Clarebout et al., 2001; Greene et al., 2006; Wood &
Kardash, 2002).
In addition, predictive validity evidence has been weak, with most effect sizes
small, or in some cases, nearly non-existent. It is perhaps not surprising that effect sizes
for the predictive validity of epistemological beliefs have been small given the lack of
reliability in the factors (Greene et al., 2006). Low reliability in dependent variables can
cause a reduction in power. More concerning, however, is the fact that many studies
utilize measures of epistemological beliefs as independent variables. Independent
variables with low reliability not only decrease the power of the analyses, they can also
bias the estimates of relations between the variables (Pedhazur, 1997). This may be why
factor relations seem to vary between studies. While taking a structural equation
modeling approach to the investigation of these relations would disattenuate the error in
these measures, ultimately if the items are not adequate indicators of the constructs, no
amount of statistical manipulation will ameliorate this problem (Greene et al., 2006).
Finally, it is questionable as to whether criterion validity can be demonstrated utilizing
GPA or exam performance as outcome variables, as is often attempted. These measures
are almost assuredly influenced by numerous additional factors such as motivation,
interest, and domain-specific means of testing. In particular, the domain-general approach
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adopted by Schommer-Aikins has been criticized as too large a grain size for adequate
analysis.
Theoretical Criticisms of the Epistemological Beliefs Model
These criticisms of the EQ and associated instruments have often been
accompanied by concerns about the underlying model as well (Hofer & Pintrich, 1997;
Wood & Kardash, 2002). Authors have questioned the model’s claims of domain-
generality as well as its inclusion of the nature of learning dimensions, quick learning and
fixed ability.
Domain generality versus domain specificity. Perry (1970, 1999) acknowledged
that at any one time a student could be in different positions regarding different academic
content areas, although he did maintain that there was a dominant position exerting
influence over much of the student’s interpretations. This belief in the domain-generality
of personal epistemology is also found in the work of the more stage-like approaches
(King & Kitchener, 2004; Baxter Magolda, 2004). While Schommer-Aikins’s model of
epistemological beliefs allows for independent development amongst the five
dimensions, it does not allow for broad differences on those dimensions by domain.
To test this hypothesis, Schommer and Walker (1995) instructed college students
to fill out the EQ twice, once while thinking about the items in terms of math and another
time thinking in terms of the social sciences. They found that correlations between
epistemological belief factors across domains were higher than cross-belief correlations,
and used this as evidence of the domain independence of the model.
Schommer-Aikins and colleagues (2002) also claimed to have found evidence
supporting the domain-generality of epistemological beliefs. In this study, they asked
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college students to fill out the EQ three times, each time thinking about either math,
social science, and business. They found that epistemological beliefs between math and
the social sciences were highly correlated, as were beliefs between math and business.
They use this as evidence to support their claim that epistemological beliefs are
“moderately domain general” (Schommer et al., 2002, p. 360).
However, other researchers (Buehl & Alexander, 2001, 2005; Buehl, Alexander,
& Murphy, 2002; Hofer, 2000) have challenged the findings of both of the studies
reviewed. Hofer (2000) points out that despite asking students to think about different
domains, many of the items on the EQ, such as “I don’t like movies that don’t have an
ending,” are not related to academic domains at all. Buehl and colleagues (2001, 2002)
concur, and note that academic domains have often been separated into discrete
categories such as well-structured or ill-structured. The use of the term “structured”
certainly suggests that academicians have differentiated domains along epistemological
lines. In general, Donald (1990), by interviewing professors, provided evidence that the
criteria used in establishing validation differ across academic domains. In the pure
sciences, empirical evidence and the use of counterexamples were more often used to
establish justification. In the humanities, peer review was more often cited as evidence
for validation.
In terms of student beliefs, Stodolsky and colleagues (Stodolsky, Salk, &
Glaessner, 1991) found that fifth graders saw social studies and math differently,
believing the latter to be more objective, whereas the former was seen as less clearly
defined. These student beliefs suggest different means of justification for each area.
Torney-Purta (1994) argues that the complexity and thoroughness of the narrative is an
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important measure of justification in social studies and history because the problems are
ill structured, with numerous potential solutions. She found that students often over-
simplified complex forces and relations in political science and history into narratives
about important historical figures and their presumed mental states. This led to students
justifying beliefs as knowledge based upon those beliefs’ congruence with these
simplistic characterizations. This work aligns with that of Carretero and colleagues
(1994), who argue that a mature understanding of historical processes requires attending
to both the personal or narrative aspects of history as well as the political, economic, and
social aspects. Clearly the standards by which knowledge can be claimed to be justified
true belief differ by domain for both experts and students.
Domain-specificity has also been studied empirically. In a study based upon four
of Schommer’s (1990) dimensions (all but omniscient authority), Buehl and colleagues
(2002) examined whether students’ epistemological beliefs varied across the domains of
math and history. After an extensive item design and analysis process, two factors were
found through EFA and CFA cross-validation: need for effort and integration of
information and problem solving. These two factors differed by domain, leading to a total
of four factors in the analysis. This four-factor model did have good CFA fit according to
Hu and Bentler’s (1999) joint criteria. To test the hypothesis of domain-specificity, the
authors compared the fit of this model to a model with only two domain-general factors.
They found the four-factor model had a better fit and the chi-square difference test
between the two models was statistically significant, indicating that the four-factor model
was superior to the two-factor one. Further support for the domain-specificity hypothesis
came in the form of a repeated measures MANOVA showing that participants’
59
epistemological beliefs statistically significantly differed by domain.
Of course, it may be that epistemological beliefs have both domain-specific and
domain-general qualities. In another study, Buehl and Alexander (2005) used a variation
of Hofer’s (2000) instrument to assess whether students clustered into distinct groups
based upon their epistemological beliefs. They also examined whether these clusters were
different across the domains of history and math. They found that four distinct clusters of
epistemological beliefs could be identified in each domain. The cluster profiles were not
comparable across domains. However, when the authors categorized those clusters as
either naïve or adaptive, they found a statistically significant correlation with a medium
effect size. This suggests that while students’ domain-specific epistemological beliefs can
vary, there may be an overarching general level of sophistication that restricts this
variance.
What is to be made of these conflicting findings? Schommer-Aikins has found
evidence of domain-generality using her instrument. Yet others (Buehl et al., 2002; Buehl
& Alexander, 2005; Hofer, 2000) have found evidence of domain-specificity using
Schommer-Aikins’s measure as well as instruments designed by the authors. Finally,
more recent research has shown that epistemological beliefs may be distinct across
domains, but have some domain-general similarities as well (Buehl & Alexander, 2005).
It is difficult to make any firm statements regarding this issue given that the studies have
been conducted with different instruments, measured different proposed latent factors,
and varied in their analyses. Nonetheless, at this time it would seem unwise to state
unequivocally that epistemological beliefs are domain-general. Based upon the
epistemological beliefs literature alone, however, the degree of domain-specificity, and
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its nature, remains unclear.
Nature of learning dimensions. While Schommer-Aikins is not alone in positing a
domain-general model of personal epistemology (Baxter Magolda, 2004; King &
Kitchener, 2004; Kuhn & Weinstock, 2002), she is unique in suggesting that beliefs about
intelligence and learning are part of personal epistemology (Schommer-Aikins, 2004).
Schommer-Aikins calls these the nature of learning beliefs, and they include the
dimensions quick learning and fixed ability. While some have questioned the factorial
validity of measures of these beliefs (Clarebout et al., 2001), others have challenged the
inclusion of these constructs based upon theoretical arguments (Hofer & Pintrich, 1997).
Schommer-Aikins’s (2004) response to this has been to both defend the inclusion of the
nature of learning factors while at the same time de-emphasizing their connection to the
nature of knowledge factors through her embedded systemic model of epistemological
beliefs (see Figure 1). In this model, culture is shown as an influence upon both the























I believe Hofer and Pintrich are correct to question the nature of learning factors
on theoretical grounds. Certainly the lack of evidence for factorial validity of the fixed
ability dimension (Clarebout et al., 2001) provides little empirical support for its
inclusion. In terms of the quick learning dimension, I question its epistemological status
based upon a review of the philosophical literature on epistemology, described later.
Summary of Epistemological Beliefs Model
Schommer-Aikins’s (2004) model has made significant contributions to the study
of personal epistemology. The model was the first to suggest that there are multiple,
independent epistemological beliefs. In addition, Schommer-Aikins developed one of the
first quantitative measures of personal epistemology, and the number of studies that have
used this instrument illustrates its influence upon the field. However, I do concur with the
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psychometric criticisms of the instruments that purport to measure epistemological
beliefs. I also question Schommer-Aikins’s nature of learning factors, and her claims of
domain-generality. Each of these criticisms suggests that Schommer-Aikins’s model may
not be an adequate description of epistemological beliefs. These are all points first
brought up by Hofer and Pintrich (1997), whose model I turn to next.
Hofer and Pintrich’s Epistemological Theories
Hofer and Pintrich (1997) produced what many consider to be the definitive
review of personal epistemology models. Both their 1997 article and subsequent 2002
book cover the major theories as well as methodological issues. One of the goals of these
publications has been to attempt to provide some structure and direction for future
research. Perhaps as a further means of establishing this structure, Hofer and Pintrich
have developed their own model, called epistemological or epistemic theories (1997;
Hofer, 2004b), that attempts to bring together the best of the models along with their own
thinking regarding issues such as construct definition, model scope, development, and
domain-specificity.
Construct Definition and Model Scope
Hofer and Pintrich (1997) point out that while definitions may vary, the constructs
posited in most models of personal epistemology can be classified as either referring to
the nature of knowledge or the nature of knowing. It is also important to note what is not
included in Hofer and Pintrich’s model. While it includes many aspects of personal
epistemology theories, it does not include the nature of learning factors that Schommer-
Aikins (2004) has claimed as a major contribution of her model. Hofer and Pintrich
(1997) disagree with Schommer-Aikins:
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It is not clear if beliefs about learning, intelligence, and teaching should be
considered as central components of epistemological beliefs…they do not
explicitly deal with the nature of knowledge or knowing in terms of how
knowledge is defined or justified…it seems to us that the domain of
epistemological beliefs should be limited to individuals’ beliefs about knowledge
as well as reasoning and justification processes regarding knowledge. (p.116).
However, Hofer and Pintrich do seem to draw some inspiration from Schommer-
Aikins’s (Schommer, 1990) model. First, they propose a multidimensional model, as
opposed to a monolithic one. Second, under their nature of knowledge category, they
include two dimensions that utilize Schommer-Aikins’s terms: simplicity of knowledge
and certainty of knowledge. Simplicity of knowledge is conceptualized as a continuum
ranging from the theory that knowledge is comprised of separate, understandable facts to
a relativistic view of knowledge, dependent upon context. In terms of the certainty of
knowledge dimension, this ranges from a faith in the absolute, unchanging nature of
knowledge to the more advanced perspective that knowledge is dynamic and defeasible.
Under their nature of knowing category, Hofer and Pintrich include two
dimensions: the source of knowing and the justification for knowing. For the source of
knowing dimension, naïve individuals see knowledge as external, deriving from
authority. As such they see themselves as incapable of generating knowledge. The more
advanced position on this dimension involves seeing knowledge as a construction of the
knower. Finally, the justification of knowing dimension concerns how individuals
determine what beliefs qualify as knowledge. This dimension, it can be argued, is the
least well-developed of the four, as Hofer and Pintrich (1997) do not elaborate upon it
beyond a reprisal of Perry’s general positions: “As individuals learn to evaluate evidence
and to substantiate and justify their beliefs, they move through a continuum of dualistic
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beliefs to the multiplistic acceptance of opinions to reasoned justification for beliefs” (p.
120). Hofer (2004b) does expand this definition: “this dimension has been described as
ranging from justification based on observation or authority (when knowledge is
perceived as certain) or on the basis of what feels right (when knowledge is perceived as
uncertain) to the use of rules of inquiry and the evaluation of expertise” (p. 46). It is
intriguing to note that in this definition, Hofer seems to recapitulate the general dualistic
to relativistic progression of Perry (1999) while also conflating this explanation with
aspects of her source and certainty of knowledge factors. I would argue that in each of the
models of personal epistemology presented thus far, the justification of knowledge aspect
has been least developed. This is ironic given that within philosophical epistemology,
justification can be seen as the central question (see below; Pollock & Cruz, 1999;
Williams, 2001).
Hofer (2004b) provides a further context for the model. Just as Schommer-Aikins
(2004) has attempted to outline how her model of epistemological beliefs related to other
constructs in educational psychology, Hofer attempts to position the model of epistemic
theories. Specifically, she claims that the model is metacognitive, with the nature of
knowledge dimensions influencing the acquisition and utilization of strategies, task
definition, and beliefs about the self and context. For example, students with naïve views
regarding the certainty and simplicity of knowledge may not choose to acquire advanced
study strategies, believing that simple memorization is sufficient. She sees the nature of
knowing dimensions as influencing metacognitive judgments and monitoring. In this
case, beliefs about the source of knowledge may influence whether an individual
questions a teacher, while justification beliefs would seem to provide a way for
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individuals to evaluate the claims of others.
Development
In terms of how these epistemic theories develop, Hofer (2004b) seems to
embrace a process similar to other personal epistemology theories, suggesting that
students move from more naïve positions to more advanced ones in a loose-stage manner.
She differs from other personal epistemology researchers by acknowledging that
epistemological development can begin prior to the college years. She argues that young
children are sometimes forced to decide whom they believe when confronted with adults
presenting discrepant views. However, she does not clearly state at what ages these stages
might occur, or what developmental milestones might need to be passed before
movement into the stage.
Domain-specificity
It is unclear whether Hofer and Pintrich’s (1997) model is domain-general or
domain-specific. They do review both alternatives, and then cite numerous works
suggesting that domain-specificity might be conceptualized as being specific to general
academic areas, such as math or history.
Hofer (2000) developed a measure called the Discipline-Focused Questionnaire
(DFC) that was intended to measure the nature of knowledge and nature of knowing
factors outlined in her previous work (Hofer & Pintrich, 1997). This measure was also
designed to be adaptable to different domains, utilizing items such as “In this field,
knowledge is certain.” Undergraduates filled out one form with the items referring to
psychology, and then another form with the items referring to science. Separate EFAs for
the items on each form revealed a common four-factor solution for both of the domains.
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The nature of knowledge dimensions were hypothesized to be orthogonal, but the results
supported combining these two factors. The other factors were justification for knowing,
source of knowledge, and attainability of truth. Cronbach ! reliabilities for five of the
eight factors (four per domain) were below .7. In terms of the research question regarding
disciplinary differences in epistemological beliefs, Hofer found that there were
statistically significant differences between each of the factor means for psychology and
science. While the factors were correlated across disciplines, the correlations were
moderate, ranging from .29 to .53. In addition, results from a repeated measures
multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) showed that students’ beliefs differed
across domains for each factor. Hofer claims these results provide evidence supporting
the domain-specificity of epistemological beliefs.
Hofer (2004b) also examined whether students’ behaviors during online searching
differed according to their degree of familiarity with the content. The implication would
be that students with more experience in an area would have a higher level of domain-
specific epistemic cognition. While she did find support for this hypothesis, only the most
advanced students displayed this type of domain-specific difference in epistemic
cognition. Many students majoring in the topic being searched did not utilize more
advanced search strategies, suggesting they were not engaging in domain-specific
epistemic cognition.
Summary
Hofer and Pintrich’s (1997) work illustrates a number of things. First, their model
demonstrates that many of the personal epistemology models can be combined without
too great a loss of fidelity. Second, they provide a theoretical argument against
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classifying Schommer-Aikins’s (2004) nature of learning dimensions as epistemological.
Third, while it is as of yet not well-developed, Hofer’s (2004b) statement that epistemic
cognition most likely develops in secondary school or earlier is an important one.
Theories that posit otherwise are subject to scrutiny, as Chandler and colleagues (2002)
discuss. Hofer and Pintrich’s inclusion of justification, as ill defined as it is, represents an
important step toward acknowledging the philosophical literature on epistemology.
Finally, Hofer (2004b) presents some evidence that personal epistemology may be
domain-specific. However, I argue that there is more to be learned from the philosophical
study of epistemology, and that each of the models reviewed could benefit from these
lessons.
Philosophical Critiques of Psychological Studies of Epistemology
Hofer (2004a) has questioned whether psychologists’ appropriation of terms from
philosophy has led to some level of ambiguity and lack of precision. Others (Buehl &
Alexander, 2001; Kitchener, 2002; Murphy, 2003) question whether psychological work
regarding personal epistemology has strayed too far from the work of philosophical
epistemologists in ways beyond nomenclature. A review of philosophical epistemology
can help clarify meanings in psychology and shed light upon controversies in personal
epistemology. After a general review of philosophical epistemology, I suggest that
definitions in personal epistemology research should be clarified. In so doing, the
controversy regarding Schommer-Aikins’s (2004) nature of learning factors can be
addressed. I believe an examination of philosophical epistemology can also illustrate why
it is important to take a close look at other constructs in personal epistemology research,
and separate those that are truly epistemological from those that deal more with ontology.
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This will allow for a more internally consistent definition of personal epistemology and
help resolve several key disputes in the field. I also demonstrate how an examination of
philosophical skepticism can help illuminate concerns regarding domain-general views of
personal epistemology.
Philosophical Epistemology
A description of philosophical epistemology is necessary to understand how it can
inform the personal epistemology research in educational psychology. The study of
epistemology itself is a philosophical inquiry into the proper means by which humans can
justify knowledge qua knowledge (Pollock & Cruz, 1999; Williams, 2001). For example,
one common problem in epistemology is how one can know that something is green, i.e.
how can one be sure of “greenness” in the sense of knowing it? This seemingly simple
question is actually quite complex, with many facets that have yet to be satisfactorily
answered despite being studied at least since the days of Plato (Williams, 2001).
First, it is important to identify how epistemologists answer the question “What is
knowledge?” (Williams, 2001, p. 1). This question has to do with the scope or limits of
knowledge. Philosophers suggest that certain kinds of beliefs, due to their very nature,
cannot be classified as knowledge. Williams lists opinion and faith as two examples.
Pollock and Cruz (1999) claim that another area of interest to psychologists, morality, is
not a fit subject for epistemological theory, as it is not clear that there are moral truths to
be ascertained. One thing that is important to note here is that when philosophers ask the
question “What is knowledge” they are not asking about its form, i.e. whether it is simple
or complex, certain or changing, as some educational psychologists do. Rather, they are
asking whether a differentiation can be made between knowledge and other kinds of
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beliefs.
The second relevant question is how philosophers actually go about
differentiating knowledge from other kinds of beliefs. A simple view of the theory of
knowledge would be based upon the question “How do you know?” but in actuality the
question is more accurately stated as “What justifies you in believing?” (Pollock & Cruz,
1999, p. 12). In essence, epistemology deals with how one can be justified in claiming
something as knowledge, as opposed to belief.
Until the early 1960s, most epistemologists agreed that for a belief to be elevated
to the status of knowledge it had to meet three conditions: it had to be justified, true, and
believed (see Pollock & Cruz, 1999 for a review). While the truth and belief conditions
have sparked little controversy, there has been much debate regarding the justification
condition. Philosophers’ focus on justification as opposed to the other conditions comes
from the fact that few would argue that knowledge qua knowledge must in fact be true
and the person must actually believe it to be true to claim knowledge. The truth condition
requires consistency in thought: “You know that all college professors are brilliant only if
it is true that all college professors are brilliant. If there is one dull college professor, you
do not know that all college professors are brilliant. Knowledge thus has a truth
requirement” (Moser & vander Nat, 2003, p. 6). The belief condition works similarly, as
it does not make sense to assert knowledge if one does not believe it to be the case. Thus,
differences regarding satisfactory means of justification lie at the heart of most variants
of philosophical epistemology (Murphy, Alexander, Greene, & Edwards, 2007), with
concerns regarding this condition being voiced by Gettier (1963).
The justified true belief conditions for knowledge persisted until Gettier (1963)
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provided examples that illustrated that in some cases individuals can have a justified true
belief, yet still fall short of having what a reasonable person would consider
“knowledge.” For example, John could be told by a reliable source that another person,
Bob, is going to get be audited by the IRS. In addition, John may know that Bob lives
down the street from him in Maryland. Therefore, John would be justified in this true
belief: “The person who is going to be audited lives in Maryland.” However, suppose
that, in fact, John is being audited, not Bob. According to the justified true belief
conditions, John’s statement “The person who is going to be audited lives in Maryland”
is knowledge because it does qualify as a justified true belief, but we would be hesitant to
grant John’s statement that honorific. John has what some would call “lucky” knowledge
(Williams, 2001), and this demonstrates that the justified true belief conditions do not
seem to be enough to properly define what we intuitively believe knowledge to be.
Further conditions seem necessary.
The problem of lucky knowledge initially seemed to be a minor one, but has
proven quite intractable (Pollock & Cruz, 1999; Williams, 2001). For every alteration to
the justified true belief conditions that excludes an example like the one presented
previously, a new example can be formed that defeats the alteration. In modern
epistemology, one way theories differ is in how they attempt to bolster the justification
condition to withstand Gettier’s “lucky” knowledge. The debate continues as to which
theories are most successful at excluding lucky knowledge (Pollock & Cruz, 1999). In
addition, there are those who claim there is no solution to the problems with the
justification condition, a stance called skepticism.
This discussion of the general form of philosophical epistemology outlines some
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key points. First, it highlights that philosophical epistemology focuses upon what beliefs
can be claimed to be knowledge, and not whether that knowledge is simple or certain, as
many educational psychologists do. As others have stated (Murphy, 2003), by more
closely following these definitions and ideas within philosophical epistemology, it may
be possible to resolve some of the construct definition problems in found in personal
epistemology research. This will prove important later in terms of identifying relevant
constructs in my model of epistemic and ontologic cognition. Second, it illustrates the
importance of justification in epistemology. Finally, it introduces the idea of skepticism,
and its relation to justification. An understanding of skepticism and its refutation will also
prove useful in examining the domain-generality versus specificity controversy in
personal epistemology research.
Definitions in Personal Epistemology
The definitions and terms used in personal epistemology can cause confusion.
Authors tend to use slightly different terms to describe similar constructs, such as
epistemological beliefs (Schommer-Aikins, 2004) and epistemological theories (Hofer &
Pintrich, 1997). However, there are also more serious concerns regarding construct
definitions. The actual term “epistemological” carries with it a specific interpretation that
does not seem to align with its use in the field of educational psychology. In addition,
even within educational psychology, there are disagreements about what constitutes
“epistemological” beliefs or factors. I believe that utilizing definitions more in line with
those from philosophy suggests that the nature of learning factors are not
epistemological. Finally, I assert that many of the constructs in personal epistemology are
in fact ontological in nature. Each of these issues will be described next.
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Theories of Knowledge
Kitchener (2002) believes the term personal epistemology is a misnomer. First
and foremost, if epistemology is a “theory of knowledge” (Kitchener, 2002, p. 92) then
the term personal epistemology implies that each individual has an articulated theory
regarding what is and is not knowledge. The term “epistemological beliefs” implies that
people have beliefs about the theory of knowledge. To argue that adults and children have
a theory of knowledge is to argue that all people are philosophers, and a review of
philosophical epistemology reveals that thinking in this area is not typical of the average
adult or child. Kitchener is not at all convinced that adults, let alone children, have
specific beliefs or theories regarding knowledge. Instead, Kitchener argues that people
engage in epistemic cognition, or thoughts about knowledge. I agree with Kitchener
(2002) that the terms “personal epistemology” and “epistemological beliefs” are
misnomers. Therefore, in my model I will use the term epistemic cognition to illustrate
that its focus is upon thinking about knowledge, and that this thinking may or may not
occur at a conscious level.
Nature of Learning
Hofer and Pintrich (Hofer & Pintrich, 1997; Pintrich, 2002) have questioned
whether certain dimensions proposed by educational psychology researchers are actually
“epistemological.” In particular, they have questioned Schommer-Aikin’s (2004) nature
of learning dimensions. As I have shown in the discussion of the general form of
epistemology, the philosophical literature (Pollock & Cruz, 1999; Williams, 2001) has
little to say about learning and its nature. Therefore, I assert that whatever Schommer-
Aikins’s (2004) factors of innate ability and quick learning are measuring, they are not
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“epistemological” and as such should not be included in the study of personal
epistemology. This does not mean that they are not important, but rather that they are
mis-categorized, and researchers’ continued attempts to force the nature of learning
constructs under the umbrella of epistemology is hampering an understanding of both. I
would argue that the nature of learning factors are related to epistemology in the same
way that other educational psychology constructs such as self-efficacy are related: as
covariates with which epistemological beliefs are to be studied.
Epistemology versus Ontology
Just as there is limited discussion of learning in the philosophical epistemology
literature, there is also little discussion of the nature of knowledge as described by Hofer
and Pintrich (1997). Hofer and Pintrich describe two aspects of the nature of knowledge:
certainty and simplicity. The certainty of knowledge deals with “the degree to which one
sees knowledge as fixed or more fluid” (Hofer & Pintrich, 1997, p. 119-120). Simplicity
refers to a continuum where “the lower-level view of knowledge is as discrete, concrete,
knowable facts; at higher levels individuals see knowledge as relative, contingent, and
contextual” (Hofer & Pintrich, 1998, p. 120). Yet, as discussed previously, philosophical
epistemology is concerned with how one goes about justifying knowledge qua
knowledge, and not with the characteristics of that knowledge (Pollock & Cruz, 1999;
Williams, 2001). What I think personal epistemology researchers want to capture with
these nature of knowledge constructs is the idea that people come to recognize that
academic domains are complex, and that our understanding of them changes over time.
These ideas are not epistemological, however. If anything, this understanding is more
about the ontology of those domains, i.e. about the features of the domain and the
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relations between those features (Pollock & Cruz, 1999). The philosophical area of
metaphysics includes both epistemology, the study of how one can justify a claim as
knowledge, as well as ontology, or the categories of existence and their relations. When
psychologists question whether young children recognize that knowledge in history is an
ill-structured domain, or a complex web of assertions and viewpoints with no objectively
“correct” answer, they are questioning children’s ability ontologic understanding. These
are questions about the nature of those domains themselves, not how beliefs about those
domains are justified. A complete review of ontology is well beyond the scope of this
dissertation, but it is important to understand how ontology and epistemology differ.
While they use the term “epistemological” rather than ontological, I believe the
work of Feltovich and colleagues (Feltovich et al., 1997; Spiro et al., 1996) on cognitive
flexibility theory illustrates how the nature of knowledge factors should be
conceptualized. Cognitive flexibility theory says that there are certain kinds of world-
views. The first kind is called a reductive world-view. People with this type of world-
view are characterized as utilizing single representations for complex systems,
decomposing those systems into presumably additive parts, and having intolerance for
ambiguity. These beliefs predispose learners to oversimplification. The second type of
world-view is expansive and flexible, including multiple partial representations of
knowledge, an appreciation of interconnectedness, and a tolerance for ambiguity. While
these world-views sound like the poles of the nature of knowledge continua, an important
difference has to do with the “grain-size” (Spiro et al., 1996, p. S59) of the constructs.
In cognitive flexibility theory, the world-views are limited to ill-structured,
complex aspects of domains. As Spiro and colleagues (1996) point out, at a smaller grain
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size such as when the novice learner attempts to grasp the fundamentals of a new area of
knowledge, the reductive world-view can actually be quite adaptive. As novice learners
gain more expertise in an area, they come to understand that the relations between these
fundamentals are complex and dynamic, necessitating a move to an expansive world-
view. Thus cognitive flexibility theory focuses on beliefs about relations within the
domains of knowledge themselves, not the means by which they are justified. Similarly, I
believe that when personal epistemology researchers discuss the nature of knowledge,
they are actually interested in the way students conceptualize relations amongst various
aspects of academic domains, not in how students justify their beliefs. Conceptualized
this way, the nature of knowledge claims describe how beliefs about domains influence
learning. Personal epistemology’s nature of knowledge dimensions are not
epistemological because they do not concern how students justify their knowledge.
Rather, these beliefs are ontological, concerning how students perceive the relations
between aspects of academic domains, as either simple or complex, certain or dynamic.
Thus the dimensions regarding the nature of knowledge, while not
epistemological, do play an important role. In fact, it would seem that for a person to
believe that justification is truly necessary, the person must think that knowledge of
reality is a more complicated matter than simply what one perceives. For people who
view the world as simple and certain, what would be the purpose of justification? For
those with a naïve view of ontology, differentiating between kinds of justification is
unnecessary because the world is indeed simple, unchanging, and readily accessible.
Justification is merely a matter of confirming a claim with reality. On the other hand,
mature learners crave justification specifically because they believe that the world is not a
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simple place, and that it has a complexity and dynamism that overwhelms their powers of
perception. As I describe in my model, I believe these ontological nature of knowledge
dimensions discriminate between those that hold the naïve view that any means of
justification is sufficient from those with a more adaptive view, that not all means of
justification are created equal. Similar to Vosniadou’s (2007) views regarding ontological
commitments and King and Kitchener’s (2004) model’s claims regarding the need for
justification, I assert that without ontological sophistication, epistemological
sophistication is not possible.
Justification and Skepticism
As mentioned previously, skepticism has been a persistent problem in
epistemology, and some would say it has been the dominant problem (Williams, 2001).
The focus upon justification in philosophical epistemology naturally leads to the question
as to whether said justification is even possible. Those that say it is not are called
skeptics, and their arguments, as well as the counterarguments against them, will prove
useful in terms of better understanding the domain-generality versus specificity debate in
personal epistemology.
While there are numerous variants of the skepticism problem, most follow one of
two lines of reasoning. First, a skeptic might say that any justification for knowledge
must be built upon other pieces of knowledge, which in turn require their own
justification, leading to an infinite regress. For example, I might claim that the earth is
round, and use a science textbook as my justification. However, the skeptic would ask
how I am justified in claiming that that textbook contains knowledge. I might counter that
the scientists cited did good research, and the skeptic would similarly ask how I know
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that to be true, et cetera. It is easy to see how this line of questioning might go on forever,
with the skeptic consistently calling into question whatever evidence I bring forth. To
circumvent this, some philosophers claim that certain kinds of knowledge require no
justification, i.e. some kinds of knowledge are foundational (Williams, 2001). For
example, some philosophers grant perceptions such status (Pollock & Cruz, 1999). The
skeptic would then alight to his or her second line of reasoning, asking how I can know
that my senses are accurate. The skeptic might ask how I can be sure that I am not just a
“brain in a vat” (Pollock & Cruz, 1999) akin to Keanu Reeves in the movie The Matrix.
Since my only ways of interacting with my world are through my senses, ultimately the
skeptic would say I have no means of justifying that I should trust my senses. This line of
argument seems quite similar to the vulgar relativism of the multiplist, who argues that
no one can “prove” that their beliefs are any more true than someone else’s (Perry, 1970,
1999).
These lines of argument seem compelling and have challenged philosophers for
hundreds of years (Pollock & Cruz, 1999). However, modern epistemology refutes them
in ways that shed light not only on philosophical thought, but also psychological thought
regarding epistemology. The first argument against skepticism is theoretical. The skeptic
not only questions our beliefs, but also our means of evaluating them. In so doing, the
skeptic leaves us nothing with which to contradict his or her argument. To have a
discussion, the skeptic must grant us either our beliefs or the means by which we evaluate
them; otherwise there is no starting.
The second argument against the skeptic concerns the supposedly inevitable
conclusion that follows from his or her premises: that knowledge is impossible. How can
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this be, when we have a sense of which beliefs seem more likely than others? This
unexplained but palpable sense of certainty regarding knowledge in and of itself provides
some reason to reject any argument that claims we cannot have knowledge qua
knowledge. To bolster this position, we must remember that when faced with an
argument whose premises lead to a counterintuitive conclusion, we do not have to accept
it. Rather, we can reject the conclusion and assume one of the premises is false.
Skepticism is such an argument. It is, in fact, a reductio ad absurdum argument (Pollock
& Cruz, 1999), meaning the conclusion seems less likely than the possibility that one of
the premises is false. When this is the case, we reject the argument. Skeptical arguments
do not undermine epistemology; rather they are useful foils for pointing out what
epistemology is as of yet not able to adequately explain. Any epistemology theory that
can be felled by a skeptical argument is a theory that needs further alteration, but it does
not follow that a successful skeptical argument against one or all epistemological theories
necessarily substantiates skepticism as a true description of knowledge, or the lack
thereof. Ultimately, “the task of the epistemologist is not to show that the skeptic is
wrong but to explain why he is wrong” (Pollock & Cruz, 1999, p. 10).
These theoretical arguments against skepticism can also be bolstered by a more
practical argument. While skepticism may seem compelling in theory, no one lives his or
her life as a true skeptic (Williams, 2001). True skeptics would doubt their ability to
“know” anything about the world, even their own existence or the existence of their
peers. True skeptics would have little need for laws or banks or even interaction itself.
Being unconvinced that one could be “sure” of anything, the true skeptic would have no
reason to engage in any activity for fear that at any moment, something wild and absurd
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might happen, with no discernable cause or consequence. As Williams (2001) points out,
knowledge is valuable, and necessary for humans to live their lives, and even the most
fervent skeptic acts in ways that suggest he or she has knowledge.
Skepticism and Domain-Generality
Thus, the philosophical argument for skepticism is not plausible either
theoretically or practically. But, of what use is this discussion for psychological views of
epistemology? I would argue domain-general unidimensional personal epistemology
theories imply people are true skeptics. Hofer and Pintrich’s (1997) definitive review
article on personal epistemology states that an individual in Perry’s multiplicity “is
inclined to believe that all views are equally valid and that each person has a right to his
or her own opinion” (p. 91). In their own conceptualization of epistemological theories
they claim: “As individuals learn to evaluate evidence and to substantiate and justify their
beliefs, they move through a continuum of dualistic beliefs to the multiplistic acceptance
of opinions” (Hofer & Pintrich, 1997, p. 120). Kuhn’s multiplists develop such an
appreciation for subjectivity that
“it overpowers and obliterates any objective standard that could serve as a basis
for comparison or evaluation of conflicting claims. Because claims are subjective
opinions freely chosen by their holders and everyone has a right to their opinion,
all opinions are equally right.” (Kuhn et al., 2000, p. 310).
King and Kitchener (2004) describe their quasireflective thinker using this quote
from a student, “People think differently and so they attaack (sic) the problem differently.
Other theories could be as true as my own, but based on different evidence” (p. 42).
Baxter Magolda (2002) provides an example of one of her students saying “Everything’s
relative; there’s no truth in the world. Each individual has their own truth” (p. 95). In
80
each of these models, there is a position where students are posited to doubt that
sufficient justification is possible. A domain-general view of personal epistemology,
coupled with a belief in a multiplistic stage of knowing, is equivalent to philosophical
skepticism. As stated earlier, philosophical skepticism is not a practical position, and as
such is unlikely to accurately describe people’s personal epistemology.
One could argue that personal epistemology researchers do not advocate for true
skepticism, but rather only skepticism when it comes to the area of academics. However,
this qualification has not been stated. In addition, it is not clear why or how individuals
would choose to separate their academic views of knowledge from all others. Why would
a student choose a skeptical view towards English, history, and physics and not have that
view infiltrate the rest of his or her beliefs about the world? Indeed, could such a
compartmentalization even be possible? I argue that it is not.
What does this mean in terms of my model? I believe both the theoretical and
practical arguments against skepticism suggest that domain generality in epistemic
cognition is highly improbable. I claim that the domain-general view, as well as the more
restricted academics-only view, is flawed. Any model of epistemic cognition must
describe not only the path of epistemic development, but also describe how that path
differs dependent upon domain. What remains at issue is the nature of this domain-
specificity, an issue I address later.
Summary of Philosophical Critiques of Personal Epistemology
Thus, the philosophical literature on epistemology helps clarify conceptual
problems in the psychological literature. Specifically, by more strictly adhering to the
definitions within philosophical epistemology, the controversies regarding the nature of
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learning and nature of knowledge dimensions can be resolved. Ironically, none of these
dimensions are truly epistemological. The many problems outlined previously regarding
the measurement of personal epistemology (Clarebout et al., 2001; Greene et al., 2006;
Wood & Kardash, 2002; Wood, Kitchener, & Jensen, 2002) may be due to
misconceptions regarding the nature of learning and knowledge constructs. Justification
is at the heart of epistemology, and must be emphasized to a greater extent in the personal
epistemology literature. Philosophical epistemology’s denunciation of skepticism
provides a means of arguing against domain-general views of personal epistemology.
However, there still remain concerns regarding personal epistemology literature that the
philosophical approaches discussed cannot address. Chief among these concerns is the
reconciliation of personal epistemology theory and research with that of the
developmental psychology literature, particularly within the research area called the
theory of mind.
Developmental Psychology and Personal Epistemology
Within developmental psychology there exists a line of research called “theory of
mind.” Psychologists who work in the area of theory of mind study how children come to
an understanding of their own mental states, as well as those of others. These researchers
investigate how children develop an understanding of concepts such as metacognition,
false belief and subjectivity (Flavell, 2004).
Some theory of mind researchers have questioned personal epistemology
research. These psychologists suggest that personal epistemology researchers’ focus on
college students and adults has been myopic, and that theory of mind research with
children can clarify some of Perry and others’ counterintuitive findings. For example,
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Chandler and colleagues (2002) argue that it seems unlikely that students entering college
could be dualists and yet still display the kinds of cognitive skills necessary to be
admitted to higher education. In addition, the idea that traditional age college students
have an unflinching faith in authority would seem doubtful to parents who have tried to
explain to their teenager why he or she cannot do whatever he or she pleases. Finally, the
idea that college students are dualists who only see the world in terms of right and wrong
begs the question of how younger teenagers and children view the world. Either a young
child’s epistemic cognition is not too far removed from that of a college student, or there
must be more to epistemic cognition than personal epistemology researchers have
described. The latter is the more plausible option.
I believe theory of mind research can inform personal epistemology models
regarding the epistemic cognition of both younger children as well as college students. In
addition, this area of research provides further support for the resolution of domain-
generality and specificity advocated by Buehl and colleagues (Buehl & Alexander, 2005;
Buehl et al., 2002). While a complete review of the literature is again well beyond the
scope of this dissertation (see Chandler & Carpendale, 1998 for such a review), there are
key points that are important to clarify here before moving on to how this research
informs personal epistemology.
Theory of Mind Studies
Personal epistemology literature has focused, for the most part, on high-school
students and older (King & Kitchener, 2004; Kuhn & Weinstock, 2002, Hofer & Pintrich,
1997; Perry, 1970, 1999; Schommer-Aikins, 2004). However, as Chandler, Hallet and
colleagues point out (Chandler et al., 2002; Hallett, Chandler, & Krettenauer, 2002),
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issues of epistemological understanding do exist for young children, and have been
studied in the theory of mind literature. Researchers of the theory of mind seek to
understand how children make the transition from a very naïve view of knowledge to a
more nuanced one. This naïve view includes beliefs such as
minds are only obliged to “fit” the world, that only exogenous factors shape
mental life, that people can only passively accommodate to the pressures of
outside experiences, and that they always copy but never construct the reality with
which they interact. (Chandler & Lalonde, 1996).
Researchers have termed this view a “copy theory” of knowledge (Chandler & Boyes,
1982). Flavell and colleagues (1992) demonstrated that this belief in a directly knowable
reality extends beyond physical facts to include morality and social conventions as well.
Very young children not only believe that there are answers to all the world’s questions,
but that those answers are known to all.
Around the age of 4 or 5, children move into a realization that individuals can be
deceived, or have a “false belief” (Carpendale & Chandler, 1996; Lalonde & Chandler,
2002; Perner & Davies, 1991; Wellman, 1990). Around age 7, children begin to
recognize that two people can be equally well-informed about reality, but still
legitimately disagree in terms of their interpretation of it. Particularly in the area of
aesthetics, children at this age understand that people can interpret the same stimulus
differently. They recognize that not all people like the same kinds of foods or the same
kinds of music. Chandler and Lalonde (1996) have argued that this “interpretative”
theory of mind comes necessarily after an understanding of false belief, and represents
another qualitative shift in a child’s epistemic cognition. This interpretative theory of
mind, with its subjectivity in terms of aesthetics only, is different than a view that allows
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for subjectivity in areas beyond aesthetics.
The move into a more constructivist, or relativist, state of epistemic understanding
requires cognitive abilities not present until the time of Piaget’s stage of formal
operations (Chandler, Boyes, & Ball, 1990). Research has shown that children who have
achieved formal operations can think in a relativistic way about familiar issues, such as at
what age it is appropriate to let people drive (Boyes & Chandler, 1982; Chandler, Boyes,
& Ball, 1990). This kind of thinking extends beyond aesthetics, into academic areas,
although not all individuals are expected to display constructivist thinking in every area
of knowledge. Thus, this ability to understand that people can have access to the same
reality while also having different but legitimate interpretations of it is called a
constructivist theory of mind (Lalonde & Chandler, 2002) and represents another
qualitative change in a child’s thinking.
Theory of Mind and Personal Epistemology
So how does the theory of mind literature inform work in personal epistemology?
First, it illustrates that the rudimentary understandings of false, but justified, belief occur
at a very young age. Then, around the time of concrete operations, young children can be
expected to understand that some kinds of knowledge, such as aesthetics, are subjective,
or based upon one’s interpretation. It is difficult to reconcile these findings with personal
epistemology models that claim that college students are dualists, expecting the world to
be composed of right and wrong answers (Chandler et al., 2002). In addition, theory of
mind research illustrates that the cognitive processes necessary for constructivist thinking
in academic areas are developed by the time of formal operations, far before personal
epistemology researchers claim they manifest.
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Thus, the theory of mind literature, by focusing on epistemological development
in young children, has unearthed a compelling question: If children develop a sense of
false belief at 4, interpretation at age 7, and the cognitive skills to think constructively at
age 11 or 12, why do personal epistemology researchers (King & Kitchener, 2004; Perry,
1990) find no movement from dualist viewpoints until well into the college years (18-20;
Hallet et al., 2002)? If it is possible that the move from dualism to multiplicity can occur
as early as middle school, why are personal epistemology researchers missing it?
Chandler’s Integration of Theory of Mind and Personal Epistemology Models
Chandler and colleagues (2002; Hallet et al., 2002) claim that the somewhat
counterintuitive findings of Perry (1990), King and Kitchener (2004), and Schommer
(1992) regarding the rather late development of constructivism, or more advanced
epistemological beliefs, in students of college age is a direct result of the failure to
recognize that epistemic understanding is not domain-general, but instead varies
dependent upon the nature of the domain. While Chandler and colleagues use slightly
different terms, in essence they claim that epistemic cognition can differ depending upon
whether the domain of interest is ill or well-structured. A proper model of epistemic
cognition, they suggest, should take into account this level of domain-specificity, and be
able to describe epistemic development from preschoolers to adults.
Chandler and his colleagues have incorporated research from the theory of mind
literature and personal epistemology to create a model of epistemic cognitive
development that can account for the diverse findings of the two literatures (Chandler et
al., 2002; Hallet et al., 2002). They propose a developmental model that posits that
epistemic cognition moves through a stage-like progression, but that this development is
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not domain-general. This stage-like progression occurs independently within three related
but separate types of knowledge. Thus, a person may be in one stage for a given type of
knowledge, but in a different stage for another. The basic stage-like progression will be
described first, and then the different kinds of knowledge.
This progression has four stages including five positions: realism, defended
realism, dogmatism, skepticism, and rationality (Chandler et al., 2002; Hallet et al.,
2002). Naïve realists believe that knowledge is directly derived from experience, and that
any disagreements between people are due to those people having access to different
facts. Naïve realists expect that if all people were exposed to the same information, there
would be no disagreements and “truth” would be “known” to all. Thus, these children are
able to understand false belief, but do not yet have an interpretative theory of mind
(Lalonde & Chandler, 2002). Defended realism is not possible until the development of
concrete operations, and is evidenced by the child’s acceptance that some kinds of
knowledge, mostly aesthetics, are based solely upon opinion, but that everything else is
as the realist believes. This is the beginning of the development of an interpretative
theory of mind. However, it is interesting to note that later work by Chandler and
colleagues (Hallet & Chandler, 2002) omits this defended realism stage.
The next stage, only possible with the development of formal operations, is a
reaction to the growing sense that knowledge, beyond aesthetics, may be entirely
subjective, or constructed. Chandler and colleagues (2002; Hallet et al., 2002) believe
people respond to this by either becoming dogmatic and seeking truth only in some
authority figure(s) or by becoming skeptics, arguing that knowledge or truth is not
possible. Both views share the idea that because knowledge is a human construction,
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rationality cannot be trusted as a means of justifying knowledge. Finally, people in the
last stage, rationality, are able to outline methods and standards for judging the adequacy
of knowledge-claims, and establish that some are more justified than others (see Table 6).
That the final stage of development is called rationality aligns nicely with the
philosophical literature, as some philosophers believe epistemology is the study of
rationality and how it can be determined (Pollock & Cruz, 1999).
Table 6
Chandler’s model of epistemic development (Hallet et al., 2002)






























































Epistemic Development Within Areas of Knowledge
This stage-like progression is not domain-general, however. Chandler and
colleagues (2002) argue that people separate facts into different categories, and may hold
different positions in each of these categories. Unlike some personal epistemology
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models that posit a domain-general form of epistemic cognition, and models that suggest
domain-specific epistemic cognition for every academic field of study, Chandler and
colleagues claim that epistemic cognition varies by “domains of understanding” (Hallet et
al., 2002, p. 290). These domains include aesthetics, and two other areas that are roughly
equivalent to the distinctions used by Buehl and colleagues (2001, 2002): ill-structured
and well-structured.
They believe children’s beliefs about aesthetics are the first to move from a naïve
realist viewpoint, around age seven. It is at this age that children adopt an “interpretative”
view of knowledge, understanding that at least in the area of aesthetics, individuals can
legitimately disagree, and there is little in aesthetics that can be called “knowledge.”
Around age 12, children’s beliefs regarding ill-structured academic domains, such as
history, begin moving from the realist stage into either dogmatism or skepticism. Finally,
beliefs about well-structured domains, such as the physical sciences, are the last kinds of
knowledge subject to this progression, occurring sometime late in adolescence or early
adulthood.
Chandler and colleagues believe that by categorizing individual’s epistemic
cognition within these three types of knowledge, their model can account for the
divergent results found by theory of mind and personal epistemology researchers. Theory
of mind researchers have found that young children display an understanding of
subjectivity when it comes to taste. For example, children understand that a cat may like
the taste of catfood, whereas a person would not (Flavell, Flavell, Green, & Moses,
1992). Adolescents and college students can display relativistic thinking when it comes to
what should be an appropriate age to begin driving, an ill-structured idea, but still think in
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a realist way about well-structured areas such as science. Chandler and colleagues (2002)
claim that personal epistemology models such as King and Kitchener’s (2004) have been
underestimating college students by attempting to classify participants by their lowest
displayed level of epistemic cognition. For example, if a participant displays realistic
thinking about science, that person has been classified as a prereflective thinker,
regardless of any potential quasireflective thinking in areas such as history or political
science. Chandler and colleagues suggest that there are further discriminations to be
made regarding individual’s epistemic cognition. It is important to note, however, that
they advocate a middle ground between domain-generality and domain-specificity,
classifying academic areas as either ill-structured or well-structured.
Measuring Chandler’s Model
The work of Chandler and colleagues (2002) seems to integrate findings from
personal epistemology and theory of mind research, but creating a measure for their
model has proven difficult. First, initial work assessing students with this model was
done using interview techniques very similar to those used by King and Kitchener (1991),
with participants presented with two opposing viewpoints and then probed as to how they
constructed and resolved the competing knowledge claims (Boyes & Chandler, 1991).
While it is certainly possible to train raters to assess students using this model, for large-
scale administrations it would be more efficient to develop an objective measure (Wood,
Kitchener, & Jensen, 2002). This would allow practitioners the ability to assess students’
epistemic cognition and utilize these results to inform their pedagogy.
More recent attempts to validate a quantitative instrument, the Epistemic Doubt
Questionnaire (Krettenauer, Hallet, & Chandler, 1999), have revealed that the measure
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does not accurately discriminate between realism and dogmatism (Hallet et al., 2002).
The authors hypothesize that it is difficult to distinguish between the realists, who believe
justification is not needed because experience is self-evident, and the dogmatists, who
believe that there is no need for justification because some higher authority has special
access to truth. While the measure revealed hypothesized differences in levels of
skepticism and rationalism between high-school seniors and college juniors and seniors,
expected differences were not found between college freshmen, sophomores, juniors and
seniors. It is encouraging, however, that the hypothesized relations regarding ill and well-
structured domains were supported, with high-school seniors much more likely to be
objective about ill and well-structured domains than college students, who tended to be
more skeptical regarding both kinds of domains.
Summary
This is not to say that the theory of mind researchers have it right, and the
personal epistemology researchers have it wrong. Indeed, both camps can be faulted for
ignoring the work of the other (Chandler et al., 2002). In addition, it would be fair to say
that both camps also might benefit from more reading of the philosophical work on
epistemology, so that they can clarify their definitions and meanings (Kitchener, 2002;
Hofer, 2004; Murphy, 2003). Kitchener (2002) advocates for a new hybrid field
combining the work of theory of mind and personal epistemology researchers. I believe it
is possible to combine the work of personal epistemology and theory of mind researchers
to describe a more complete model of epistemic cognition. In addition, the quantitative
measures used in the epistemological beliefs literature can be a guide for creating similar
measures for this new model.
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The Epistemic and Ontologic Cognition Development Model
Personal epistemology and epistemological beliefs models dominate the field of
educational psychology, but fail to adequately describe the cognition of people younger
than 18-20 year old traditional college students (Chandler et al., 2002). In addition, the
measurement of the proposed constructs has proven difficult (Wood & Kardash, 2002).
Theory of mind researchers have worked within the human development literature, and
while their models do a good job of describing young children’s cognition, there are
problems with measuring more advanced forms of epistemic cognition (Hallet et al.,
2001). Finally, it seems that neither area has done an adequate job integrating work from
philosophy, and there still exists an empirical question regarding the level of domain-
generality or specificity of epistemic cognition.
I believe these problems can be addressed by focusing on the central question of
philosophical epistemology: justification. In addition, the inclusion of Hofer and
Pintrich’s (1997) nature of knowledge factors as ontologic influences, not epistemic ones,
will further help discriminate between various kinds of thinking about knowledge. Here, I
outline my Epistemic and Ontologic Cognition Development Model (EOCDM). A
delineation of my model requires outlining the areas of knowledge in which development
occurs, a review of the stages of development, a description of how ontologic cognition
influences thinking in those areas of knowledge, and an explanation of how these
dimensions can be measured.
Areas of Knowledge
The level of domain-generality or specificity of personal epistemology is an
empirical question. Nonetheless, I believe Buehl and colleagues (2001, 2002, 2005) and
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Chandler and colleagues (2002) are correct that thinking about knowledge differs
depending upon whether the area is well or ill-structured. Domain-general personal
epistemology models are subject to categorizing people according to the domain in which
they perform the lowest, and multidimensional models like Schommer-Aikins’s are too
“diffuse” (Hallet et al., 2002, p. 290). While the basic course of epistemic and ontologic
development is the same within well and ill-structured domains, this development occurs
in a related, but separate manner.
As children mature, epistemic cognition develops, but in a stage-like manner
within each area of knowledge. Movement from the initial position begins at a younger
age within ill-structured domains, and does not begin until late in adolescence or young
adulthood within well-structured domains. This progression is similar to Kuhn’s (Kuhn &
Weinstock, 2002) work, but is not as complex as Kuhn’s proposed objectivity to
subjectivity back-and-forth model. Thus, in essence there are two developmental aspects
to my model. There is a progression among domains regarding when cognition begins
maturing, starting first with ill-structured domains and then later with well-structured.
Likewise, within each of those areas of knowledge, individuals move in a developmental
manner through four positions. Those positions are discussed next.
Positions in Development
My model builds off of the stages posited by Chandler and colleagues (2002;
Hallet et al., 2002). It should be noted, however, that Chandler and colleagues include a
stage, called defended realism, which I do not. I question whether this is truly a “stage” at
all, as it does not differ from realism except in the area of taste. Whereas all of the other
stages occur independently within domains, defended realism is the only one to describe
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a specific set of stages across domains. I feel this stage does not follow the form of the
other stages and is redundant; therefore I have not included it in my model. This leaves
my model with four distinct positions: realism, dogmatism, skepticism, and rationalism.
In general, I believe that these positions can be more accurately described and
measured by incorporating philosophical work regarding ontology and justification. In
terms of describing how to characterize and measure these positions, it is easiest to ignore
the distinction of well and ill-structured domains for the moment. In my model, each of
the four positions is differentiated according to an individual’s views regarding ontology
and justification.
Ontology
Realists follow a “copy theory” of the world. These individuals believe there can
be no disagreement regarding knowledge that cannot be resolved by an appeal to the
facts. In essence, their view of the world, their ontology, is simple and certain. With such
a view, epistemic cognition is muted, as justification can be one’s own experience, or an
appeal to an authority that has had the requisite experience. Individuals can disagree, but
one of them is “right” and either direct experience or an authority figure can resolve this
disagreement. This view regarding justification is quite similar to that of King and
Kitchener’s (2004) prereflective thinker and Kuhn’s (Kuhn & Weinstock, 2002)
absolutist.
If epistemology is really about justification as the philosophers (Williams, 2001)
claim, and individuals with a realist ontology have no need for justification, then they are
not engaging in epistemic cognition, as Kuhn (1999) and King and Kitchener (2004) have
asserted. Realists hold a strong belief in a simple and certain ontology, thus they see both
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justification by authority as well as personal justification as valid. With a simple
ontology, justification of either kind is reasonable but in some ways unnecessary. The
true sign that justification, and thus epistemic cognition, has become an issue for
individuals is when they adopt a more sophisticaed understanding of the ontology of the
world. Only when individuals realize that knowledge is not a direct copy from reality is it
possible for them to begin to have epistemic cognition in the way that both psychologists
and philosophers conceptualize. For example, a realist would believe that knowing
gravity is merely a question of experiencing it, or learning of it from an authority figure.
The realist would not question whether gravity truly exists. Instead, the realist would
assume that all things in the world, including gravity, are simple to know and certain to
stay the same. Asking a realist for justification would bring a quizzical look, and an
answer akin to “because that’s the way it is” or “because my teacher told me so.” To the
realist, both responses are equally valid, but in actuality no justification is needed. Every
other position in the model, dogmatism, skepticism, and rationalism, has a more adaptive
view of ontology, where the world is not simple and certain. To differentiate amongst
these positions, then, requires an elaboration of justification.
Justification
The realization that people can legitimately disagree about an area of knowledge
brings about a crisis for the individual: knowledge claims are subject to scrutiny. The
consequence of this crisis is the first inkling of epistemic cognition: the understanding
that knowledge claims must be justified. This forces the person to choose one of two
paths to justification.
Confronted with the possibility of false belief, the person can decide that all
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knowledge in any one area is in fact subjective and personal, making them a skeptic. The
other option is for the individual to look to some authority figure for guidance as to what
to believe, making the person a dogmatist. These two positions are differentiated in two
ways. Skeptics claim that the only justification that matters is personal, and that this
personal justification cannot be questioned. Dogmatists are also firm in their belief that
justification cannot be questioned, but in their case this justification comes from some
authority. Only through an appeal to authority can any belief be substantiated as
knowledge. Likewise, the dogmatist discounts personal justification, while the skeptic
does not privilege the views of authority. Thus, in terms of acceptable grounds for
justification, personal or authoritative, these two groups are polar opposites (see Table 7).
For example, in terms of ontology, both the dogmatist and the skeptic might agree that
gravity is not directly knowable and thus not evident to all without justification.
However, when pressed to justify their “knowledge” of gravity, the dogmatist would
produce statements or evidence from authority figures such as teachers or scientists. The
skeptic might simply say, “I think gravity exists because I see stuff fall to the ground, I
don’t need to justify it any other way.”
Finally, with development comes the move to rationality, the final position in
Chandler and colleagues’ model. Rationalists maintain a high need for justification. They
see that evidence and support are the means by which knowledge is separated from
belief. While they maintain that knowledge is defeasible (Williams, 2001), they allow
that individuals must personally evaluate evidence to determine what to categorize as
knowledge, and then act upon those justified true beliefs until proven incorrect. However,
unlike the dogmatist, rationalists do not believe that the appeal to authority alone is
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sufficient for justification. Likewise, rationalists do not believe in the multiplicity of the
skeptics. Instead, the rationalist looks for corroborating evidence, personal experience, or
the logic of the statement before accepting an authority’s claim for knowledge. Thus, a
rationalist may rely upon personal experience as justification, if it coheres with other
experience, or logic. Likewise, the rationalist may depend upon justification by authority
to bolster an argument, but only if that authority figure is deemed trustworthy and if the
knowledge claim coheres with other knowledge claims. Therefore, rationalists have
moderated faith in both authority-based and personal means of justification. Neither is
accepted without scrutiny, but likewise both can be acceptable means of justification
under the right circumstances.
While I believe that rationalists use both authority-based and personal means of
justification, it is not clear that we understand all of the ways in which mature individuals
come to a rationalist decision about knowledge. This is an area where King and
Kitchener’s (2004) and Kuhn and colleagues’ (2000) work begins to play a major role,
and an examination of the many philosophical theories of epistemology may prove useful
(see Murphy et al., 2007).
To finish the example, the rationalist, when pressed to justify a belief in gravity,
would most likely produce a number of different mutually-coherent justifications.
Perhaps the rationalist would appeal to peer-reviewed science journals, and buttress that
argument with examples of gravity’s influence upon celestial bodies, or more local ones.
The rationalist would acknowledge the possibility that his or her belief in gravity was
potentially incorrect or ill-formed, but claim that until shown convincing evidence to the
contrary, he or she would claim to “know” about gravity. It is important to note that the
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EOCDM is probabilistic, and does not guarantee that all people will achieve a rationalist
point of view.
Summary of the Model
Reintegrating the idea of differences in epistemic and ontologic cognition across
well-structured and ill-structured domains leads to a full explication of the model.
Separately within both domains, I propose that individuals begin in realism, then move to
either dogmatism or skepticism, and finally transition to rationalism, although not all
people will reach this final position. I also posit that people’s position in ill-structured
domains will be at least as advanced as their position in well-structured domains.
Therefore, while epistemic and ontologic cognitive development occurs separately within
each of these domains, they are related. The model can accommodate findings in personal
epistemology research as well as those in theory of mind, is consistent with the foci and
terminology of philosophical epistemology, and addresses the domain-generality versus
specificity issue. However, if this model is to be successful, it must also overcome a
challenge confronting both personal epistemology and theory of mind models:
measurement.
Measurement of the Model
Schommer-Aikins (2004) says that “quantitative assessment of personal
epistemology is still in its infancy” (p. 23). Indeed, the measurement of epistemic
cognition has proven difficult (Wood, Kitchener, & Jensen, 2002) and controversial
(Hofer & Pintrich, 1997). Some argue for qualitative approaches due to the complexity of
construct (Baxter Magolda, 2004; Wood & Kardash, 2002) while others insist that
quantitative measures best capture the multidimensional nature of epistemic cognition
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(Schommer, 1990). In general, measures of epistemic cognition have proven challenging
to create because of semantics, such as the ways that participants interpret words such as
“truth” and “facts” (Alexander et al., 1998; Wood, Kitchener, & Jensen, 2002), content
concerns regarding possible domain effects (Hofer & Pintrich, 1997), and practical issues
such as the time and expense necessary to train raters to administer and score qualitative
measures. My model addresses these concerns by positing that the four positions can be
measured using three latent factors or continua. These continua can be measured using
Likert-style items in a questionnaire format, with attention paid to the language used
(Alexander et al., 1998) and separate items for ill-structured and well-structured domains
(Buehl et al., 2001, 2002).
In my model, individuals can be placed in one of the four positions of epistemic
and ontologic cognition based upon their views on three continua. These continua involve
the nature of knowledge factors combined into a single continua measuring a person’s
ontology and two continua concerning the central question of philosophical
epistemology: justification (Pollock & Cruz, 1999; Williams, 2001). The instrument used
to measure my model will focus on these three continua, and evidence of construct
validity of these continua can be taken as support for the underlying model.
Epistemic cognition cannot begin until the person takes a more mature view
regarding the simplicity and certainty of knowledge, recognizing that knowledge claims
require justification. Thus, the ontologic continuum discriminates between realists and all
other positions. Realists would score highly on questions designed to assess a belief in
simple and certain knowledge, whereas individuals in any of the other positions would
score lower on these items. The first epistemic continuum concerns whether the person
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believes justification by authority is valid, whereas the second concerns whether the
person feels personal justification is sufficient. These two continua discriminate between
dogmatists, skeptics, and rationalists. The dogmatist would score high on the authority
continuum and low on the personal, with the skeptic the opposite. The rationalist, with a
greater appreciation for both kinds of justification, would score moderately high on both
continua, acknowledging that these means of justification are important, but rarely
sufficient in and of themselves.
By utilizing these three ontologic and epistemic continua, my model classifies
people as being in one of Chandler’s four positions (see Table 7).
Table 7









Realism High High High
Dogmatism Low High Low
Skepticism Low Low High
Rationalist Low Mid Mid
Realists see the world as simple and certain, thinking that justification is not truly
necessary, but do see authority figures and personal statements as sufficient for justifying
claims, particularly those with which they do not have direct experience. People in all of
the other positions believe the world to be complex and changing and thus have a low
score on the simple and certain continuum. Dogmatists believe justification is necessary
because human interpretation cannot be trusted, and they turn to authority figures for that
justification. Skeptics, on the other hand, believe that justification is personal, and that no
one can truly know another’s experience, nor refute it. Finally, rationalists believe
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justification to be necessary but do not see an appeal to an authority figure or personal
experience alone as sufficient for this justification. A rationalist would want more
evidence to support any knowledge claim. Thus, rationalists will score moderately high
on both continua, recognizing that these types of justification can be sufficient, but often
require corroborating evidence.
I believe that a test of the construct validity of my model will be whether I can
create an instrument that successfully measures individuals’ beliefs on these three
continua, and places people into one of the four categories of epistemic cognition. An
individual will have a position for ill-structured domains, and another for well-structured,
with the former always being at least as high as the latter. Thus, another means of
substantiating my model will be through positing that a developmental sequence across
areas of knowledge will hold. For example, I propose it is not possible for one to be a
skeptic when it comes to ill-structured domains but a rationalist when it comes to well-
structured. In this way, my model posits two developmental progressions, both within
areas of knowledge and between them (see Table 8).
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Table 8
Hypotheses Regarding Age, Position of Epistemic and Ontologic Cognition, and Score on the Three Dimensions by Domain
Ill-Structured Domains Well-Structured Domains
Age Position SC JA PJ Position SC JA PJ









Realism High High High








Graduate Education Rationalism Low Mid Mid Rationalism Low Mid Mid
SC = Simple and Certain Knowledge Dimension; JA = Justification by Authority Dimension; PJ = Personal Justification Dimension
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Therefore, my model makes a direct hypothesis regarding the domain-generality and
specificity debate in personal epistemology research (Pintrich, 2002). This
conceptualization clearly follows from philosophical epistemology, and the work of
Buehl and colleagues (2001, 2002, 2005) as well as Chandler and colleagues (2002;
Hallet et al., 2002).
In addition, I have utilized the findings from theory of mind research (Chandler et
al., 2002; Flavell, 2004; Hallet et al., 2002) to make predictions regarding when
transitions between positions are likely to first occur. Within ill-structured domains, the
transition from realism should occur at or after age 12, whereas in well-structured
domains this transition is not expected before mid-college (see Table 7). Rationalism is
not expected before mid-college for ill-structured domains, and not until graduate school
for well-structured domains. These predictions in theory of mind research derive from
beliefs about Piagetian cognitive development, but the rationale as to why I chose to use
educational level rather than a more direct measure of Piagetian cognitive development
follows.
Predicting Development: Educational Level as a Proxy
Many developmental psychologists (Chandler et al., 2002; Flavell, 2004; Hallet et
al., 2002) posit that true epistemic cognition does not begin until the development of
formal operations as outlined by Piaget (1972). Thus, it would seem beneficial to include
a measure of Piaget’s cognitive development theory with my questionnaire to test the
hypotheses regarding when individuals are likely to progress into a different position.
However, Piaget mainly advocated interview methods for his theory, and attempts at
creating paper-and-pencil measures of formal operations have been plagued with
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difficulties regarding reliability and validity (Patterson & Milakofsky, 1980; Pratt &
Hacker, 1984; Santmire, 2004; Stefanich, 1983).
For example, Patterson and Milakofsky (1980) critiqued 17 pencil-and-paper
measures of Piaget’s theory, and found that most failed to measure their intended stages,
required advanced language and reading skills, were limited in terms of the ages for
which they were appropriate, took too long to administer, and rarely reported reliability
or validity information. Their own investigation into one of these measures revealed low
reliability of scores for certain age groups, and failed to demonstrate construct validity
evidence.
Specific analyses of the more popular measures of Piaget’s theory have also
uncovered problems with reliability and validity. Arlin’s (1982) Test of Formal
Reasoning has shown reliabilities below .7, calling into question the validity of the scores
given that those scores cannot be valid if they are not reliable (Crocker & Algina, 1986).
Arlin’s measure has also been questioned by Hagborg and Wachman (1992) who found
that the instrument lacked criterion validity when used to predict both the identification
of accelerated mathematics students and academic performance. Pratt and Hacker (1984)
examined the factor structure of Lawson’s (1978) test of formal operations using a Rasch
model, and found evidence that the instrument was not unidimensional as predicted.
Stefanich and colleagues (1983) examined three popular tests of formal operations,
including Lawson’s, and found that each measure only agreed with trained rater interview
results 50 percent of the time.
In general, these findings suggest that an acceptable paper-and-pencil measure of
Piaget’s theory currently does not exist. Thus, no such measure will be included in this
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dissertation. Without this measure, there exists the possibility that age, cognitive ability,
and educational level may be confounded in this dissertation. For this dissertation, I will
be using educational level to predict individual’s positions in well and ill-structured
domains. Future research, perhaps including more reliable interview methods of Piaget’s
theory, will be needed to untangle these issues. This dissertation must be constrained in
this, and other, ways.
Relations to Other Personal Epistemology and Philosophical Work
The EOCDM borrows and integrates concepts from personal epistemology,
philosophy, and theory of mind work. My model builds off of the general progression of
beliefs about knowledge first outlined by Perry (1990). Perry’s dualists believe that
knowledge is factual, much as my model’s realists do. Likewise, in Perry’s model the
relativist adopts more complex standards for justification, as do rationalists. King and
Kitchener’s (2004) focus on justification fits well with my model. In particular, the
prereflective student in King and Kitchener’s model views all problems as well-
structured with a clear answer, just as I posit realists view the world. The prereflective
student’s appeal to authority to resolve disagreements is in line with dogmatists in my
model. The quasireflective student in King and Kitchener’s model would be categorized
as a skeptic in my model, with both believing that justification is personal. Finally, a
person with reflective judgment can utilize an authority figure as justification, so long as
that person has been critically evaluated. In my model, the rationalist can make a similar
justification claim. Baxter Magolda’s (2002) independent knower is quite similar to the
quasireflective student in King and Kitchener’s model, and my skeptic. In terms of Hofer
and Pintrich’s (1997) epistemological theories, while I applaud their focus on
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justification, I question their source continuum. Whereas they believe there is an inverse
relation between seeing the source of knowledge as the self versus seeing it as an
authority, I posit that these are two independent continua regarding the legitimacy of
these sources of justification.
Both Kuhn’s (Kuhn & Weinstock, 2002) as well as Chandler and colleagues’
(2002) model emphasize the importance of examining epistemic cognition by content
areas, although not at so domain-specific a level as Hofer (2004) or Buehl and colleagues
(2002). I have chosen to adopt this position between the unidimensional models’ domain-
generality and the more extreme versions domain-specificity advocated by Hofer and
others. Buehl and Alexander’s (2005) findings regarding the clustering of
epistemological beliefs are more similar to my view.
Both Hofer and Pintrich (1998) as well as Schommer-Aikins (2004) emphasize
quantitative measures of the nature of knowledge, but in my model I have clarified these
as ontologic beliefs, and utilized them to differentiate realists from dogmatists, something
with which Chandler and colleagues have struggled. However, I have incorporated many
other aspects of theory of mind models, particularly Chandler and colleagues’. Finally, I
have utilized philosophical work in epistemology to clarify the definitions used in my
model, the constructs that should be considered epistemic, and the role of skepticism as a
better description for those who Perry would call multiplists. I believe my model
represents an important step forward both in terms of bringing together past work and




In sum, my model seeks to reconcile concerns with previous personal
epistemology models regarding the seemingly counterintuitive epistemic status of
traditional college age students. It does this by integrating theory of mind research into
personal epistemology theory. However, the measurement difficulties associated with
Chandler and colleagues’ model have been resolved by focusing more on the central
question of philosophical epistemology, justification, as well as the clarified role of
ontology. The domain-generality or specificity controversy in personal epistemology is
also addressed in my model, with support from philosophy, the work of Buehl and
colleagues (2001, 2002) and theory of mind research. By positing dimensions that can be
measured using quantitative techniques, I should be able to categorize individuals’
epistemic and ontologic cognition. That cognition is dependent upon the nature of the
domain being evaluated, and by considering this factor my model accounts for the
disparate findings of previous measures, both in terms of overall level of development as
well as the concerns about domain-generality versus specificity. Finally, my emphasis on
philosophical epistemology has allowed me to clarify the role of the nature of knowledge
dimensions of Hofer and Pintrich (1997) and properly position them as ontological, not
epistemological. This further clarification will also aid in producing an instrument that
has strong construct validity.
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CHAPTER 3: PILOT STUDY
Overview
Given the importance of developing a psychometrically strong instrument to
measure epistemic and ontologic cognition with middle-school students through adults, a
pilot study was conducted. Pilot studies can help researchers determine whether
participants understand and follow instructions and if participants interpret items in the
manner in which they were intended. They can also help researchers gain an initial idea
of whether the instrument is discriminating between groups as desired (Cone & Foster,
1993). A draft version of the Epistemic and Ontologic Cognition Questionnaire (EOCQ)
was produced (see Appendix A) and administered to a convenience sample of three
graduate, three undergraduate, four high-school, and three middle-school students, all
from an urban area in the Mid-Atlantic region. These data were analyzed in both
quantitative and qualitative manners to inform the creation of the version of the EOCQ to
be used in this dissertation.
Research Questions and Goals
The main goal of this pilot study was to gain qualitative information regarding
how participants were interpreting the items on the EOCQ. Thus, one research question
was whether the items were tapping the latent constructs for which they were designed. A
second goal of this pilot study was to examine participants’ scores on each item, to see
whether educational level appeared associated with epistemic and ontologic positions
within academic content areas as predicted. In my model I predicted that middle-school
students would be realists in both ill and well-structured domains. High-school students
were hypothesized to be dogmatists or skeptics for ill-structured domains and realists for
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well-structured domains. According to my model, college students should be rationalists
in ill-structured domains and dogmatists or skeptics in well-structured domains. Finally,




The pilot instrument (see Appendix A) was designed to measure the three
dimensions of the EOCDM: simple and certain knowledge, justification by authority, and
personal justification. In addition, items were needed to assess these dimensions in three
areas: aesthetics (not analyzed here), ill-structured domains, and well-structured domains.
Thus, dimensions were fully crossed with content areas, necessitating nine types of items.
Numerous items were created for each dimension/content area set with the intention that
some items would be dropped based upon the results of the pilot testing.
Content Areas
For ill and well-structured domains, I sought out academic areas that matched
Hallet and colleagues’ (2002) assertion that “the long-standing, if somewhat
controversial, distinction between the social and natural sciences…is, we think, another
instantiation of the difference between” (p. 293) ill and well-structured domains. I chose
academic areas I thought would be familiar to each age group: natural sciences such as
physics and mathematics for well-structured domains; and social sciences such as history
and political science for ill-structured domains.
Dimensions
Simple and certain knowledge. Given that the simple and certain knowledge
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dimension derives directly from the work of Schommer (1990) and Schraw and
colleagues (2002), it seemed natural to examine their instruments for potential items. A
review of item functioning, including both quantitative measures such as factor loadings
reported in previous studies (Bendixen et al., 1998; Greene et al., 2006; Schraw et al.,
2002), as well as more general interpretations of content validity, led to the inclusion of
three items from the EQ and the EBI. These items were adapted from their domain-
general phrasing in the EQ and EBI to phrasing appropriate for ill and well-structured
domains. The original items and their ECOQ versions can be found in Table 9.
Table 9
Items adapted from the EQ and EBI for inclusion in the EOCQ
EQ/EBI Wording ECOQ Wording
Well-Structured Domain Ill-Structured Domain
If two people are arguing about




about some part of
[physics, math] one of
them must be wrong.
If two [historians,
political scientists]
disagree about some part
of [history, political
science] one of them
must be wrong.
What is true today will be true
tomorrow.
In [physics, math], what
is true today will be true
tomorrow.
In [history, political
science], what is true
today will be true
tomorrow.
Sometimes there are no right
answers to life’s big problems.
There are some things in
[physics, math] that we
will never understand.
There are some things in
[history, political
science] that we will
never understand.
The “simple” aspect of the simple and certain dimension was supplemented with other
items designed to test participants’ views regarding the nature of knowledge in each
content area. Multiple items referred to “truth” or “facts,” including whether the truth
meant different things to different people and whether facts were all that was needed to
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succeed in school. Items concerning whether things will always be true in the future and
whether facts can change were included to measure the “certain” aspect of this
dimension.
Justification by authority. For the justification by authority dimension, items
focused on participants’ views regarding teachers, domain experts, and classroom
learning. The purpose of these items was to determine just how much faith the
participants put into authority figures, and the degree to which they accepted, without
question, the claims made by those authority figures. Items regarding the authority of
textbooks were also included as a way of assessing a more non-human manifestation of
authority.
Personal justification. Items for the personal justification dimension proved the
most difficult to draft. Items chosen for inclusion in the pilot EOCQ focused upon
personal beliefs in content areas and whether others could disprove those beliefs. In
addition, an item was included that was reverse-coded, intending to measure whether
participants believed that individuals had the ability to justify knowledge qua knowledge
at all (see numbers 27, 28, 55, and 56 in Appendix A).
Response Scale
All items were measured on a Likert-type seven-point scale with completely
disagree coded as a one, neither disagree nor agree coded as a four, and completely agree
coded as a seven. Items were phrased strongly to ensure that participants’ degree of belief
in the item would be captured in their choice of response option, and not confounded by
item language (DeVellis, 2003). Numerous items were reverse-coded to test whether
participants were mindful of the scale when responding. A total of 68 items were created
111
for assessing the nine dimension/content areas, and five demographic items were listed at
the end of the EOCQ, bringing the total to 73 items (see Appendix A).
Participants
Participants were gathered using convenience sampling during the Spring
semester and Summer of 2006. Graduate students in the Department of Human
Development at the University of Maryland, and undergraduates working in that
department, were asked to participate. High-school students included two students from a
high-school in Montgomery Country, Maryland, a student attending a private school in
Washington, DC and another student attending a Maryland military school. Middle-
school students were solicited through acquaintances, and included students from two
different Maryland counties and three different schools, two attending public schools and






Number Education Level Sex Age
01 Undergraduate Male 18
02 Graduate Female 28
03 Graduate Female 31
04 Undergraduate Male 21
05 High-school Male 18
06 High-school Female 17
07 Graduate Male 30
08 Undergraduate Female 22
09 High-school Male 17
10 Middle-school Male 10
11 High-school Male 16
12 Middle-school Male 10
13 Middle-school Male 10
Procedure
All participants indicated their consent before participating, and those under 18
years of age also obtained consent from a parent as well as filling out an assent form
themselves (see Appendices B through D for these forms). The assent form described the
study to the younger participants, making clear they could stop at any point and asking
them to sign indicating they understood what would be asked of them during the study.
Participants were tested individually. At the beginning of the session the experimenter
explained that the purpose of the activity was to both examine the participant’s
understanding of various kinds of knowledge as well as to learn more about how
participants interpreted the items on the questionnaire. It was stressed that there were no
“right” answers to the items, and that if an item was not clear that it was not an indication
of any deficit on the part of the participant, but rather a problem with the item itself.
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After answering any initial questions, the experimenter asked the participant to
put on a microphone so that he or she could be audiotaped while filling out the
questionnaire. To better understand how the items were being interpreted, participants
were also asked to “think aloud” while filling out the questionnaire (Ericsson & Simon,
1993). This involved the participant saying everything he or she was thinking.
Participants were encouraged to verbalize their understanding of each item as well as
what they thought as they determined how to respond to the item. If a participant was
silent for more than three seconds, the experimenter prompted, “Can you say what you
are thinking?”
The questionnaire was administered in paper-and-pencil format. Participants were
given as much time as they wished to fill out the questionnaire. After completing the
questionnaire, the experimenter followed a semi-structured interview format, asking
questions regarding how difficult the questionnaire was to fill out, whether any items
were particularly difficult to understand, whether the response scale was sufficient, and if
there were any other information the participant thought it important to share.
Data Analysis and Scoring
Qualitative
Qualitative analyses involved first transcribing the audiotapes in their entirety.
This produced 190 (M = 14.6) single-spaced pages of text with 6,408 (M = 493) lines and
53,889 (M = 4,145) words. Next, participants’ think aloud data, as well as their semi-
structured interview responses, were separated and organized by item to facilitate item
analysis. Think aloud procedures have been endorsed as a way of assessing how the items
are being interpreted and as a means of providing information to help in the rewriting of
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items (DeVellis, 2003). In this study, think aloud data plus the experimenter’s own notes
were used to assess each item individually.
Quantitative
All questionnaire responses were entered in SPSS version 11.0.4. Due to the small
sample size of this pilot, many statistical analyses such as t-tests, ANOVAs, and factor or
reliability analyses were not feasible. Even item means by educational level would serve
little purpose. Instead, individual participant responses were examined. All reverse-coded
item responses were reflected before analysis (see Appendix A). Classification of
participants into one of the four positions of epistemic and ontologic cognitive
development was predicted to vary based upon the participant’s educational level, as
shown in Table 8, previously. For example, middle-school students were predicted to be
realists in terms of well-structured domains. Therefore, the model would predict that
these participants would have higher scores on the simple and certain knowledge
dimension than other participants, and relatively high scores on the justification by
authority and personal justification dimensions.
Results
General comments about the testing procedures and the instrument will be
presented first, followed by specific reviews of each relevant item.
Thinking Aloud with Middle-School Participants
All of the middle-school students had extreme difficulty thinking aloud while
filling out the questionnaire. In each case, repeated requests for students to “say what
[they were] thinking” were followed by silence or a simple verbalization of their numeric
response. It seemed that thinking out loud presented too much cognitive load for these
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students. Therefore, the experimenter took detailed notes of participant responses and
after their completion of the questionnaire, directly queried the middle-school students
about their responses to many items. All other participants were able to think aloud while
completing the questionnaire.
Physics and Political Science
Upon testing the middle-school participants, it became readily apparent that any
instrument used with this population could not include items about physics or political
science. These students simply had not had courses in these areas yet, could not speculate
about knowledge in these areas, and indeed often did not know what the words “physics”
or “political science” meant. The following dialogue illustrates this, and is typical of
transcripts from the other middle-school students:
P10: Some of the questions I didn’t understand - the political science.
JG: Okay, good, um what, what didn’t you understand or why were they why
were they hard for you?
P10: Um well, I haven’t done political science in school yet.
JG: Okay.
P10: Um…
JG: So you haven’t done it so it was hard, was it hard trying to guess?
P10: Yeah.
JG: What you like…
P10: Mmm.
JG: Okay, what about physics?
P10: I haven’t done physics in school either, but I can have an idea of what it’s
like.
JG: Mm-hm okay, and what do you think it’s like?
P10: Um….it’s like I think it’s like learning a life, like how you’re live your life,
I’m not sure.
Some high-school students also struggled with these areas:
JG: Okay, so first of all what were your overall impressions of filling this out?
P11: I don’t know, I have no idea what political science.. and I haven’t taken
physics so, I have no idea what, I didn’t really know what to put for those.
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Even some graduate students sometimes struggled with the items addressing these
content areas:
P02: Um, I..had…some trouble with the subjects. You know like I mentioned, I
think, it’s been so long since I’ve taken physics, so I was trying to think about,
you know, um, physics formulas and the little ramps, and like doing all the
different kinds of formulas and equations and proofs, um, so I had trouble sort of
situating my thinking in, within that topic. And again, as I mentioned, I hadn’t
taken a political science course, I don’t think, so thinking about that as a topic,
um, was a little bit of trouble for me, I think it was easier for me with the math
and the history.
Given these difficulties and the need for the EOCQ to have the same items across
educational levels, the decision was made to drop all items referring to physics and
political science. In the interest of brevity, items addressing these academic areas will not
be discussed further in this analysis.
Reverse Coding and Negatives
As DeVellis (2003) has suggested, the reverse-coded items posed problems for
many pilot participants. Many of these items included the word “not” and some had
double negatives (see Appendix A, item number 65 for an example). Graduate and
undergraduate students were able to understand the items, but with some difficulty. The
following quote was typical:
JG: Okay okay..um were there any items that you kind of didn’t understand, or
didn’t make any sense to you?
P01: Um there might have been one or two but nothing was so bad that it sort of
jumps out at me, just sort of like the wording with a lot of nots and completely
disagree or agree I have to think about it for a second.
Younger participants had an even more difficult time with these questions.
JG: Okay, good, okay, and the last one that I saw, that I thought might be
confusing for you is 65.
P09: Yeah there was one, like, double-negative.
JG: Yeah.
P09: Yeah that one. [laughs] I was really lost on that one.
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JG: Okay so the double negative was what confused you.
P09: Yeah, pretty much.
Therefore, the dissertation version of the EOCQ was written without double negatives
and with an effort to reduce the use of terms such as “not.” The number of reverse-coded
items was reduced, and those items made more clear by eliminating negatives.
Response Scale
Each participant was asked whether the seven point Likert scale was both
interpretable and sufficient. All participants agreed on both counts. However, it was often
noted that when participants were unsure as to the meaning of the item, they selected
neither disagree nor agree. This kind of equivocation is not what the response option was
intended to measure, but is often found when there are an odd number of response
options with a true neutral point (DeVellis, 2003). While it is hoped that the unclear items
have been clarified in the final version of the EOCQ, it is important to try to prevent
participants from using the true neutral as a proxy for a “I don’t understand” response.
Therefore, the response scale on the final version of the EOCQ was changed to a six-
point scale, with the options: completely disagree, mostly disagree, somewhat disagree,
somewhat agree, mostly agree, and completely agree (see Appendix E).
Ill-Structured Versus Well-Structured Domains
High-school students did seem to see a difference between social sciences and
hard sciences, as Chandler and colleagues (2002) would suggest:
JG: So, let me just ask you this question in general, um if you think about like,
math or history for example, some people will um talk about how much of it is
opinion versus how much of it is fact, so for math how much do you think is fact
and how much do you think is opinion?
P11: Math? I think everything is fact.
JG: Okay, so it’s almost entirely facts.
P11: Yeah.
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JG: What about history?
P11: History is based off of I think a lot of opinion.
JG: Okay, so more opinion than fact in history? Okay good, that’s really helpful.
An interesting finding of the pilot, however, was that two of the middle-school students
also showed an understanding of subjectivity in history, something the model would not
predict. The following two dialogues were instructive:
JG: Okay, great. Um…let’s see…so..for in history the truth means different
things to different people you put a five, why did you put that?
P10: Because um…with the civil war, um, some, all of the Americans think that
um..we uh, we were like, yeah, we were like really good.
JG: Mm-mm.
P10: To, yeah, to…to do that, to start a war because it wasn’t fair.
JG: Mm-mm.
P10: But some, some people in England probably thought, maybe the opposite of
that.
JG: Oh, okay, oh the American Revolution?
P10: Yeah, American Revolution.
JG: Right okay.
P10: That’s it.
JG: So, um, so if in America people thought they were doing the right thing but
in England people may have thought they were not doing the right thing?
P10: Yeah.
JG: Okay, and um, is one of those groups more right or more wrong?
P10: Um…no.
JG: No.
P10: No, cause..also in the Civil War too, because slaves, the slaves, some people
thought it was good to have slave but some people thought it wasn’t right.
JG: Okay, and there’s not kind of a right or wrong answer?
P10: Yeah.
JG: Okay, great, okay..alright so for this question: In history, the truth means
different things to different people you said neither disagree nor agree, why did
you say that?
P12: Because some people’s opinions on like World War II would be that…Hitler
was a very good man, now personally I really hate Hitler.
It was readily apparent that in both these cases the participant understood that people
view history differently depending upon their perspective. These students appeared to be
very bright and perhaps therefore atypical, but it will be interesting to see if whether in a
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larger sample the characterization of middle-school students as realists when it comes to
ill-structured domains will be borne out. The other middle-school student had responses
more in line with the model.
Simple and Certain Knowledge Items
Table 11 shows each participant’s score on the simple and certain knowledge
items. Higher scores indicate greater belief in simple and certain knowledge, a less
adaptive position. All reverse-coded items have been recoded so that higher scores
represent greater belief in simple and certain knowledge. In addition, the participant’s
educational level is shown, along with a column indicating the hypothesized score for
that participant based upon educational level.
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Table 11


















Graduate Low 5 3 6 6 3 2
Graduate Low 2 1 2 3 6 2
Graduate Low 3 5 7 7 4 1
Undergraduatea High 2 2 6 7 3 3
Undergraduatea High 7 3 6 7 2 7
Undergraduatea High 7 4 6 6 5 5
High-school High 4 6 6 5 7 4
High-school High 7 7 6 4 7 7
High-school High 6 3 6 6 6 2
High-school High 3 2 7 7 3 7
Middle-school High 5 5 7 7 1 4
Middle-school High 4 7 7 7 3 5


















Graduate Low 1 4 3 4 1 1
Graduate Low 2 1 2 2 3 3
Graduate Low 1 5 7 7 4 1
Undergraduatea Low 1 6 4 6 2 1
Undergraduatea Low 2 7 4 6 1 7
Undergraduatea Low 2 5 4 4 3 1
High-school Low 1 2 1 1 1 2
High-school Low 1 4 1 1 7 4
High-school Low 2 6 7 6 2 4
High-school Low 3 7 2 7 2 4
Middle-school High 3 5 4 6 1 6
Middle-school High 4 6 7 7 3 6
Middle-school High - 7 7 7 4 7
Scores that are opposite of what was hypothesized from the model are highlighted.
a These participants were in their first two years of college, so they were classified as
“Early College.”
These data suggest that items 4, 10, 31, and 35 may be problematic in that they have
numerous responses that are not as hypothesized.
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For the most part, item number two (“In math, the truth means different things to
different people.”) seemed to be working well, with 77 percent of the responses matching
expectations. Graduate students seemed more likely to agree with this statement, as this
think aloud illustrates:
P07: Um..again I’m going to, because of the wording, I’m going to have to agree
with this ... Basically, the truth regardless of whether or not it is a fundamental
truth, can be interpreted differently by different people.
Younger participants were more likely to disagree. In terms of the parallel item for
history, item 29, it elicited adaptive responses from high-school through graduate
students, as expected. However, as stated previously, one of the middle-school students
also responded with an adaptive response, while another was so confused that he could
not respond to either item. The item was not changed in the final dissertation version of
the EOCQ given the positive quantitative and qualitative results for most participants, but
the one middle-school student’s inability to respond is concerning.
On the other hand, many participants disagreed with item four (“To do well in
math class, the main thing you need to do is memorize facts.”) not because they had a
more adaptive belief in the complexity of math, but because “you only have to remember
formulas you don’t remember facts” (P06). These participants often referenced other
aspects of the class as more important than facts, but the intention of the item was to
assess whether participants understood that the interconnections and interpretations of
knowledge were more important. The parallel item in history, item 31, had a different
problem. Numerous undergraduate and high-school students, expected to have an
adaptive response, instead agreed that in history classes, memorizing facts is all that is
required. For example, participant one said: “I know you’re supposed to memorize
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interpretations and stuff like that, but, it’s mostly about facts, it’s about who what when,
where and why and those are all facts.” This appeared to be a commentary upon history
assessment, and not the area of knowledge itself. The quantitative data also suggest this
item is not functioning as intended, with only 58% of the responses as predicted. To
address these two problems these items were changed to read: “To know [math/history]
well, you need to memorize what you are taught.” This change is intended to put the
focus of the question back upon whether the knowledge in each of these areas is distinct
and whether personal interpretation is not necessary, i.e. simple and certain.
Item six (“In math, what is true today will be true tomorrow.”) discriminated
between the rationalism of a graduate student and the dogmatism of a college student,
respectively, as these two quotes show:
P03: Well, 2 and 2 will always be true but some of the more complicated stuff
probably not, so, about a 2 [Participant is referring to her response being
disagree].
P04: Uh..I’d say that’s a six [agree], uh, because math is usually facts and it’s
rarely that it gets changed around.
The parallel item for history, item 33, also elicited predicted responses. However, in light
of the work of Alexander and Dochy (1995) regarding people’s use of different terms for
knowledge and beliefs, this item was changed to use the word “fact” rather than “true.”
Therefore they now read “In [math/history] what is a fact today will be a fact tomorrow.”
Item eight (“In math, the facts do not change”) and its history parallel, item 35, confused
graduate students because they interpreted “facts” as something beyond human
understanding. Two graduate students’ think aloud statements illustrate this:
P07: Um, I would, I would argue that our knowledge of the facts can change but
the facts themselves don’t change.
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P02: Um..hm again it’s that idea of what we think are facts or what are actual
facts um…I..the facts do not change..I guess when I think of something as a fact it
is by definition it is something that does not change…so..I’m going to say 6 for
that one.
Clearly there was a problem with the word “facts” so this item was altered to:
“[Mathematicians’/Historians’] knowledge of the facts about [math/history] does not
change.” The choice of the term “mathematician/historian” rather than “our” derives from
a problem with items 10 and 37 (“There are some things in [math/history] that we will
never understand”). One participant in particular interpreted the term “we” differently
than intended:
P11: There are some things in math that we will never understand well I know I
don’t understand some things in math, like half the stuff I don’t understand
because the teacher doesn’t tell you how it works in the real world so I don’t
understand why I need to learn it.
This participant responded agree, interpreting “we” as “I.” Other high-school students
strongly disagreed with this statement, as predicted, so it appears that the “we” in this
item was troublesome. It is possible the middle-school students made the same
interpretation, and if their hypothesized beliefs were indeed that math is simple and
certain, this would explain their surprisingly low scores (see Table 8).
For the parallel history item number 37, the middle-school participants seemed to
be disagreeing with the statement due to a belief that humans lack a detailed record of
everything that has happened in the past. This was not the desired interpretation of the
item. The item was intended to assess whether participants believed that some knowledge
was so complex (i.e. not simple) that it may exceed human understanding. To better
capture this idea as well as avoid any confusion regarding “we,” these items were
rewritten as: “[Math/history] is so complex that humans will never really understand it.”
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Finally, items 12 and 39 (“If two [mathematicians/historians] disagree about some
part of [math/history], one of them must be wrong”) were troublesome because numerous
participants said:
P07: You can certainly have a scenario where even two people with expertise
could disagree, um, but, both of them be wrong, which would make uh, this a
false statement.
This item is a good example of why quantitative analyses alone do not suffice for
understanding item functioning, because the participants’ scores support the hypotheses.
However, the qualitative data are clear. Participants were disagreeing with this statement
because both experts could be wrong. This item was intended to measure whether
participants believed that two experts could disagree but both be “right.” These items
were not working well and, upon further inspection, also seemed to overlap to some
degree with the justification by authority dimension, so they were dropped.
Justification By Authority Items
The quantitative data become even more difficult to interpret with the justification
by authority dimension. For both ill and well-structured domains, graduate students were
expected to respond in the middle of the scale, operationalized here as three through five.
For well-structured domains, undergraduates should have either responded consistently
high, making them dogmatists, or consistently low, making them skeptics. High was
operationalized as five through seven, low as one through three. For ill-structured
domains, both undergraduates and high-school students should have either scored
consistently high or consistently low. High-school students should have been realists
when it comes to well-structured domains, responding with consistently high scores.
Finally, middle-school students should have been realists in both ill and well-structured
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domains, responding with high scores in both areas. Table 12 lists participant scores by
educational level.
Table 12
















Graduate Mid 3 3 2 4 3
Graduate Mid 2 6 4 6 7
Graduate Mid 6 6 6 7 3
Undergraduatea High/Low 6 6 6 7 7
Undergraduatea High/Low 4b 6b 3b 2b 5b
Undergraduatea High/Low 3b 6 6 5 5
High-school High 7 6 3 7 7
High-school High 1 6 2 7 1
High-school High 1 6 5 7 7
High-school High 6 7 7 7 6
Middle-school High 5 6 3 2 4
Middle-school High 6 7 6 7 3
















Graduate Mid 3 1 1 3 1
Graduate Mid 4 4 3 3 4
Graduate Mid 5 5 6 2 2
Undergraduatea High/Low 6 6 3b 6 6
Undergraduatea High/Low 4 6 7 7 3b
Undergraduatea High/Low 3 4 4 5b 3
High-school High/Low 4 3 2 2 3
High-school High/Low 1 5b 1 5b 2
High-school High/Low 2b 6 4b 5 7
High-school High/Low 6 6 6 6 6
Middle-school High 5 5 3 3 2
Middle-school High 6 6 7 1 7
Middle-school High 6 7 1 7 7
Scores that are opposite of what was hypothesized from the model are highlighted.
a These participants were in their first two years of college, so they were classified as
“Early College.”
b These scores were not consistent with the majority of other scores for this participant on
this dimension
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One general question was whether participant responses would be consistently indicative
of either the dogmatism or skepticism positions. For the most part this was found,
although one undergraduate was highly inconsistent in terms of mathematics and two
high-school students were somewhat inconsistent for history.
Items 14 and 41 (“If a [mathematician/historian] says something is a fact, I
believe it”) performed as expected overall, and participants appeared to understand the
question. An example of how participants’ responses were in line with predictions was
this high-school student’s think aloud:
P05: I complete agree because…pretty much math is, isn’t something you can see
or feel, it’s not really something to be skeptical because when you’re taught
something, you’re taught it, meaning it’s something that they made so, from them
it’s got to be true so you just straight up believe it.
One graduate student, who was predicted to be a rationalist about math, agreed or
completely agreed with all but one of the justification by authority items. This was
unexpected but his think aloud data showed that he was taking more of a dogmatist
perspective:
P07: Um…um again even if it was con- if it contradicted something I believed,
um I think I still would, uh, believe it’s a fact because of the source. A
mathematician clearly has more expertise than I do, um, so I think that,
mathematician is a more valid source then say me.
It could be that this graduate student was indeed a dogmatist in terms of math. The
parallel history item elicited expected responses. For example, this graduate student was
approaching history with a rationalist perspective:
P02: Uh, again it’s it’s hard to say if this is a person you know who I respect and
who I think looks at things from, um, all perspectives and, um….then I’d be more
likely to believe it. Um, but I am gonna, I’m going to say three for that I don’t
necessarily believe it automatically.
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Thus, these two items were retained in the dissertation EOCQ as written.
Items 16 and 43 (“I think the things written in [math/history] textbooks are true”)
were understood by the participants and their ratings were for the most part as predicted
by the model. As mentioned earlier, the same graduate student had more dogmatic faith
in math authority figures, including textbooks, providing support for the arguments of
other personal epistemology researchers that only a small number of people reach a
position such as rationalism (King & Kitchener, 2004; Kuhn, 2000). However, given
previous problems with the stem “I think” these items were rewritten as: “Things written
in [math/history] textbooks are true.”
The next pair of items was not nearly as successful as the previous sets. Items 18
and 45 (“If my friend and I disagree about something we learned in [math/history] class,
we just have to ask the teacher to tell us who is right”) were intended to assess
participants’ beliefs about the authority of teachers. Instead, participants more often
responded to the idea of whether there was a right answer in those fields:
P01: Again, I’m going to go with six because it’s not like I’m going to argue a
math point, one of us is going to be right or wrong, it’s not going to be something
that’s completely debatable.
P02: I completely disagree with that, um, I think that I could have an idea of what
happened [in history], my friend could have an idea of what happened, the teacher
could have another idea of what happened and none of us may necessarily be
correct.
This type of interpretation is more relevant to the simple and certain knowledge
dimension, not justification by authority. Therefore, these items were dropped.
Their responses to items 22 and 49 (“I don’t automatically believe whatever my
history teacher tells me”) were more in line with model predictions, and think aloud data
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showed that participants were focusing on the trustworthiness or authority of the teacher.
Participant eight’s think aloud for the history item illustrates this:
P08: Um…I think teachers have their own biases that they inadvertently put on
what they are saying so I would say 5 towards agree.
However, there were concerns about the negative phrasing of “don’t automatically
believe,” so the items were rewritten as: “If a [math/history] teacher says something is a
fact, I believe it.”
Finally, items 20 and 47 (“I don’t believe everything I learn in [math/history]
class”) may seem repetitive of the previous items in this dimension, but I believe they tap
an overall sense of trust in learning. However, the middle-school students struggled with
the phrasing of the question:
JG: Okay this one here, I don’t believe everything I learn in history class. And
you put completely agree, so you don’t believe everything you learn in history
class
P12: See, I think that was one of the mistakes I made because I had, I think this
was when my eye was sort of getting kind of tired, um…because I didn’t get, I
think, very much sleep I was, I did get a lot of sleep but my eyes are still kind of
tired….so, I was, I should have read this and like a second time and then put a
better answer like completely disagree because if your teacher tells you that
something is a fact they would probably know better because they’ve gone
through this many more times
JG: Okay, so um in history class if a teacher says something is true, you tend to
believe your teacher?
P12: Yes
Despite his claims of being tired, it appeared that he got confused regarding the negative.
Therefore, this question was rewritten as: “I believe everything I learn in [math/history]
class” and is now not reverse-coded.
Personal Justification Items
There are a number of interesting findings among the personal justification items.
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First, at a general level, the EOCDM predicts that participants in the dogmatism and
skepticism positions should be high on one justification dimension, and low on the other.
Looking past the items that have been replaced, of the ten participants in either of these
two positions, only two were high on both dimensions (see Table 13). All of the other
participants had high scores on one dimension and low scores on the other. This is
encouraging in terms of the specific hypothesis of the EOCDM that students in those
positions should not have similar scores on both dimensions.
130
Table 13





PJ score Item 24 Item 26 Item 28
Graduate Mid 3 2 5
Graduate Mid 1 1 4
Graduate Mid 3 1 5
Undergraduatea High/Low 2 1 3
Undergraduatea High/Low 3 1 5
Undergraduatea High/Low 2 2 4
High-school High 4 1 2
High-school High 1 1 7
High-school High 1 2 4
High-school High 2 1 6
Middle-school High 3 4 5
Middle-school High 1 1 1





PJ score Item 51 Item 53 Item 55
Graduate Mid 2 2 4
Graduate Mid 1 1 6
Graduate Mid 2 2 3
Undergraduatea High/Low 6 1 5
Undergraduatea High/Low 7 2 2
Undergraduatea High/Low 2 4 5
High-school High/Low 4 6 1
High-school High/Low 7 1 1
High-school High/Low 1 2 4
High-school High/Low 2 1 5
Middle-school High 2 4 2
Middle-school High 1 3 2
Middle-school High - 1 -
Scores that are opposite of what was hypothesized from the model are highlighted.
a These participants were in their first two years of college, so they were classified as
“Early College.”
However, the other interesting finding is much less positive. From a quantitative point of
view, the personal justification items seem to be working quite well for participants
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hypothesized to be in dogmatism or skepticism, but working very poorly for all other
participants. Qualitative data support this conclusion. At the extreme, one middle-school
student simply could not answer most of these questions. When asked about why this was
so, the student was at a loss to explain himself.
In terms of items 24 and 51 (“In [math/history], you just have to decide what you
believe and what you do not”) numerous students reacted to the “just” as implying that
the scientific method, or other kinds of rigorous thinking, was not useful. For example,
this graduate student is thinking in a relativistic manner, but responded with “completely
disagree.”
P02: Again, when I first read that I feel a little bit more like hmmm, maybe so,
maybe you do have to decide what you believe and what you do not, but I don’t
feel comfortable saying that I agree, I disagree with that. Um, I don’t think you
just have to decide what you believe and what you do not, I think maybe there’s a
process that you have to go through um…and..and um…not endorse, or not
endorse, but, come to a conclusion through other ways.
A vast majority of the high-school and middle-school students responded to item 24 with
slightly disagree or lower, contrary to hypotheses. College students also disagreed, but in
their case this met the model’s hypothesis, so their responses appear supportive of the
EOCDM. However, it is clear that the intention of this item, to assess whether
participants viewed personal experience as sufficient for justification, was not
communicated. In addition, Alexander and Dochy’s (1995) findings would suggest that
the word “truth” should be replaced with “knowledge.” Therefore, to better tap this
construct, this item was completely rewritten as: “In [math/history], everyone’s idea of
knowledge can be different because there is no one absolutely right answer.”
Items 26 and 53 (“In [math/history], if you believe something is true, no one can
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tell you that you are wrong”) also had almost completely opposite results for participants
hypothesized to be in realism or rationalism. Many participants reacted to the “no one can
tell you that you are wrong” portion of the item in a similar manner, for example:
P02: Again, someone can always tell you that you are wrong, so I’m going to say
that I disagree, a 2 for that.
Participants in realism or rationalism focused on the idea that people can be told they are
wrong and not whether they can be proven wrong. One high-school student expressed
this clearly:
P05: Um…uh…..and also that one thing that I thought could have confused
me…was “no one can tell you whether you are wrong or not.” Does that mean no
one is able to just say you are wrong, or no one will be able to prove and say,
“You’re wrong for sure?”
However, it is interesting that those participants in the dogmatism or skepticism positions
did seem to grasp that the question was intended to assess whether they believed there
was an objective right or wrong:
P11: Well, no a historian could tell you if you were wrong so let’s go with a two.
Well, actually let’s go with a one.
So, in an effort to preserve the positive aspects of this item but address some participants’
misunderstanding of the word “tell” these items have been rewritten as: “In
[math/history], if you believe something is a fact, no one can prove to you that you are
wrong.” It is important to note that this item does differ from the simple and certain
knowledge item “In [math/history], the truth means different things to different people.”
The personal justification item focuses on whether some can justify their individual
belief, whereas that simple and certain knowledge item focuses on whether knowledge is
complex and able to be interpreted in different ways by different people.
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Items 28 and 55 (“In [math/history], the average person cannot tell what is true
and what is not”) were very confusing for participants:
P08: Again, um, average person has to be better defined. Well, if by average
person you mean someone who has not taken history at all, yeah, it can have, it’s
not if they can say what is true or what is not, they don’t have an understanding.
Numerous other participants had similar struggles, so this item was rewritten to better
address this issue of the validity of personal experience in academic areas and the work
of Alexander and Dochy (1995): “In [math/history], what’s a fact depends upon a
person’s point of view.” Finally, I felt it important to add an item that included both the
terms Alexander and Dochy (1995) found most strongly related to knowledge. Thus, I
added the items “[Mathematical/historical] knowledge is all factual and there are no
opinions.” These items are obviously reverse-coded.
Summary
This pilot study was very helpful in determining which items were working well
and which needed to be rewritten or removed. The quantitative data provided an initial
insight into how participants were responding by educational level and in terms of the
hypotheses of the EOCDM. The think aloud and interview data, however, provided
important insight into participants’ interpretations and struggles with the items. Based
upon participant responses, the items were refined to be more focused upon the central
issues of the three dimensions: simple and certain knowledge, justification by authority,
and personal justification. A new, shorter but more focused version of the EOCQ was
created for use in the dissertation study (see Appendix E). This dissertation version of the
EOCQ contains 26 content items and seven demographic items, making it much quicker
to fill out and reducing the resource demands. The title was also changed so that it does
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Chapter 3 provides information regarding the final dissertation version of the
EOCQ to be used in this dissertation. This chapter focuses upon the procedures used to
administer this measure, how missing data was handled, the coding of educational level,
and the analysis plan.
Participants
Participant Recruitment
Professors and instructors from multiple departments at the University of
Maryland, including Human Development, Measurement, Statistics, and Evaluation,
Counseling and Personnel Services, and the College Park Scholars program were asked if
I could enter their classes and administer the EOCQ to their students. I also received
permission to enter into English classes at Downingtown West High School in
Downingtown, Pennsylvania. Finally, I also drew a sample from the sixth-grade students
at Downingtown Middle School in Downingtown, Pennsylvania.
Sample Characteristics
There were a total of 662 participants in this study. Table 14 details the




Participants by Educational Level, Sex, and Age
Male Female Age: Mean
(Standard
Deviation)
Middle School 52 75 11.57 (.496)
High School 68 105 16.74 (1.066)
Undergraduate 79 225 20.35 (2.804)
Graduate 20 38 28.4 (5.266)
The total response rate across educational levels was 67%. Table 15 shows the response
rate by educational level.
Table 15
Response Rate by Educational Level
Educational Level Response Rate
Middle School 42% (127/300)
High School 62% (173/281)
Undergraduate 99% (304/307)
Graduate 60% (58/97)
The response rate for middle-schools students was particularly low. However, the
principal of that school said the low rate may be related to the fact that it is quite difficult
for middle-school students to remember to get parental consent forms signed and
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returned. He stated that a 25 percent return rate was not uncommon for these types of
forms (Mr. Tom Mulvey, personal communication, February 8, 2007).
Finally, Table 16 shows the major of the undergraduate and graduate students,
crossed with gender.
Table 16
Graduate and Undergraduate Major by Gender
















Educational Psychology Male 1
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Female 2
Family Studies Male 0
Female 1








Public and Community Health Male 0
Female 2
School Psychology Male 0
Female 3





Aerospace Engineering Male 0
Female 1
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Allied Health Male 0
Female 1
American Studies Male 0
Female 2



















Computer Engineering Male 1
Female 0
Computer Science Male 0
Female 1
























































Public and Community Health Male 2
Female 13













Women’s Studies Male 0
Female 2
Although there are a proportionally larger number of education majors in the sample, in
general the kinds of majors students reported were fairly diverse.
Informed Consent
Participants over the age of 18 were asked to complete the informed consent form
immediately before completing the EOCQ. Participants under the age of 18 were asked to
take the informed consent form to a parent or guardian to sign. Students brought the
consent form to class and this was collected. These participants, under the age of 18, then
were given the assent form to read and sign (see Appendix F for scans of the consent and
assent forms with IRB approval stamp). Once both the consent and assent forms had been
signed, the EOCQ was administered. Any questions about the procedure that did not




Participants were told ”This questionnaire is meant to assess your understanding
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of different academic and non-academic areas. There are no right or wrong answers.
Please answer the items honestly, as your responses will be confidential.” The response
scale was also described as spanning from one to six, with one being completely disagree,
two being mostly disagree, three somewhat disagree, four somewhat agree, five mostly
agree, and six as completely agree. Participants were given as much time as they need to
complete the EOCQ, contingent upon the time allotted by the instructor of the class in
which they are taking the questionnaire. No student took longer than 20 minutes to
complete the questionnaire, and none expressed concern that they lacked the time
necessary to complete it. Participants filled out the EOCQ individually and were asked to
not discuss the questionnaire while completing it. Any content questions participants may
have had about items on the questionnaire were not answered to prevent bias. Instead, the
participants were told to “do the best [he or she] can” in interpreting the item. After
collection of the EOCQ, participants were asked not to discuss the questionnaire with any
peers who might be taking it at a later time.
Debriefing
This measure was administered to groups of students in classrooms, not on an
individual basis. Therefore, the needs and wishes of the instructor of the class were
respected. If time was available for a group debriefing, I gave a brief description of the
content of the questionnaire. I also offered individuals the opportunity to contact me via
email to arrange a time to debrief individually.
Analysis
The data analysis itself is described in the results section. However, three issues
are relevant to the methods used in this study. The first is missing data, next is the
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measurement of educational level, and the last is statistical power.
Missing Data
Of the 662 participants, only 23 had missing data. There were 16 unique missing data
patterns, with no pattern repeated more than twice. Given that this was a low percentage
of the total data and that there were no specific patterns that were frequent, the missing
data was treated as missing completely at random (MCAR; Little & Rubin, 2002). In
Mplus, when the data are MCAR, full information maximum likelihood is used so that no
cases need be removed from the analyses (Muthén & Muthén, 2006).
Educational Level
As stated previously, educational level is a proxy for exposure to education, and is
conflated with age and cognitive ability. Participants were asked if they were in middle-
school, high-school, college, or graduate school. College students were asked whether
they were freshmen, sophomores, juniors, or seniors. For analysis, this variable was
coded as years of school, with middle-school as 6, high-school as 11, freshman as 13,
sophomore as 14, junior as 15, senior as 16, and graduate school as 17, thus making it a
continuous variable.
Power
Wood and Kardash (2002) assert that many studies of epistemic cognition lack the
power necessary to find statistical significance. This is often due to either a failure to use
more powerful statistical techniques or a study having a low sample size. For this
analysis I utilized a factor mixture model, which disattenuates error providing a more
powerful test of the relations amongst the variables. However, factor mixture models also
require larger sample sizes than many other techniques. Unfortunately, sample size
146
recommendations for factor mixture models “are difficult if not impossible to provide”
(Lubke & Muthén, 2005, p. 36). Nonetheless, power analysis can provide a rough idea of
sample size needs.
The factor mixture model can be considered a kind of mixture structural equation
model (SEM), thus the closest means of assessing a priori power is to utilize methods for
SEM models such as those described by Hancock (2006). In this case, the power analysis
concerned sample size determination for testing data-model fit as a whole. A fully
unrestricted final factor mixture model without covariates is the most complex model
with the least amount of information, and thus requires the most participants to reach
sufficient levels of power. Mixture models require the estimation of both the mean and
covariance structure. Hancock (2006) provides a formula for determining the necessary
sample size based for the common standard of power: .80. This formula requires knowing
the degrees of freedom of the model, which in this case is the number of unique pieces of
information in the variance/covariance matrix and the means structure minus the number
of parameters to be estimated. Assuming 26 EOCQ items, there would be 351 unique
pieces of information. Assuming a four class model with strong factorial invariance and
latent factor variances and covariances free to vary across classes, the following
parameters would have to be estimated: 20 factor loadings (6 set to 1 for identification),
104 error variances, 52 error covariances, 26 intercepts, 24 latent factor variances, 80
factor covariances, and 12 latent means (6 set to 0 for identification), totaling 318
parameters. Thus the degrees of freedom would be 33. Setting the RMSEA test p-value at
! = .05 and using Hancock’s (2006) recommendation for the reference distribution’s
degree of noncentrality, it was determined that 439 participants would be needed for a
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The analyses addressed three main issues. The first concern was the validity and
the reliability of scores from the EOCQ. The second concern was the testing of the
EOCDM using a factor mixture model. The third concern was the proposed
developmental progression of EOCDM positions and its relation to educational level.
Validity and Reliability of the EOCQ
According to the Standards for Educational and Psychological Testing (2000),
validity is “the degree to which evidence and theory support the interpretations of test
scores” (p. 9) and is specific to the sample, the time the sample was gathered, and the
conditions of the data collection. As such, all discussions of validity in this dissertation
are subject to these conditions. The construct validity of scores from the EOCQ, their
reliability, and the viability of the underlying model, was first assessed using a
measurement model. These analyses addresses research question one, hypotheses one and
two. All analyses were performed using Mplus version 4.2 (Muthén & Muthén, 2006),
and full information maximum likelihood estimation due to the MCAR nature of the
missing data.
Measurement Model Validity
Using confirmatory factor analysis (CFA), I used the measurement model to
examine whether the three dimensions (simple and certain knowledge, justification by
authority, personal justification) within each domain (math and history) were adequately
captured by their respective items, or indicators. In this model, all latent factors, the
dimensions, were allowed to covary (see Figure 2). The possibility of statistically
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significant error covariances was more likely with the EOCQ given that parallel items
were used for math and history (for example, see items 1 and 13 in Appendix E).
Therefore, error covariances for each set of parallel items were included a priori. These
covariances are not shown in Figure 2 for the sake of clarity.
Figure 2
Measurement Model
If found, acceptable fit of the model to the data would provide evidence of the construct
validity of scores from the EOCQ. Data-model fit was assessed in multiple ways. The
chi-square test of fit was calculated but not used to determine data-model fit due to its
sensitivity to sample size (Kline, 2005). Instead, I examined the chi-square/df ratio, the
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comparative fit index (CFI), the Tucker-Lewis coefficient (TLI), the standardized root
mean-square residual (SRMR) and the root mean square error of approximation
(RMSEA). Using current standards, the hypothesis of good data-model fit can be retained
when the chi-square/df ratio is less than 2.0 (Kline, 2005), the TLI and the CFI are
greater than or equal to .96, the SRMR is less than .09 or the RMSEA is less than or
equal to .06 (Hu & Bentler, 1999). Hu and Bentler (1999) recommend using the SRMR in
combination with either the CFI or RMSEA to determine fit. Successful data-model fit
provides support for hypothesis one. A lack of fit does not necessarily imply a problem
with measurement. In factor mixture models, it is possible that a CFA might have poor fit
specifically because there are underlying mixtures in the sample that have differing
relations amongst the items (Dr. Gregory R. Hancock, personal communication,
September 11th, 2006). Therefore, construct validity evidence was obtained using both
the measurement model and the factor mixture model, described later.
Measurement Model Reliability
The factor mixture model implemented later to test hypotheses about the EOCDM
utilized the theoretical latent factor scores as indicators of the latent classes. As such, the
reliability of those theoretical latent factor scores was important. The appropriate
indicator of reliability for latent factor scores is Coefficient H, which is a maximal
reliability measure (see Hancock & Mueller, 2001). This reliability measure yields an
estimate of the degree to which the latent construct is captured in the information
contained in its measured indicators, which in this case are the items. Coefficient H also
provides a sense of how well this factor would be expected to cross-validate. Hypothesis
1a, that Coefficent H will be greater than .7 for each latent factor in math and history in
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the measurement model, was examined. The value .7 was chosen because it is a
commonly accepted lower bound for adequate reliability (Cronbach & Shavelson, 2004).
Domain-Generality Versus Specificity Hypothesis
Hypothesis two was tested by running three comparison models. The first
comparison model had a single domain-general factor for the first dimension, simple and
certain knowledge. The fit of this model was compared to the fit of hypothesized
measurement model. The second and third comparison models had domain-general
factors for the justification by authority and personal justification factors, respectively. A
scaled chi-square difference test (Satorra & Bentler, 1999) was used to determine
whether each comparison model had a statistically significantly worse fit than the
domain-specific measurement model. If the fit of each comparison model was statistically
significant worse than that of the measurement model, this would provide evidence for
retaining hypothesis two, that epistemic and ontologic cognition, as measured by my
model, is domain-specific.
Factor Mixture Model
The factor mixture model combined the confirmatory factor analysis used in the
measurement model with a latent class cluster analysis using the theoretical latent factor
scores. Confirmatory factor analyses disattenuate error in the EOCQ, providing better
measures of participants’ beliefs to be used in classifying participants as realists,
dogmatists, skeptics, or rationalists (Kline, 2005). The main advantage of the factor
mixture model is that it provides a confirmatory way of assessing whether these
classifications are supported by the data.
The factor mixture model addressed hypothesis three, and was used for
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hypotheses four and five. Given that epistemic and ontologic cognition position is latent,
an individual’s position in the EOCDM must be determined from his or her responses to
individual items. The factor mixture model provided a way of categorizing participants as
realists, dogmatists, skeptics, or rationalists within each domain based upon their
responses to individual items. Within both math and history, EOCDM position was
defined in terms of scores on the three epistemic and ontologic dimensions (see Table 8).
For example, realists in math and history are hypothesized to have relatively high scores
on all three epistemic and ontologic dimensions in both domains. Therefore, it follows
that realists’ theoretical latent factor scores in the measurement model should be at least
as high or higher than participants with dogmatic, skeptical, or rationalist beliefs in these
domains. A participant’s EOCDM categorical position was determined based upon his or
her theoretical latent factor scores across all six dimensions.
In terms of statistical modeling, EOCDM position across both math and history
can be considered a categorical variable. For example, participants could be categorized
as realists in math and skeptics in history, or dogmatists in math and rationalists in history
(see Table 8 for a list of hypothesized positions across domains). The classification of a
participant on this categorical variable was made through the use of six continuous latent
factor indicators: the dimensions (see Figure 3). This kind of analysis can be thought of
as akin to a latent profile or latent class cluster analysis (see Magidson & Vermunt, 2004
for a general description of latent class cluster analyses). However, given that the
indicators were latent and not observed, Lubke and Muthén (2005) would describe this
type of analysis as a factor mixture analysis, and that is how it will be referred to here
(see Muthén, Asparouhov, & Rebollo, 2006 for an example of a factor mixture analysis,
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in this case with behavioral genetics modeling). Factor variances and covariances were
allowed to vary across classes. For clarity, factor indicators, the items, and indicator error
covariances are not shown in Figure 3, but are the same as shown in Figure 2.
Figure 3
Factor Mixture Model
Whereas in latent class analysis the indicators, in this case the EOCQ items, are often
assumed to be locally independent, in factor mixture analysis the covariances of the items
are modeled using the latent factors, and these relations are captured in the CFA or
measurement portion of the model. The CFA portion of the model disattenuates the
measurement error in the items, providing stronger measures of the theoretical latent
154
factor scores to be used as indicators of the latent classes. Therefore, the factor mixture
model assessed whether participants clustered into classes according to their theoretical
latent factor scores, with the expectation that the class means for each factor would match
those hypothesized by the model and illustrated in Table 8. For example, for the ill-
structured domain, history, the model suggests that middle-school student means on the
three dimensions should all be high, whereas graduate students’ latent means should be
low on the simple and certain knowledge factor and mid (in the middle of the scale) for
the two justification factors. In essence, a factor mixture model is like a multiple-groups
CFA where the groups are unknown and must be determined by the data.
However, before latent factor means can be used to typify classes, the factorial
invariance of the measurement portion of the model must be demonstrated (Byrne, 1994;
Lubke & Muthén, 2005). Factorial invariance has been defined as having three
increasingly restrictive levels: weak, strong, and strict invariance (Meredith, 1993). Weak
invariance occurs when only factor loadings are fixed across classes. Strong invariance
fixes intercepts as well as factor loadings. In addition to the restrictions in strong
invariance, strict invariance also fixes error variances and covariances across classes. In
general, factor loadings and intercepts must be fixed across classes to use the latent
means in the factor mixture, necessitating at least strong factorial invariance. There
continues to be disagreement as to whether strong or strict factorial invariance is
necessary for factor mixture models (Lubke & Muthén, 2005) but it is becoming more
evident that fixing factor loadings across classes helps in the estimation of factor means
(Lubke & Muthén, 2007), the focus of this study. This analysis assumed strong factorial
invariance was sufficient for utilizing latent factor means, and also assessed whether
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strict invariance held. Therefore, factor loadings and intercepts were held fixed across all
classes, but models with and without error covariances and variances fixed were tested.
Data-model fit for factor mixture models is an unsettled issue in the field (Nylund,
Asparouhov, & Muthén, under review). The measurement model assessed the fit of the
CFA portion of the factor mixture model. The factorial invariance models (Lubke &
Muthén, 2005) assessed whether the models were amenable to using the theoretical latent
factor scores as indicators of the latent class variable, EOCDM position. Assessing the fit
of the model with the inclusion of the latent class position variable with its latent factor
indicators, however, complicated the analysis in two ways. First, the factorial invariance
models described previously had to be run anew each time the number of posited latent
classes was increased. So, the analyses began with a two latent class model, and models
with and without error variances and covariances fixed across classes were fit to
determine which model had better fit. Then a three latent class model was examined,
again comparing models with and without residual variances and covariances fixed. This
process continued through a four latent class model. This resulted in a number of models
tested, necessitating some means of choosing the best model. The decision rule used to
choose between models is described next.
Further complicating the use of a latent class position variable is that commonly
accepted criteria for choosing the best model based upon data-model fit in factor mixture
models, such as Hu and Bentler’s (1999) for CFA, do not exist. The main concern with
the fit of the categorical position variable is how many different classes, in this case
EOCDM positions, are appropriate given the information in the latent indicators.
Certainly substantive theory should be the main guide, and in this model there should
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have been at least two classes, one with math and history realists and another with more
adaptive positions in these domains. However, it was possible that the data would be
better fit with a model with more classes. It was possible to have one class for each
model-supported combination of position crossed with domain, leading to a large number
of factor mixture models with varying numbers of classes. While the interpretability of
the classes is one means of deciding between models, more mathematical criteria are also
desirable.
Unfortunately, a model with K-1 classes is not nested within a model with K
classes, thus they cannot be directly compared using standard likelihood-ratio tests (c.f.
Dayton, 1998). Models differing in the number of classes, however, can be compared
using information criteria measures. These measures include the Akaike and Bayesian
information criteria (AIC, BIC; Vermunt & Magidson, 2002). These information criteria
are designed to select the model that “is expected to show the smallest decrease in
likelihood if the model were cross-validated on a new sample of cases” (Dayton, 1998, p.
18). The AIC does not directly take into account sample size, whereas the BIC does and
is considered asymptotically consistent. For each measure, the model with the lowest
value is considered a better fit. In many cases the BIC tends to favor models with fewer
classes than those selected using the AIC (Dayton, 1998). The adjusted BIC (SABIC) has
also been recommended as another means of comparing data-model fit across models
with different numbers of classes (Nylund et al., under review).
Information criteria measures have been criticized, however, and researchers have
attempted to create alternative versions of the likelihood-ratio test as a means of directly
comparing models with differing numbers of classes. One such test is the Lo-Mendell-
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Rubin likelihood ratio test (LMR; Lo, Mendell, & Rubin, 2001), which tests the null
hypothesis that the data are actually the result of K-1 classes. Rejection of this null
hypothesis supports retaining a model with at least K classes, if not more. Recently,
Nylund and colleagues (under review) have submitted simulation results suggesting that
the parametric bootstrap likelihood ratio test (called the bLRT) is a more accurate test of
whether a model with at least K classes fits better than a model with K-1 classes.
Given the still unsettled nature of the field, a decision rule was needed for
choosing between models. For this dissertation, I used the following measures to choose
between factor mixture models with differing numbers of classes: the AIC, BIC, SABIC,
LMR, and bLRT. When these measures differed, a consensus was sought, and barring
any consensus, substantive theory and the bLRT were used to make final decisions
regarding the best fitting model.
Factor Mixture Model Reliability
During the process of estimating the factor mixture model, it was possible that the
factor loadings would be different from those is the measurement model CFA, affecting
the measure of reliability, Coefficient H. Therefore, hypothesis 3a was used to examine
whether the factors in factor mixture model also had a construct reliability of .7 or higher.
Developmental Progression of Math and History Positions and Their Relation to
Educational Level
Math and History Position Hypothesis
From the tested models, the best model, as determined using the decision rule
described previously, was chosen as the final factor mixture model. Participants were
placed into the class for which they had the highest probability. The means of each
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class’s theoretical latent factor scores were then examined and used to characterize the
math and history EOCDM position for participants in that class (see Table 7). For
example, if a class were to have a high latent factor mean for all six latent factors, this
would identify the class as realist for both math and history. Latent factor means are
described on a relative scale, meaning that they must be compared to means in other
classes to determine whether they are high, mid, or low. With hypothesis four, I predicted
very specific combinations regarding latent factor means within domain, thus this
hypothesis could be retained or rejected based upon whether the pattern of factor means
matched those stated in Table 7. In addition, it was hypothesized that a latent class’s
history position would always be at least as adaptive as its math position.
Educational Level Hypothesis
Hypothesis five stated that graduate students would be more likely to be in a
higher position for both math and history than undergraduates, who were predicted to be
higher than high-school students, who in turn were predicted to be higher than middle-
school students. To test this, the latent class variable was regressed on a covariate of
educational level (middle-school, high-school, college freshmen, sophomore, junior,
senior, and graduate student). In Mplus, models with a categorical outcome variable (in
this case math and history position) are estimated using a logistic regression model.
The final factor mixture model with the covariate is shown in Figure 4.
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Figure 4
Final Factor Mixture Model with Covariate
Research Questions and Hypotheses
The research question and associated hypotheses were as follows.
Research Question: What evidence is there supporting or refuting the EOCDM
based on the construct and discriminant validity and reliability of scores from the
EOCQ?
Hypothesis 1: The statistical measurement model, which allows all latent
factors (simple and certain knowledge, justification by authority, and
personal justification dimensions) to covary, will have an acceptable level
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of data-model fit according to Hu and Bentler’s (1999) criteria.
Hypothesis 1a: The construct reliability of latent factor scores
derived from the measurement model will have a Coefficient H
value greater than or equal to .7.
Hypothesis 2: Domain-specificity will be found, with items for history and
mathematics loading on separate latent factors.
Hypothesis 3: The hypothesized factor mixture statistical models will have
an acceptable level of data-model fit. The fit of these statistical models
will be compared to alternative factor mixture statistical models positing
more positions, as well as ones positing fewer positions, as well as models
with less restrictive assumptions. Procedures and criteria for factor
mixture model fit as outlined by Lubke and Muthén (2005) will be used.
Hypothesis 3a: The construct reliability of latent factor scores
derived from the factor mixture model will have a Coefficient H
value greater than or equal to .7.
Hypothesis 4: For a majority of individuals, their conceptual model-
predicted EOCDM position within history will be equal to or higher than
their conceptual model-predicted position for mathematics.
Hypothesis 5: Educational level and EOCDM positions in history and
mathematics will be probabilistically related, with higher levels of
education predictive of higher positions within the EOCDM.
Hypothesis 1: Measurement Model Results
The measurement model (see Figure 2) was assessed to determine whether the
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individual items were valid indicators of their respective factors. The measurement model
included covariances between all factors and error covariances between parallel items for
math and history (e.g. Items 1 and 14 in Appendix E). The model was fit using Mplus 4.2
(Muthén & Muthén, 2006) with a robust estimator to account for multivariate non-
normality in the indicators. Descriptive statistics for the individual items are listed in
Appendix G. Numerous fit indices and tests were examined, but Hu and Bentler’s (1999)
criteria were used as the main arbiter of model fit. These criteria state that models should
have an SRMR less than .09 and either a CFI greater than or equal to .96 or an RMSEA
less than or equal to .06, although these values were not derived using a robust estimator.
Model fit indices, including which have been computed using robust estimation, and
statistics are listed in Table 17.
162
Table 17
Measurement Model Fit Indices and Statistics
Fit index/statistic Recommended valuea Measurement Model Value
Robust Chi-square p > .05 906.917, 271 df (p < .001)










Robust Root Mean Square
Error of Approximation
" .06 .060
a Recommended values based upon Kline (2005) and Hu and Bentler (1999).
It should be noted that Hu and Bentler’s CFI and RMSEA criteria were not determined
using robust estimation; further, regarding the CFI specifically, recent research has
suggested that it may degrade in models containing a large number of variables such as
this one (Kenny & McCoach, 2003). Solely judging model-data fit by the statistical
significance of the chi-square and the CFI and TLI, the fit is not acceptable. However,
using Hu and Bentler’s (1999) criteria, given that the SRMR and RMSEA are within the
recommended values, there is evidence to retain the hypothesis of adequate data-model
fit of the measurement model. The standardized factor loadings are listed in Table 18.
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Table 18
Measurement Model Standardized Factor Loadings
























-.556** .672** .736** -.464** .756** .659**
.077 .665** .316** .329** .789** .052
.377* .767** .807** .678** .852** .617**
.275* .758** -.453** .637** .855** -.664**
-.120* -.309**
* p < .05
** p < .01
Items written to have negative loadings on factors (items 1, 5, 13, 14, 18, and 26) did
indeed load negatively. As can be seen in Table 18, all but two indicators were
statistically significant at the .05 level or lower. In addition, all but four indicators had
factor loadings equal to or greater than .3, a standard for acceptable loadings in
exploratory factor analysis (DeVellis, 2003; Gorsuch, 1983) but certainly a weak
standard for CFA. From these results, it appears that the simple and certain knowledge in
math factor was most problematic. It had one statistically non-significant loading and
three loadings below .3. Table 19 lists the error covariances in a standardized metric as
correlations, with all but two being statistically significant, implying relevant method
covariance between parallel items.
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Table 19
Measurement Model Error Correlations
Factor / Items Error Covariance
Simple and Certain Knowledge Items
Question 1 and Question 14 .100*
Question 2 and Question 15 .210**
Question 3 and Question 16 .132**
Question 4 and Question 17 .163**
Question 5 and Question 18 .287**
Justification by Authority Items
Question 6 and Question 19 .064*
Question 7 and Question 20 .076**
Question 8 and Question 21 .0221
Question 9 and Question 22 .064*
Personal Justification Items
Question 10 and Question 23 .010
Question 11 and Question 24 .183**
Question 12 and Question 25 .133**
Question 13 and Question 26 .175**
* p < .05
** p < .01
All error covariances hypothesized a priori were retained in the measurement model to
test their statistical significance in the classes defined by the factor mixture models to
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follow. Factor correlations, construct reliability, and variance extracted values are listed
in Table 20. These values further indicate that the simple and certain knowledge math
factor was the weakest using construct reliability and variance extracted as metrics,
whereas the justification by authority factors were the strongest.
Table 20




















































.11 .51 .37 .26 .66 .31
* p < .05
* p < .01
Note: Construct reliability estimates (H) on diagonal.
166
The variance extracted was highest for the justification by authority factors, with little
variance extracted from the simple and certain knowledge in math factor.
Hypothesis 1a: Reliability Results
The construct reliabilities (see Table 20) of three of the factors were above .7, with two
above .67 and with the simple and certain knowledge in math factor having a poor
construct reliability of .42. Thus for three of the six factors, hypothesis three was
retained, but for the other three it was not. Ultimately, however, the construct reliability
must be reexamined in the factor mixture model. In addition, it is important to note that
these are reliability estimates based upon this sample and would require confidence
intervals to give a sense of plausible population values.
Hypothesis 2: Domain-Generality Versus Specificity Results
Hypothesis two concerned whether the three dimensions, simple and certain
knowledge, justification by authority, and personal justification, were domain-general or
domain-specific. I hypothesized that a domain-specific model, with separate factors for
math and history, would be a better fit than models with domain-general factors. This
hypothesis was tested by comparing the fit of the measurement model to the fit of three
comparison models. Comparison model one had all of the simple and certain knowledge
items loading on the same factor. Comparison model two did the same for justification by
authority items and comparison model three did this for personal justification items.
These three comparison models were nested within the measurement model,
therefore while the fit indices could be compared, a scaled chi-square difference test
provided the most direct evidence as to whether a domain-general factor was supported.
Given that these models used a robust estimator, it was necessary to use the scaled chi-
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square difference statistic (Satorra & Bentler, 1999). If this test was statistically
significant, then the comparison model did a statistically significantly worse job of
explaining the data, and the measurement model, with domain-specific factors, should be
retained. As can be seen in Table 21, each comparison model had poorer results than the
measurement model on all model fit indices and had a statistically significant scaled chi-
square difference test, supporting the hypothesis that all three factors were in fact
domain-specific in this study.
Table 21
Fit Indices and Statistical Tests of Measurement Versus Comparison Models





























Hypothesis 3: Factor Mixture Model Results
Initial Estimation Problems
Convergence of mixture models in general can be a difficult issue (McLachlan &
Peel, 2000), and this is even more of a problem for factor mixture models. A majority of
the hypothesized factor mixture models would not converge with the measurement model
described in hypothesis one, even after trying various techniques to achieve convergence
such as using different starting values for parameter estimates. As a next step, various
items were removed, starting with those that did not have statistically significant factor
loadings, items 2 and 24. These items’ factor loadings were .077 and .052, respectively.
This model also had convergence problems, leading to the decision to remove item 5,
which had a statistically significant factor loading below .3. This model also failed to
converge. Modification indices for the full measurement model indicated that item 1,
which had a statistically significant factor loading of -.556, had strong cross-loadings
with other factors, including both math justification factors as well as the justification by
authority history factor. The removal of item 1 did produce a factor mixture model that
could converge and be estimated. Therefore, the analysis required removing a total of
four items, which included the following, “In math, the truth means different things to
different people,” “To know math well, you need to memorize what you are taught,”
“Math is so complex that humans will never really understand it,” and “In history, if you
believe something is a fact, no one can prove to you that you are wrong.” Each of the
removed items were set aside for further analysis in the future. The removal of these
items also necessitated the removal of their associated error covariances from the model.
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A confirmatory factor analysis of this reduced model, using a robust estimator,
with four factor indicators removed, produced more favorable fit indices and reliability
estimates than the original measurement model, and similar factor loadings (see Tables
22, 23 and 24).
Table 22
Measurement and Reduced Measurement Model CFA Fit Indices and Statistics



























a Recommended values based upon Kline (2005) and Hu and Bentler (1999).
170
Table 23
Reduced Measurement Model CFA Model Factor Loadings
























.724* .670* .710* -.444* .755* .645*
.545* .669* .347* .362* .791* .607*
.771* .841* .689* .853* -.678*
.752* -.437* .647* .854*
-.314*
* p < .01
























































.41 .51 .38 .26 .66 .41
* p < .05
* p < .01
Note: Construct reliability estimates (H) on diagonal.
The construct reliability of the simple and certain knowledge factor, which was most
problematic in the original measurement model, increased to .60, and the variance
extracted for this factor also increased to .41. The construct reliability of the history
personal justification factor, which was the other factor that had an item removed from it,
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stayed at .68, with an increase in variance extracted to .41. Therefore, given the
feasibility, improved fit, and construct reliability of factor scores of this reduced model, it
was used as the measurement model for each of the subsequent factor mixture models
tested.
Factor Mixture Model Testing
Robust estimators are not available for factor mixture model testing, thus
adjustments were not made for non-normality in indicators. All factor mixture models
tested allowed factor variances and covariances to vary across classes. Lubke and Muthén
(2007) have found that the inclusion of covariates in model estimation can facilitate class
separation and participant categorization, therefore each model had the latent class
variable regressed on the covariate, educational level. The first set of models, called the
strict invariance set, had factor loadings, intercepts, and error variances and covariances
fixed across classes. The second set of models, called the strong invariance set, had the
same restrictions except they allowed error variances and covariances to vary across
classes.
For both the strict and strong invariance sets, two, three, and four class factor
mixture models were run. In both sets, the four class models did not terminate normally
and had solutions with numerous problems including correlations between factors greater
than one and negative factor variances. This suggests that the solutions were not valid
and therefore they are not reported. All other models converged to admissible solutions
using user-provided start values. Mplus 4.2 (Muthén & Muthén, 2006) provides an option
of randomly perturbing start values, to determine whether the solution with lowest
loglikelihood is repeated. Ideally, this solution should be repeated using different sets of
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start values to ensure that it is indeed the best estimation of the model. Using this option,
each model’s lowest loglikelihood was obtained using the unperturbed start values, but it
was not repeated using perturbed start values, even with 30 random starts. It appeared
that these models were very sensitive to start values.
Better fitting models have log-likelihood, AIC, BIC, and SABIC values closer to
zero. LMR and bLRT values less than .05 indicate that a model with at least as many
classes as posited is warranted. The LMR and bLRT values are comparisons between
models with the same factorial invariance standards, either strong or strict, but different
numbers of classes. The preponderance of evidence across each of these metrics
suggested that the three class factor mixture model with strong factorial invariance was
the best fit (see Table 25).
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Table 25
Factor Mixture Model Fit Indices
Model Log-
Likelihood
AIC BIC SABIC LMR bLRTa
Measurement
Model
-22584.179 45356.358 45778.913 45480.460 - -
2 class, strict
invariance
-21381.266 43000.532 43535.468 43157.639 .000 .000
3 class, strict
invariance
-21247.982 42791.964 43457.263 42987.358 .12 .000
2 class, strong
invariance
-21133.144 42566.287 43240.577 42764.321 .000 .000
3 class, strong
invariance
-20878.567 42177.133 43121.139 42454.381 .186 .000
a bLRT values indicate a comparison between that model and a model with one less class
but the same restrictions regarding factorial invariance.
The only metric that did not support the three class strong invariance model was the
LMR, which has been criticized as being less accurate than the bLRT (Nylund &
colleagues, under review). The bLRT results did suggest that at least a three class strong
invariance model was supported. Therefore, using the decision rule for this dissertation,
the three class, strong invariance model was chosen as the final factor mixture model for
this analysis.
This final factor mixture model had factor loadings different than the reduced
measurement model CFA, as can be expected in this type of analysis (see Table 25). The
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differences in the standardized factor loadings between the reduced measurement model
(see Table 23) and the factor mixture model can be attributed to the fact that when there
are mean differences in the items across unidentified classes, as can be the case in a
single class measurement model, the covariances between those items can be attenuated.
The factor mixture model accounts for these mean differences in the items between
classes, causing the covariances to differ. In addition, while the unstandardized factor
loadings were fixed across classes to meet one of the requirements of strong factorial
invariance, the factor and error variances were allowed to vary across classes, resulting in
standardized factor loadings that differed across classes (see Table 26).
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Table 26
Factor Mixture Model Standardized Factor Loadings




































































Note: All factor loadings p < .01. For each set, factor loadings are listed in order for latent
class 1, latent class 2, and latent class 3.
Factor correlations, variances, construct reliability, and variance extracted for the
factors by class are reported in Table 27.
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Table 27
Factor Mixture Model Factor Correlations, Variances, Construct Reliability (H), and





























































































































* p < .05
** p < .01
a All factor variances except this one have p < .05
Notes: Factor variances on diagonal. Multiple values appear in a cell, indicating the value
for each class, in order: Class 1, Class 2, Class 3.
From Table 27 it appears that the low variance of the history simple and certain
knowledge factor in class 3 had a detrimental effect upon that factor’s construct
reliability and variance extracted. In general, the factors in class 3 had much smaller
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variances than their respective factors in classes 2 and 3, affecting the standardized factor
loadings that are used to determine both Coefficient H and the percentage of variance
extracted. This explains the lower values for class 3 on these metrics.
Hypothesis 3a: Factor Mixture Model Construct Reliability Results
The construct reliability results for the factor mixture model are difficult to
interpret because they vary by class. In general, 12 of the 18 construct reliability values
were above .7. In absolute terms, classes 1 and 3 each had three factors each with
construct reliabilities above .7, whereas in class 2 all construct reliabilities were above .7.
The construct reliability of the factors in class 2 were all higher than those in the reduced
measurement model, while those in class 3 were lower, with class 1 having some
construct reliabilities higher and some lower. Again, the dependency of Coefficient H
upon factor variances may explain the differences in construct reliability of factors across
classes.
Interpretation of Factor Mixture Model Classes
The next question concerned the interpretation of the latent factor means within
each class to determine whether the hypothesized EOCDM positions were supported (see
Table 7). Estimation of a factor mixture model includes a latent class cluster analysis
where participants are grouped based upon how similar they are in terms of their
theoretical latent factor scores. Participants are given a likelihood of being in each class,
and then assigned to the class for which they have the highest likelihood. Classification
of participants based upon their most likely latent class membership using this final factor
mixture model resulted in 248 participants in class one, 221 in class two, and 193 in class
three. Each class, then, has a latent factor mean for each dimension based upon the
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average of theoretical latent factor scores for all participants in that class. Factor means
are measured on a latent scale, thus the means in one class must be set to zero to establish
reference points (Kline, 2005). In this model, the means of the third class were set to
zero. Latent factor means for all classes are shown in Table 28. Each latent factor was
measured on its own unique scale, thus it is not appropriate to compare latent factor
means across factors. The means are not on a standardized metric because the factor
variances differed greatly, calling into question whether an appropriate pooled variance
could be computed for standardization purposes.
Table 28






















1 -.549* -.923* -.254 -1.117* -1.035* .538*
2 -.146 -.438* -.496 -1.175* -1.058* .875*
3 0 0 0 0 0 0
* Statistical test of this mean compared to class three mean of 0 had p < .05
In Table 28, statistical significance indicates that the latent factor mean differs
statistically significantly from zero, the factor mean for class three. The factor means for
math justification by authority in classes one and two also differ statistically significantly
from each other. Each of the history factor means in classes one and two differ
statistically significantly from zero, but not from each other. Within each dimension and
across classes, the means can be categorized as either low, mid, or high. These
classifications can then be used to categorize the classes according to EOCDM position
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(see Table 8). Interpretations of the factor mixture model latent factor means in terms of
the EOCDM positions are shown in Table 29.
Table 29






















1 Low Low High Low Low High
2 High Mid High Low Low High
3 High High High High High Low
For example, the math simple and certain knowledge latent factor mean for class one was
statistically significantly lower than the means for classes two and three, whose means
did not statistically significantly differ from each other (see Table 28). Therefore, it can
be interpreted that class one’s math simple and certain knowledge mean was low,
whereas the other two classes’ means were high (see Table 29). Likewise, in math
justification by authority, all three latent class means differed statistically significantly
from each other, suggesting the class one’s mean be considered low, class two’s mid, and
class three’s as high. By examining each class’s pattern of means within the math and
history factors, classes can be categorized as realist, dogmatist, skeptic, or rationalist (see
Table 7).
Characterizing these classes in terms of positions (see Table 30) suggests that
participants placed in class one can be considered skeptics (e.g. low simple and certain
knowledge, low justification by authority, high personal justification) in both math and
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history. On average, these participants believed that knowledge was not simple and
certain, and also had little faith in authority figure’s ability to provide justification.
Instead, these participants believed that “facts” in math and history were really just
opinions and that there were few “right” answers. The class two math position is
somewhat ambiguous with the justification by authority value being mid, but overall
suggests a realist position for math and a clear skeptic position for history. These students
responded similarly to class one respondents in terms of history, but had a less adaptive
view regarding math, thinking that knowledge was simple and certain, with personal
experience held in high regard and authority figures somewhat less so. The math position
for class three is clearly realist, but the history position is less clear with a high value for
simple and certain knowledge but a low value for the personal justification factor. This
pattern of means was not hypothesized, and seems to be a mix of the realist and
dogmatist positions. In terms of their history position, these participants claimed
knowledge was simple and certain, but denied that personal opinion was a sufficient
means of justification. This was an unexpected result because according to the EOCDM a
belief in simple knowledge should result in the acceptance of any means of justification,
either authority or personal experience.
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Table 30
Latent Class EOCDM Positions




a Interpretation does not strictly follow from EOCDM
Therefore, of the six latent class positions, four align with the hypotheses generated by
the EOCDM, whereas two do not. This can be considered mixed support for retaining
hypothesis 3.
Hypothesis 4: Math and History Positions Results
Hypothesis four stated that participants’ history position should be at least as high
as their math position. An examination of the three latent classes from the factor mixture
model shows evidence supporting this hypothesis. Given that the skeptic position is more
adaptive than the realist, in each class the history position is at least as adaptive as the
math position (see Table 30). The history position in class three is somewhat difficult to
interpret, but is certainly at least as adaptive as the math position, supporting hypothesis
four.
Hypothesis 5: Educational Level and Math and History Positions
The last hypothesis concerned whether there was a relationship between
educational level and EOCDM position. The statistical test of this hypothesis involved a
logistic regression of the latent class variable on educational level. Before this is
examined, however, it is helpful to examine frequency data.
183
In the results of the factor mixture model, each participant was given a posterior
probability of being in each of the three classes. Using each participant’s most likely
class, Table 31 shows the frequency of each class by educational level.
Table 31









Class 3: Realist /
Realist/Dogmatist
Total
Middle-school 41 1 85 127
High-school 84 42 47 173
Freshman 21 22 13 56
Sophomore 17 26 14 57
Junior 38 48 16 102
Senior 26 51 12 89
Graduate 21 31 6 58
Total 248 221 193 662
In general, middle-school students were more prevalent in the less adaptive class 3,
whereas the other educational levels were more likely to be in the more adaptive classes 1
or 2. According to the EOCDM, class 2 is somewhat less adaptive than class 1, making
the predominance of college seniors and graduate students in this class an unexpected
result. These frequencies can be more thoroughly examined by regressing latent class
membership on the covariate, educational level.
The latent variable representing participants’ positions in math and history was
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categorical; therefore using educational level to predict these positions required a logistic
regression model. The results of this logistic regression are shown in Table 32.
Table 32
Multinomial Logistic Regression of Position Variable on Educational Level
Comparison Intercept b eb
Class 1 versus Class 3 -1.376 .149 1.161
Class 2 versus Class 3 -4.918* .404* 1.498*
Class 1 versus Class 2 3.542* -.255* .775*
* p < .01
Educational level was coded as a continuous variable representing years in school. As
such, middle-school was coded as 6, high-school as 11, freshman as 13, sophomore as 14,
junior as 15, senior as 16, and graduate school as 17. The results indicate that for a one
unit increase in educational level, an increase of one school year, the odds of being in
class one versus class three increased by 16 percent, but that this increase was not
statistically significant. It is, however, in the predicted direction as the class one positions
in math and history were both skeptic, a more adaptive position than the positions in class
one, which were both realist. A unit increase in educational level was associated with a
50 percent increase in the odds of being in class two versus class three, and this
difference was statistically significant and in the hypothesized direction, given that class
two had a more adaptive position for history than class three. Finally, a unit increase in
educational level was also associated with a 22 percent decrease in the odds of being in
class one versus class two. This provides further evidence that as educational level
increases participants are more likely to be in class two rather than classes one or three.
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This result was not hypothesized, given that class one had a more adaptive position in
math than class two.
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CHAPTER 6: DISCUSSION
In this dissertation, I outlined a new epistemic and ontologic cognitive
development model (EOCDM). This model followed in the tradition of personal
epistemology research within educational psychology, but was informed by philosophical
epistemology as well as developmental psychological work in the area of theory of mind.
By incorporating a greater focus upon justification, a main concern of philosophical
epistemology, my model accommodated disparate findings from the two psychological
literatures as well as informed the measurement of epistemic and ontologic cognition.
The conceptual debate within personal epistemology literature regarding domain-
generality or specificity was addressed using philosophical literature, and I showed that a
domain-specific model, distinguishing between well and ill-structured domains, was the
most likely representation of individuals’ epistemic and ontologic cognition. I also used
philosophical literature to support reclassifying certain aspects of personal epistemology
models as ontological, as opposed to epistemological. The integration of personal
epistemology, philosophical epistemology, and theory of mind research allowed me to
create a model that described epistemic and ontologic cognition throughout the lifespan.
In addition, my conceptually grounded model, with domain-specificity and a focus upon
justification, allowed for the creation of a more psychometrically sound measure of
epistemic and ontologic cognition.
The Epistemic and Ontologic Cognition Questionnaire (EOCQ) was designed to
measure the constructs outlined in the EOCDM, and a revision of it was informed by a
pilot study and research regarding how individuals view issues of fact versus opinion
(Alexander & Dochy, 1995). A revised EOCQ was given to 662 participants who ranged
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from middle-school to graduate school students. Support for the reliability and validity of
scores from the EOCQ was interpreted as initial evidence for retaining the EOCDM as a
plausible model of epistemic and ontologic cognition. The EOCDM itself must be tested
numerous times and ways over the course of many years before it can be considered a
fully defensible model of epistemic and ontologic cognition, however. Nonetheless, the
validity of both the conceptual model and the measure were each reciprocally supported
by the other.
Within the limitations of this study, the results of this dissertation provided
reasonable support for the validity and reliability of scores on the EOCQ with these
participants. The hypothesis of domain-specificity was supported, although the degree of
this specificity will need to be examined in future studies. Statistical findings were
generally supportive of the EOCDM, but the evidence for two of the four positions,
dogmatist and rationalist, was mixed. Educational level was related to EOCDM position,
with higher educational levels associated with more adaptive epistemic and ontologic
cognition positions. The unexpected findings concerning certain EOCDM positions and
their developmental progression may have been due to a failure to obtain sufficient
numbers of participants in late college and graduate school, some selection bias due to
the low response rate among middle-school students, and problems with some of the
EOCQ items themselves, such as items 1, 2, 5, and 24. Each of the findings is more
completely discussed next, along with the limitations, contributions and implied future
directions of this research area.
Discussion of Hypothesis 1
Beyond providing a strong conceptual and theoretical foundation, an important
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step toward establishing the EOCDM as a viable alternative to other models of personal
epistemology was to determine whether an instrument could be developed that measured
its underlying constructs. The first hypothesis of this dissertation was that the EOCQ
would have acceptable data-model fit according to Hu and Bentler’s (1999) criteria, and
this hypothesis was retained. This provided support for the construct validity of the scores
from the EOCQ, and by extension, provided some evidence suggesting that the
underlying EOCDM may be an accurate representation of epistemic and ontologic
cognition. Work in both personal epistemology research (Hofer, 2004b; King &
Kitchener, 2004; Kuhn & Weinstock, 2002) and philosophical epistemology (Williams,
2001) suggests the predominance of justification in epistemic cognition. The EOCQ’s
inclusion of two separate justification factors, one for authority and another for
skepticism, allowed for a more nuanced measurement of how individuals go about
establishing justification for knowledge than other models that posit only a single
justification factor comprising both authority and skepticism (e.g. Hofer, 2004).
Measurement model results supported capturing justification using multiple factors.
Indeed, Kuhn’s (2005) and King and Kitchener’s (2004) exploration of adults’ standards
of justification suggests that there may be even more ways that individuals think about
justification, beyond just faith in authority or skepticism.
However, other measures of data-model fit, and by extension the construct
validity of scores from the EOCQ, were less clearly supportive of the model, including
the CFI, TLI, and chi-square. The chi-square value was statistically significant, implying
that there still existed some degree of misfit in the measure. The chi-square test has as its
null-hypothesis that the model implied relations between variables and the actual data-
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derived relations are statistically equivalent. Thus, a rejection of the null-hypothesis
suggests that the model is not an accurate representation of the data. The chi-square has
been championed by some as the only important metric of data-model fit (Hayduk &
Glaser, 2000) and indeed a statistically non-significant chi-square value is the gold
standard for latent variable models in general. The statistically significant chi-square
result for this analysis suggests that the EOCQ can be improved as a measure of
epistemic and ontologic cognition.
Other indications of data-model fit include the 26 factor loadings, of which all 26
were in the hypothesized direction, 24 were statistically significant and 22 were above .3.
Certainly this is encouraging regarding the degree to which the items capture the
underlying constructs, but in general it would have been more desirable to have items
with standardized factor loadings higher than .3, with each statistically significant. The
small factor loadings contributed greatly to the rather low variance extracted values for
the math and history simple and certain knowledge and personal justification factors. The
construct reliability of these factors was also below the hypothesized .7 metric. In all,
these problems all indicated that while the EOCQ could be used for analyses in this
dissertation, for future work it will be important to refine the items to improve its
psychometric qualities. The strongest case for the EOCDM would be an EOCQ with a
statistically non-significant chi-square and strong, statistically significant factor loadings
allowing for each factor to have a variance extracted percentage above .5 (Gorsuch,
1983), and a construct reliability above .7 (Cronbach & Shavelson, 2004). Indeed, the
fact that the EOCQ did not achieve these standards may be the reason why the factor
mixture model was difficult to estimate, a problem discussed later. However, constructs
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in the factor mixture model often had higher maximal reliabilities and variance extracted
than those in the measurement model, a positive aspect of the factor mixture model that
must be considered as well when evaluating the EOCQ and EOCDM. This is also
discussed later.
It should be noted that the EOCQ had stronger evidence of its psychometric
quality than previous measures including the EQ (Schommer, 1990) or the EBI (Schraw
et al., 2002). The EOCQ did achieve acceptable CFA fit using Hu and Bentler’s (1999)
standards, something that cannot be claimed about the EQ. The EBI has only been tested
using a CFA once (Greene et al., 2006) with acceptable but poorer data-model fit,
variance extracted, and construct reliability results than the EOCQ, as reported here.
Discussion of Hypothesis 2
In addition to the concerns regarding the lack of construct validity evidence for
previous measures of personal epistemology (Clarebout et al., 2001), there continues to
be debate about whether the underlying constructs are domain-general or specific (Buehl
& Alexander, 2001, 2005; Buehl, Alexander, & Murphy, 2002; King & Kitchener, 2004;
Pintrich, 2002; Schommer & Walker, 1995). Lately, a consensus has begun forming
around the idea that there are both domain-general and specific aspects of
epistemological beliefs (Buehl & Alexander, 2005; Hofer, 2002).
My EOCDM was based upon a theoretical and philosophical argument that
complete domain-generality is a form of vulgar relativism, a stance highly unlikely, if not
impossible to hold. Instead, I suggested that epistemic and ontologic cognition could vary
according to whether the domain discussed is well or ill-structured. The EOCQ contained
parallel items for math and history within well and ill-structured domains respectively.
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The results indicated that a domain-general factor structure was not supported, and that
my hypothesis of domain-specificity should be retained. This provided further evidence
suggesting that epistemic and ontologic cognition varies across domains. A full test of my
hypothesis regarding the degree of specificity, particularly at the well and ill-structured
level, will require an EOCQ with items addressing multiple well and ill-structured
domains. Nonetheless, these findings aligned with the work of Buehl and colleagues
(Buehl & Alexander, 2001, 2005; Buehl, Alexander, & Murphy, 2002) who also used
factor analytic techniques to provide empirical support contradicting the strict domain-
generality arguments of other theorists.
Discussion of Hypothesis 3
Item Removal Issues
Initial factor mixture model estimation problems prompted the removal of four
EOCQ items from this analysis. Three of these items either had statistically non-
significant factor loadings, or factor loadings below .3, both indicators of problems with
the item itself. The fourth, item one, had strong cross-loadings with multiple factors,
suggesting that it also failed to adequately capture its intended dimension and nothing
else. Once these items were removed, factor mixture model estimation proceeded
normally. While it is certainly not ideal to remove items hypothesized to load on the
factors of interest, it is not unusual for new instruments to require revision based upon
initial analyses (DeVellis, 2003). These results suggested that these items be revised for
future administrations, and indeed better designed items may lead to better data-model fit
indices and a statistically non-significant chi-square for the measurement model.
It was not immediately apparent why items two (“To know math well, you need
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to memorize what you are taught”) and 24 (“In history, if you believe something is a fact,
no one can prove to you that you are wrong”) caused problems in the factor mixture
model, particularly given that their parallel items in the other domain did work well.
Another think-aloud study may shed light on how participants were interpreting these
items.
On the other hand, the use of the word “truth” in item one (“In math, the truth
means different things to different people”) may have confused respondents. Whereas in
history the “truth” is often debated, this term may be less familiar in the context of
mathematics. Finally, item five (“Math is so complex that humans will never really
understand it”) contained two separate ideas, that math is complex and that humans
cannot comprehend it. This may have led to students responding to only one of the ideas
in the item, and perhaps likewise for its parallel item for history. In the case of
mathematics, this extraneous variance may have been strong enough to disrupt the factor
mixture model estimation process.
Factor Mixture Model
A three class, strong factorial invariance factor mixture model was chosen as the
best fit to these data. This model was supported by model fit indices, including the AIC,
BIC, SABIC, and bLRT results, although estimation problems limited my ability to
compare the three class model to more complex models with four or more classes. This
three class factor mixture model included numerous factors with stronger loadings, higher
construct reliability, and more variance extracted than the measurement model discussed
in hypothesis one. In all, these results suggested that the construct validity and reliability
of the measurement model may have been masked by the latent classes within this
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sample. The factor mixture model took into account these classes, allowing for better
measurement. The psychometric properties of the EOCQ, as measured by the factor
mixture model, exceeded the results of Schommer’s (1990) EQ and Schraw and
colleagues’ (2002) EBI, providing further support for its use an alternative to these
measures. However, items had to be removed from the math simple and certain
knowledge and history personal justification factors to allow the factor mixture model to
converge. The removal of these items calls into question whether there was sufficient
evidence of construct validity for these two dimensions. In the end, it must be
acknowledged that these dimensions most likely have not been captured sufficiently.
In the end, factor mixture models are not useful unless the latent classes of
respondents are interpretable based upon the theory driving the analysis. Hypotheses
derived from the EOCDM predicted that only certain patterns of latent factor means
would be found, and that these patterns could be interpreted as representing one of four
positions: realist, dogmatist, skeptic, and rationalist (see Table 7). An examination of the
latent factor means in each class (see Table 29) revealed that four of the six patterns of
means were clearly interpretable using predictions from the EOCDM. One class was
clearly comprised of skeptics in both math and history. These students had lost faith in
authority and had adopted the belief that objective truth does not exist in these areas.
Another class seemed to be realistic regarding math and was clearly skeptical regarding
history. These individuals viewed math as a simple and certain, objective domain where
justification merely required presenting evidence from an authority figure or one’s own
experience, but viewed history as less definitive. The last class contained individuals who
were clearly realists in terms of math. The history position was harder to identify, but
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appeared to be more dogmatic, suggesting that they recognized the complexities of the
domain, but felt that authority figures had the ability to “prove” what was “correct.”
The analysis of educational level and EOCDM position, discussed later, suggested
that the second latent class, which contained the problematic realist in math position, may
have been a combination of realists and skeptics in math. In my EOCDM, I predicted that
skepticism in math should not occur before mid to late college (see Table 8), and even
then only in some individuals. This sample contained 249 juniors, seniors, and graduate
students. This was only 38 percent of the sample, and given that movement from realism
in math occurs for only a portion of late college and graduate students, there simply may
not have been enough math skeptics for the factor mixture model to be able to
discriminate them from realists. Factor mixture models often require large numbers of
participants to discern latent classes, and it could have been that the low number of
skeptics could not be adequately differentiated from the realists in this class.
The problematic interpretation in history, found in class three, mirrored a problem
that Hallet and colleagues (2002) had. They reported difficulty in discriminating between
realists and dogmatists using their measure, which was a problem for the EOCQ as well.
The inclusion of the ontologic cognition factor, simple and certain knowledge, was
intended to help facilitate this discrimination, but in these analyses it did not seem to be
performing in this way. Again, it may be that there simply were not enough participants
who were dogmatists to discern their class using a factor mixture model. It was also
disappointing to find no rationalist positions in this analysis. Again, it may be that the
relatively small number of college seniors and graduate students did not allow class three
to separate into a realist/realist class and more adaptive classes. This is certainly an issue
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for future research, and more advanced students are needed to test this assertion.
Overall, the analysis using the factor mixture model did support numerous aspects
of the EOCDM, in particular the skeptic positions in math and history and the realist
position in math. It also demonstrated the importance of considering latent factor mean
differences when evaluating the validity and reliability of instruments measuring
epistemic and ontologic cognition. The psychometric qualities of the EOCQ, in particular
the standardized factor loadings, changed considerably when mean differences between
latent classes were considered. This is evidence that mean differences can attenuate
relations in the measurement model, obfuscating measures of reliability and validity.
Finally, the interpretability of four of the six positions was an encouraging result for an
initial administration and analysis.
Discussion of Hypothesis 4
In the EOCDM I posited four positions in a developmental sequence from least to
most adaptive: first realist, then dogmatist or skeptic, and lastly rationalist. In terms of
relations across well and ill-structured domains, I hypothesized that participants’ ill-
structured domain position should be at least as adaptive as their well-structured domain
position. Despite the limited number of classes extracted from the data, the evidence
supported retaining hypothesis four (see Table 30). In each class, the history position was
at least as adaptive as the math position, if not more adaptive. For example, in the second
class the math position was realist while the history position was a blend of realists and
skeptics. Regardless of what the actual classification should be, the history position
would be at least as adaptive as the realist math position.
These findings were congruent with work done in developmental psychology, and
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in particular Chandler and colleagues’ (2002) theory of mind model. It also cohered with
the work of Perry (1999), King and Kitchener (2004) and Kuhn and Weinstock (2002)
who all suggest that epistemic cognition moves from what I would call a more realist
position to some kind of skepticism, followed by a version of rationalism. These
researchers, in particular Perry and King and Kitchener, claim that the movement from a
realist position does not occur until college, a claim I disputed on theoretical,
philosophical, and, with these results, now empirical grounds. I also differed with these
researchers regarding their claims regarding the domain-generality of epistemic
cognition, as my model adhered more with the work of Buehl and colleagues (Buehl &
Alexander, 2001, 2005; Buehl, Alexander, & Murphy, 2002) showing a middle ground
between domain-general and domain-specific epistemic cognition.
Discussion of Hypothesis 5
The final hypothesis of this dissertation concerned the relation between
educational level and EOCDM position in math and history. In the EOCDM, I predicted
that cognitive development would be associated with more adaptive positions in both
math and history. Due to the lack of an acceptable measure for formal operations, I had to
use educational level as a proxy. However, this had many drawbacks, as it was
confounded with age and cognitive ability. Future studies should include a better measure
of individual cognitive development, rather than classifying all students within a grade
similarly.
Despite the less than optimal nature of this proxy, the frequency data of class by
educational level also provided evidence supporting the general hypothesis. Middle-
school students were predominantly in the less adaptive class, whereas college and
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graduate students were most likely to be in the more adaptive classes. The results of a
logistic regression of latent class on educational level also provided some support for the
hypothesis. In general, as educational level increased, so did the likelihood of being in
one of the two more adaptive classes. When findings were not statistically significant,
they were in the predicted direction. Participants at a higher educational level were
statistically significantly more likely to be in the realist/skeptic class than either of the
other two (see Table 30). It is possible that the realist/skeptic class could have been a
hybrid containing an undifferentiated rationalist/rationalist class, given the mid value for
history justification by authority. If this were the case, this could have been the reason for
these somewhat contradictory results. A larger sample with more graduate students may
help discriminate between these two latent classes.
As stated earlier, many models of personal epistemology claim that more adaptive
epistemic cognition does not develop until college. Yet in this study, 42 of the 147
middle-school students displayed some form of epistemic cognition beyond realism, as
did 84 of the 173 high-school students. Therefore, my model and the analyses here
supported the work in developmental psychology showing that for many students the
progression toward more adaptive epistemic and ontologic cognition begins in middle-
school, not college.
In summary, the scores on the EOCQ provided initial empirical support for the
EOCDM. Certainly much more work needs to be done before the EOCQ can be
considered an instrument ready for use in applied situations. Until the psychometric and
factor mixture model estimation concerns with the EOCQ are adequately addressed,




The current unorganized state of personal epistemology research suggested the
value of creating a new model of epistemic and ontologic cognition that could integrate
the findings and ideas of the other models. My model built upon Perry’s (1999) basic
structure, as does most of personal epistemology research. But I also incorporated aspects
of other models within educational psychology, including King and Kitchener’s (2004)
ideas regarding whether young children can even engage in epistemic cognition, their
focus on justification, and their claims regarding level of educational attainment and
epistemic cognition. From Kuhn’s (Kuhn & Weinstock, 2002) work I incorporated a
focus upon justification, an idea also supported by Hofer (2000). From Buehl and
colleagues’ (Buehl & Alexander, 2001, 2005; Buehl, Alexander, & Murphy, 2002) work
I adopted a stance between domain-generality and specificity that was similar to Chandler
and colleagues’ (2002). Schommer-Aikins’ (2004) model provided the impetus for my
simple and certain knowledge factor, and I used aspects of her EQ to inform the creation
of my own quantitative instrument. This integration of many models of personal
epistemology was something that numerous authors (Hofer, 2004a; Benedixen & Rule,
2004) have suggested. In addition I incorporated philosophical epistemology into the
model, something that has also been advocated (Murphy et al., 2007).
Philosophical epistemology focuses upon justification, providing the support for
my model’s increased attention to this issue. I also utilized philosophical epistemology to
resolve concerns regarding which factors should and should not be considered
epistemological as well as whether domain-generality was plausible. The EOCDM also
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incorporated research from developmental psychology and was designed to be able to
account for findings in that field as well as those in educational psychology. In particular,
the model accounted for findings in developmental psychology showing cognition
beyond dualism before the college years, and it also incorporated ideas of dogmatism and
skepticism from Chandler and colleagues’ (2002) model. Overall, the strong,
interdisciplinary foundation for the EOCDM, spanning educational psychology,
developmental psychology, and philosophy, allowed for the creation of a quantitative
measurement instrument that was more likely to meet high psychometric standards.
My results clearly supported three important conclusions that are contributions to
the personal epistemology literature beyond theoretical integration. First, more adaptive
epistemic and ontologic cognition begins well before the college years for many students.
The idea that high school students think dualistically with complete reverence for
authority figures does not align with theory, anecdotal or empirical evidence. Second,
there does appear to be some level of domain-specificity to epistemic and ontologic
cognition, as evidenced in the work described here and elsewhere. Finally, this
dissertation reasserted the importance of more sophisticated conceptual modeling of
justification in epistemic cognition. Philosophical epistemology places great importance
upon how individuals justify their knowledge. Theory and empirical results support the
idea that justification is a complex and multi-faceted construct, and cannot be simplified
into a single continuum with belief in authority on one end and vulgar relativism on the
other.
Methodological Contributions
This dissertation underscored the importance of developing measures of epistemic
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and ontologic cognition that meet high standards for psychometric quality. Instruments
designed to measure psychological constructs, such as epistemic cognition, must be pilot
tested carefully. This study showed how items that appear clear to researchers often are
not so to participants. Likewise, examining think aloud data as well as quantitative results
can help explain the confusions participants encounter, and point to new ways of
measuring the latent factors. Pilot testing helps produce instruments that are more likely
to display strong psychometric qualities with their intended populations, including
validity and reliability. Construct validity should be tested using confirmatory methods.
Also, metrics for validity and reliability should match the analyses performed, for
example by using Coefficient H for factor reliabilities rather than Cronbach’s alpha
(Hancock & Mueller, 2001). This dissertation highlighted these more sophisticated
techniques that should be used more often in educational psychology studies. The validity
and reliability of scores must be tested before they can be used in further analyses or
interpretations. Studies may produce results that seem to support the hypotheses, but
without testing the validity and reliability of their scores, these findings remain
unpersuasive (e.g. Bråten & Stromso, 2005; Schommer-Aikins et al., 2002).
Many of the studies mentioned previously utilized a “two-step” approach, where a
CFA was used to obtain factor scores and then various criterion variables were regressed
on these scores, with or without other covariates. More powerful and elegant techniques
exist, such as including covariates and criterion variables in the CFA or factor mixture
model itself, as done in this study. This allows a test of the overall model in its entirety,
and can facilitate estimation and data-model fit (Lubke & Muthén, 2005). Also, because
all aspects of the conceptual model can be statistically analyzed simultaneously, it allows
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for a more persuasive argument for the validity of the measure and the value of the
model.
In addition, the factor mixture model used in this study illustrated how ignoring
potential latent factor mean differences between latent classes can hinder measurement,
decreasing the validity of scores taken from instruments. Numerous studies have
examined the relations between factor scores and various academic outcomes
(Schommer, 1990, 1993) without considering the possibility that unobserved group
differences within the sample may be masking relations. At best this practice may fail to
disattenuate error that can disguise results, at worst it may render such analyses
meaningless, particularly when factor scores are used as predictor variables in statistical
models, such as multiple linear regression (Pedhazur, 1997), that include an assumption
of accurate measurement of those variables.
However, factor mixture models are also very problematic. They require large
sample sizes and depend upon distributional assumptions, such as the normal distribution
of indicators and latent factors that may not be tenable in most samples (Bauer & Curran,
2003). The testing of these models is also a relatively new area, and current
recommendations include assuming the invariance of factor loadings or intercepts across
the latent classes (Lubke & Muthén, 2007). This is of some concern because conceptually
factor mixture models are akin to multigroup SEM analyses, except in the former the
groups are unknown, whereas in the latter they are known a priori. An important aspect
of multigroup SEM is the testing of the invariance of the factor loadings and intercepts
across groups (Kline, 2005). Given the similarities between multigroup SEM and factor
mixture modeling, it would seem that testing the invariance of factor loadings and
202
intercepts would be important in both kinds of analysis. When invariance is not tenable, it
implies that the items measure different things in different groups, an important finding
that invalidates comparisons of group means. These group means, called latent class
means in a factor mixture model because the groups cannot be directly observed, are used
to characterize the classes. Therefore, if the factor loadings or intercepts in a factor
mixture model are not invariants, then the means are not valid, invalidating the
classifications. Given that the classifications are one of the primary goals of a factor
mixture model, it would seem that an examination of the tenability of invariant factor
loadings and intercepts should be an essential step in factor mixture modeling, not one
that is skipped.
Finally, this study assessed the validity, reliability, and predictive qualities of
scores from the EOCQ with a sample that included students from middle-school through
graduate school. This allowed cross-sectional comparisons regarding the relative
development of students from each educational level, and decreased the chances of range
restrictions that may attenuate correlations between variables when studied within a
group of students of similar age or educational level. For example, studies of epistemic
cognition that only focus on college students may suffer due to the lack of variance
within this group. Including a wider range of ages and educational levels ensures better
estimation of the variance of each measure, and the covariances between measures.
Implications for Education
While preliminary in its findings, this study has two implications for educators
and students. First, teachers should try to recognize the underlying epistemic and
ontologic beliefs of their students (Alexander et al., 1998). Whereas other models of
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personal epistemology (King & Kitchener 2004; Perry, 1999) make this task particularly
easy for middle-school and high-school teachers by suggesting all students are some form
of dualist, my dissertation illustrated that a far more diverse set of beliefs are possible,
even amongst sixth graders. Therefore, it is important for teachers to take into account the
epistemic and ontologic cognition of their students. With further revision, the EOCQ may
become a relatively quick yet accurate way to ascertain this information. EOCQ results
could be used to characterize students as realists, dogmatists, skeptics, or rationalists in
various domain areas. However, it is important to consider that response bias is likely to
occur when teachers give their students a survey that asks about their faith in that
teacher’s authority.
Otherwise, assessing students’ epistemic and ontologic cognition may require
conversations beyond the typical explication of technique or algorithm, and necessitate
teachers to probe students’ means of justification and understanding of knowledge in a
given field. Students who hold a simplistic view of knowledge may be at a real
disadvantage compared to their more sophisticated peers, particularly in classrooms
where assessment includes more than objectively scored items such as multiple-choice
questions. When students are asked to explain their thinking and explore multiple
pathways to understanding, those students who have more adaptive beliefs about
knowledge and justification will have a head start on those who instead look for the one,
simple answer.
Indeed, the failure to account for differences in epistemic cognition may account
for some of the difficulties associated with problem-based learning (Kirschner, Sweller,
& Clark, 2006). As Sandoval (2005) has illustrated, one reason students do poorly in
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problem-based or inquiry learning environments is because they fail to adopt more
adaptive views regarding the nature of science. Efforts to foster the adoption of more
adaptive views are often thwarted because students hold separate formal and practical
epistemologies. Formal epistemologies are beliefs about science as it is done by
professionals, whereas practical epistemologies are beliefs about how the students
themselves seek and justify knowledge. Problem-based learning often fails to take into
account these separate sets of beliefs, unintentionally aiming instruction at formal
epistemologies and leaves students’ practical, and often less adaptive, epistemologies
untouched. The students, who often are realists or dogmatists in well-structured domains
like science, may then be frustrated by the ill-structured problems, need for learner
control, instructions to search for multiple solutions, or subjectivity in evaluation criteria
that are typical in problem-based and inquiry learning environments. This frustration may
lead to less involvement and poorer performance. These students can be encouraged to
challenge their views of knowledge and means of justification by reading refutational
texts (Hynd, 2001) and engaging in classroom discussion with their peers as ways to
foster development in epistemic and ontologic cognition at the practical level, as
Sandoval (2005) describes it. However, whether interaction between peers who differ in
their epistemic cognition leads to development in this area remains an empirical question.
The second implication of this study follows from the finding that students’
epistemic and ontologic cognition is not domain-general. Therefore, it follows that
teachers and parents should not be surprised when students’ performance varies from
subject to subject. More adaptive epistemic and ontologic cognition in history, for
example, might lead to academic performance that is not matched in a science class
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where the same student’s position is realist. Sandoval’s (2005) ideas of formal and
practical epistemologies imply that even students with a more adaptive position for
formal epistemology may hold a less adaptive position in terms of their own, practical
epistemology. Teachers should be prepared to assess epistemic and ontologic cognition
separately by domain, and understand that gains made in one domain may very well not
transfer to others. They may also have to assess whether students’ beliefs differ
depending upon whether they are seen as relating to professionals or the self.
Limitations
Every study has its limitations, and this dissertation was no exception. Limitations
of this dissertation included those regarding the sample and the design.
Sample Limitations
All of the participants for this study were recruited either from a relatively
selective mid-Atlantic University or a suburban area of Pennsylvania that is known for its
high-quality education systems. As such, the generalizability of the findings was limited
by the relative homogeneity of the students. Future studies will be necessary to determine
whether these findings are applicable beyond these limited contexts.
Factor mixture models, which include a latent class cluster analysis, require a
large number of participants to discriminate classes. The sample size of 662 participants
was most likely not sufficient to differentiate the large number of potential latent classes
in the EOCDM. In particular, this sample had a relatively small number of college seniors
and graduate students, who are most likely to be in the dogmatist and rationalist
positions. In this study the dogmatists and rationalists may have been too few in number
to adequately discern them from the realists. This may be why evidence for the dogmatist
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and rationalist positions was somewhat ambiguous.
Design Limitations
The EOCDM was posited to be a developmental model. The cross-sectional
design of this study did not allow for true test of developmental progression. Future
studies should follow the same students for a number of years to test whether epistemic
and ontologic cognition develops in the orderly progression outlined in the EOCDM. A
longitudinal study would also allow more opportunities to measure participants’
educational exposure and stage of Piagetian cognitive development. Educational level
was a poor proxy for these important variables, and it was confounded with age and
cognitive ability. More sophisticated and targeted measures are necessary.
While demonstrating domain-specificity of epistemic and ontologic cognition, the
EOCQ could not test the degree of this specificity. The hypothesized well versus ill-
structured distinction can only be tested using a version of the EOCQ that includes more
than one domain from each category. For example, an EOCQ with questions about both
math and science could test the well-structured domain hypothesis, while questions about
history and literature could test the ill-structured domain hypothesis.
Future Directions
There remains great potential for the EOCDM, but much works needs to be done.
Certainly the first concern is improving the EOCQ itself by examining the items that had
to be excluded and improving the measurement of the posited factors. Further piloting
and discussions with participants regarding their interpretations of these items will help to
create an instrument more amenable to the complexity of factor mixture modeling. It is
also possible that attitude items cannot capture the ontologic factor. It may be more
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effective to provide a task asking participants to identify problems as well or ill-
structured, with those who are incapable of doing this classified as realists.
Once new items or measures are created, a broader administration with more
participants, and particularly more college seniors and graduate students, will be
necessary to determine whether the EOCQ, and by extension the EOCDM, accurately
captures more adaptive epistemic and ontologic cognition. It has been suggested that the
means of justification in adults may be more complex than postulated in many models of
personal epistemology (Hofer & Pintrich, 1997), and while the EOCDM does allow for a
more nuanced understanding than past models, it too may be underrepresenting the
phenomenon. It could be that the means of justification for more sophisticated
participants can include ideas beyond authority and the self, to include philosophical
epistemology’s ideas of coherence or probabilism (Murphy et al., 2007). What is needed
is an extended qualitative study of justification with individuals who have more adaptive
epistemic and ontologic cognition. While King and Kitchener (2004) and Kuhn (2005)
have engaged in qualitative analyses of justification, their work could be informed by the
inclusion of concepts from philosophical epistemology, such as coherence as a means of
justification (Murphy et al., 2007). Such a study may point toward additional justification
factors to be included in measures like the EOCQ.
Another potential addition to the EOCDM, and personal epistemology models in
general, is a position of epistemic and ontologic diffusion. As Dr. Patricia A. Alexander
has suggested (personal communication, May 11, 2007), it may be that certain
individuals have an inconsistent or diffuse set of beliefs about knowledge and knowing,
and that their responses do not fit any particular position. It may be that attempts to
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recncile epistemic and ontologic development is stressful and causes individuals to
become stuck between positions, particularly as they encounter experiences and ideas that
challenge realist beliefs in a fixed, unchanging, and objective reality. These individuals
may respond to the EOCQ in a diffuse manner, with no discernable position. Hammer
(1994) has found that students’ views regarding the nature of science vary by context,
and are not always internally consistent. It would also not be surprising if such
individuals’ views not only varied by context, but were particularly influenced by the
context in which they were given epistemic and ontologic cognition measures. A student
who believes in realism in mathematics may be more prone to ignore ontologic doubt
about other academic domains when given the survey by a mathematics teacher or in a
mathematics classroom, for example.
Indeed, the context in which individuals respond to measures of epistemic and
ontologic cognition may even influence those who have fairly strong beliefs about
knowledge and knowing. Certainly authoritative teachers may elicit more dogmatic
responses whereas environments that promote radical constructivism may influence
students to respond in a more skeptic manner. An important question is whether these
influences are context-specific and fleeting, or whether they are cumulative, leading to
some type of development. Too great a sensitivity to the former would be misleading,
while systematically missing the latter would impoverish the conceptual model.
There are numerous potential applications for a fully supportable EOCDM and
EOCQ. Hofer (2004) has already posited that individuals’ epistemological beliefs may
influence their choice of strategies, task definition and degree of metacognitive
monitoring. In terms of the EOCDM, I believe that students’ positions on the simple and
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certain factors should influence their task definitions, need for cognition (Cacioppo et al.,
2006) and depth of understanding, whereas their positions on the justification continua
should influence their metacognitive monitoring. The EOCQ could be used as a predictor
of self-regulated learning (SRL) activities (Pintrich, 2000; Winne, 2001; Winne &
Hadwin, 1998; Zimmerman, 2000). Azevedo and colleagues (Azevedo & Cromley, 2004;
Azevedo, Moos, Greene, Winters, & Cromley, in press; Greene & Azevedo, 2007) have
demonstrated how think-aloud protocols can be used to identify the SRL processes
students use while engaging in complex tasks. I believe that EOCDM position should be
predictive of these processes, with students with more adaptive beliefs more likely to
engage in higher-order SRL processes such as planning and monitoring their learning.
This research would address why students approach learning tasks differently, and help
establish the predictive validity of the EOCQ and by extension the utility of the EOCDM
and epistemic and ontologic cognition in general. Schommer-Aikins’ (2004) ideas
regarding embedding epistemic cognition with other important covariates for learning,
such as her nature of learning factors, should also be considered. Ultimately, an
understanding of the magnitude of the influence of epistemic and ontologic cognition
requires examining it simultaneously with other factors known to affect learning.
Finally, it would be particularly interesting to examine teachers’ beliefs about the
subjects they instruct, and whether congruence between a teacher’s and student’s
positions is associated with more favorable feedback and assessment. It may be that some
teachers approach their subjects with a strong epistemic or ontologic position, with
students who hold incongruent beliefs being less likely to achieve high grades. The




One indicator of a good model is that it is generative, producing new questions
and lines for research. The EOCDM does that, with much work needing to be done
regarding its measurement and many consequences of its proposed relations awaiting
discovery. The model integrates and expands upon the work in personal epistemology to
produce a conceptually strong foundation from which psychometrically valid measures of
the phenomena can be created. These measures can then be used to explore how students’
beliefs about knowledge and its justification both help and hinder the learning process,
shedding light on new ways to facilitate their academic performance.
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Appendix A: Pilot Version of the Epistemic and Ontologic Cognition Questionnaire
The pilot version of the EOCQ that follows is annotated to illustrate which dimension and
content area each item assesses. After each item is a code. The dimension is listed first:
simple and certain knowledge (SC), justification by authority (JA) and personal
justification (PJ). The next part of the code identifies the domain: math (M), history (H),
and aesthetics (A). For example, the code SCM indicates an item measuring the
dimension of simple and certain knowledge in the area of math. Items that are reverse-
coded are indicated with an (RC).
The Epistemic and Ontologic Cognition Questionnaire
For each of the following statements, please answer honestly. There are no “correct” answers. Please circle
your answer using a number from the seven-point scale:
1) In physics, the truth means different things to different people (SCMRC)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Completely Neither Disagree Completely
Disagree Nor Agree Agree
2) In math, the truth means different things to different people (SCMRC)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Completely Neither Disagree Completely
Disagree Nor Agree Agree
3) To do well in physics class, the main thing you need to do is memorize facts (SCM)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Completely Neither Disagree Completely
Disagree Nor Agree Agree
4) To do well in math class, the main thing you need to do is memorize facts (SCM)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Completely Neither Disagree Completely
Disagree Nor Agree Agree
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5) In physics, what is true today will be true tomorrow (SCM)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Completely Neither Disagree Completely
Disagree Nor Agree Agree
6) In math, what is true today will be true tomorrow (SCM)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Completely Neither Disagree Completely
Disagree Nor Agree Agree
7) In physics, the facts do not change (SCM)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Completely Neither Disagree Completely
Disagree Nor Agree Agree
8) In math, the facts do not change (SCM)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Completely Neither Disagree Completely
Disagree Nor Agree Agree
9) There are some things in physics that we will never understand (SCMRC)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Completely Neither Disagree Completely
Disagree Nor Agree Agree
10) There are some things in math that we will never understand (SCMRC)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Completely Neither Disagree Completely
Disagree Nor Agree Agree
11) If two scientists disagree about some part of physics, one of them must be wrong (SCM)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Completely Neither Disagree Completely
Disagree Nor Agree Agree
12) If two mathematicians disagree about some part of math, one of them must be wrong (SCM)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Completely Neither Disagree Completely
Disagree Nor Agree Agree
13) If a physicist says something is a fact, I believe it (JAM)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Completely Neither Disagree Completely
Disagree Nor Agree Agree
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14) If a mathematician says something is a fact, I believe it (JAM)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Completely Neither Disagree Completely
Disagree Nor Agree Agree
15) I think the things written in physics textbooks are true (JAM)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Completely Neither Disagree Completely
Disagree Nor Agree Agree
16) I think the things written in math textbooks are true (JAM)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Completely Neither Disagree Completely
Disagree Nor Agree Agree
17) If my friend and I disagree about something we learned in physics class, we just have to ask the
teacher to tell us who is right. (JAM)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Completely Neither Disagree Completely
Disagree Nor Agree Agree
18) If my friend and I disagree about something we learned in math class, we just have to ask the
teacher to tell us who is right. (JAM)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Completely Neither Disagree Completely
Disagree Nor Agree Agree
19) I don’t believe everything I learn in physics class. (JAMRC)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Completely Neither Disagree Completely
Disagree Nor Agree Agree
20) I don’t believe everything I learn in math class. (JAMRC)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Completely Neither Disagree Completely
Disagree Nor Agree Agree
21) I don’t automatically believe whatever my physics teacher tells me. (JAMRC)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Completely Neither Disagree Completely
Disagree Nor Agree Agree
22) I don’t automatically believe whatever my math teacher tells me. (JAMRC)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Completely Neither Disagree Completely
Disagree Nor Agree Agree
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23) In physics, you just have to decide what you believe and what you do not. (PJM)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Completely Neither Disagree Completely
Disagree Nor Agree Agree
24) In math, you just have to decide what you believe and what you do not. (PJM)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Completely Neither Disagree Completely
Disagree Nor Agree Agree
25) In physics, if you believe something is true, no one can tell you that you are wrong. (PJM)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Completely Neither Disagree Completely
Disagree Nor Agree Agree
26) In math, if you believe something is true, no one can tell you that you are wrong. (PJM)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Completely Neither Disagree Completely
Disagree Nor Agree Agree
27) In physics, the average person cannot tell what is true and what is not. (PJMRC)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Completely Neither Disagree Completely
Disagree Nor Agree Agree
28) In math, the average person cannot tell what is true and what is not. (PJMRC)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Completely Neither Disagree Completely
Disagree Nor Agree Agree
29) In history, the truth means different things to different people. (SCH)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Completely Neither Disagree Completely
Disagree Nor Agree Agree
30) In political science, the truth means different things to different people (SCH)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Completely Neither Disagree Completely
Disagree Nor Agree Agree
31) To do well in history class, the main thing you need to do is memorize facts (SCHRC)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Completely Neither Disagree Completely
Disagree Nor Agree Agree
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32) To do well in political science class, the main thing you need to do is memorize facts (SCHRC)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Completely Neither Disagree Completely
Disagree Nor Agree Agree
33) In history, what is true today will be true tomorrow (SCHRC)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Completely Neither Disagree Completely
Disagree Nor Agree Agree
34) In political science, what is true today will be true tomorrow (SCHRC)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Completely Neither Disagree Completely
Disagree Nor Agree Agree
35) In history, the facts do not change (SCHRC)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Completely Neither Disagree Completely
Disagree Nor Agree Agree
36) In political science, the facts do not change (SCHRC)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Completely Neither Disagree Completely
Disagree Nor Agree Agree
37) There are some things in history that we will never understand (SCH)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Completely Neither Disagree Completely
Disagree Nor Agree Agree
38) There are some things in political science that we will never understand (SCH)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Completely Neither Disagree Completely
Disagree Nor Agree Agree
39) If two historians disagree about some part of history, one of them must be wrong (SCHRC)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Completely Neither Disagree Completely
Disagree Nor Agree Agree
40) If two political scientists disagree about some part of political science, one of them must be wrong
(SCHRC)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Completely Neither Disagree Completely
Disagree Nor Agree Agree
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41) If a historian says something is a fact, I believe it (JAH)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Completely Neither Disagree Completely
Disagree Nor Agree Agree
42) If a political scientist says something is a fact, I believe it (JAH)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Completely Neither Disagree Completely
Disagree Nor Agree Agree
43) I think the things written in history textbooks are true (JAH)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Completely Neither Disagree Completely
Disagree Nor Agree Agree
44) I think the things written in political science textbooks are true (JAH)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Completely Neither Disagree Completely
Disagree Nor Agree Agree
45) If my friend and I disagree about something we learned in history class, we just have to ask the
teacher to tell us who is right. (JAH)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Completely Neither Disagree Completely
Disagree Nor Agree Agree
46) If my friend and I disagree about something we learned in political science class, we just have to
ask the teacher to tell us who is right. (JAH)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Completely Neither Disagree Completely
Disagree Nor Agree Agree
47) I don’t believe everything I learn in history class. (JAHRC)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Completely Neither Disagree Completely
Disagree Nor Agree Agree
48) I don’t believe everything I learn in political science class. (JAHRC)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Completely Neither Disagree Completely
Disagree Nor Agree Agree
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49) I don’t automatically believe whatever my history teacher tells me. (JAHRC)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Completely Neither Disagree Completely
Disagree Nor Agree Agree
50) I don’t automatically believe whatever my political science teacher tells me. (JAHRC)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Completely Neither Disagree Completely
Disagree Nor Agree Agree
51) In history, you just have to decide what you believe and what you do not. (PJH)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Completely Neither Disagree Completely
Disagree Nor Agree Agree
52) In political science, you just have to decide what you believe and what you do not. (PJH)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Completely Neither Disagree Completely
Disagree Nor Agree Agree
53) In history, if you believe something is true, no one can tell you that you are wrong. (PJH)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Completely Neither Disagree Completely
Disagree Nor Agree Agree
54) In political science, if you believe something is true, no one can tell you that you are wrong. (PJH)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Completely Neither Disagree Completely
Disagree Nor Agree Agree
55) In history, the average person cannot tell what is true and what is not. (PJHRC)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Completely Neither Disagree Completely
Disagree Nor Agree Agree
56) In political science, the average person cannot tell what is true and what is not. (PJHRC)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Completely Neither Disagree Completely
Disagree Nor Agree Agree
57) Everybody agrees what movies are good and which are bad. (SCARC)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Completely Neither Disagree Completely
Disagree Nor Agree Agree
218
58) Everybody agrees what songs are good and which are bad. (SCARC)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Completely Neither Disagree Completely
Disagree Nor Agree Agree
59) Everybody agrees what paintings are good and which are bad. (SCARC)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Completely Neither Disagree Completely
Disagree Nor Agree Agree
60) Everybody agrees what food tastes good and which tastes bad. (SCARC)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Completely Neither Disagree Completely
Disagree Nor Agree Agree
61) Movie critics know whether a movie is good or not. (JAA)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Completely Neither Disagree Completely
Disagree Nor Agree Agree
62) Music critics know whether a song is good or not. (JAA)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Completely Neither Disagree Completely
Disagree Nor Agree Agree
63) Art critics know whether a painting is good or not. (JAA)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Completely Neither Disagree Completely
Disagree Nor Agree Agree
64) Food critics know whether a kind of food tastes good or not. (JAA)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Completely Neither Disagree Completely
Disagree Nor Agree Agree
65) If I don’t like a movie, no one can tell me I am wrong. (PJA)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Completely Neither Disagree Completely
Disagree Nor Agree Agree
66) If I don’t like a song, no one can tell me I am wrong. (PJA)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Completely Neither Disagree Completely
Disagree Nor Agree Agree
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67) If I don’t like a painting, no one can tell me I am wrong. (PJA)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Completely Neither Disagree Completely
Disagree Nor Agree Agree
68) If I don’t like some kind of food, no one can tell me I am wrong. (PJA)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Completely Neither Disagree Completely
Disagree Nor Agree Agree
69) Please indicate your grade in school or whether you are in college or graduate school:
70) Please indicate your sex: Male, Female, Transgendered
71) Please indicate your age:
72) Please write down any science, math, political science, and history classes you have taken in the
last year.
73) Please indicate your current GPA:
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Appendix B: Pilot Middle-school and High-school Parental/Guardian Consent Form
Identification of
Project
Epistemic and Ontologic Cognition Questionnaire
Statement of Age of
Participant
Signing this document acknowledges that you are over 18 years of age and wish
to give permission for your child to participate in a program of research being
conducted by Dr. Roger Azevedo at the Graduate School, University of
Maryland, College Park, Department of Human Development.
Purpose The purpose of this research is to assess students’ understanding of various
kinds of knowledge.
Procedures The procedures will involve filling out a survey questionnaire. An example of a
question from the questionnaire is: “In physics, the truth means different things
to different people.” Your child will be rating items on a scale of 1-7, with 1
being completely disagree and 7 being completely agree. There are a total of 69
items that should take about 10-20 minutes to complete. In addition there are 5
demographic items. Your child will be asked to think out loud as you complete
the survey. After completing the survey your child will be asked some questions
regarding the survey itself which may take up to 30 minutes. An example
question is: “What are your overall impressions of the questionnaire?” Your
child will be audiotape recorded. You or your child may decide to terminate
your child’s participation at any time.
Confidentiality All information collected in the study is confidential, and your child’s name
will not be identified with his or her responses at any time. A numeric code will
be used as identification on data collection materials. Once data are collected,
this code will be used for maintenance and analysis of data. Only aggregate data
and pseudonyms will be used in publications and conference papers. Survey
questionnaire materials will be viewed only by Dr. Roger Azevedo and Jeff
Greene (the student investigator) in the College of Education). All materials
will be kept in a locked storage area in the Cognition and Technology Lab
(Benjamin Building, Rm. # 0313) to which only Dr. Azevedo and his graduate
research assistants have keys. Only the investigator and his graduate student
will have access to the audiotape, and this audiotape will be kept for three years
before being destroyed.




This experiment is not designed to help you or your child personally, but the
investigators hope to learn more about people’s views of knowledge. Your
child’s participation in this research is completely voluntary. You or your child
may choose not to take part at all. If your child decides to participate in this
research, he or she may stop participating at any time.




Department of Human Development
3304 Benjamin Building, room 3304E






Department of Human Development
3304 Benjamin Building, room 3304E




Contact Information of Institutional Review Board:
If you have questions about your rights as a research subject or wish to report a research-related injury,
please contact: Institutional Review Board Office, University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742;
(e-mail) irb@deans.umd.edu; (telephone) 301-405-0678
Printed Name of Participant: ______________________________
Signature of Participant: ______________________________
Date: ______________________________
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Appendix C: Pilot Middle-school and High-school Assent Form
INSTITUTE: University of Maryland
PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR: Dr. Roger Azevedo
STUDY TITLE: Epistemic and Ontologic Cognition Questionnaire
Assent for Epistemic and Ontologic Cognition Questionnaire
INTRODUCTION
We would like you to be in a study to find out more about how people think about
various kinds of knowledge. This will involve you filling out a questionnaire and then
answering some questions that the researchers will ask you about the questionnaire.
Filling out the questionnaire and answering these questions should take about 50 minutes.
WHAT YOU WILL DO IN THE STUDY
You will complete one pencil and paper questionnaire called the Epistemic and Ontologic
Cognition Questionnaire. This questionnaire asks questions about how you feel about
certain views you might have about different things like school subjects or music. Then
the researcher will ask you questions about what you thought about the questionnaire
such as whether it was easy to fill out and if you understood all of the questions. You will
be audiotaped while you fill out the questionnaire and answer the researcher’s questions
afterward. The researcher will ask you to “think out loud” as you fill out the
questionnaire. This is basically like saying out loud everything that you think in your
head.
CONFIDENTIALITY
The fact that you are participating in the study will be kept confidential (secret or
private), unless we are required by law to disclose it. When the results of the study are
published, the people who take part are not named. No one will ever know that you are in
the study unless you and your parents decide to tell them. The only people who will be
able to see the information are the research team members. The only time we would
break this rule would be if you or a family member tells us information that we think
your parents need to know to be able to keep you or other people safe. We would also
break this rule if you or a family member tells us information on the questionnaire that
would warrant a mental health diagnosis (depression for example). If this happens a
researcher will meet with your parents and will provide them with a doctor that will be
able to help. The only other time we may break this rule is if there is some evidence that
you are or have been abused. If there is evidence that you have been abused we are
required by law to tell the proper authorities.
WHAT YOU MAY NOT LIKE
Sometimes it gets boring to answer all of the questions, but we ask that you try hard to do
them anyway. If you get tired while completing the questionnaire, you can quit at any
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time. By being in the study you will help the researchers understand how people think
about knowledge. Although it may not help you directly, it may help other children in the
future.
You will not be paid for your involvement in this portion of the study.
It is important for you to remember that you are volunteering for this study and you can
stop doing it at any time.





Department of Human Development
3304 Benjamin Building, room 3304E






College Park, MD 20742-1131
301-405-4212
I have had this study explained to me in a way I understand, and I have had the chance to
ask questions. I agree to take part in the study. I understand that I can stop the study at
any time if there is something I don’t like.
Signature of Participant: ___________________________ Date: ______________
Signature of Investigator: __________________________ Date: ______________
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Appendix D: Pilot Graduate and Undergraduate Student Consent Form
Identification of
Project
Epistemic and Ontologic Cognition Questionnaire
Statement of Age of
Participant
You state that you are over 18 years of age and wish to participate in a
program of research being conducted by Dr. Roger Azevedo at the Graduate
School, University of Maryland, College Park, Department of Human
Development.
Purpose The purpose of this research is to assess students’ understanding of various
kinds of knowledge.
Procedures The procedures will involve filling out a survey questionnaire. An example of
a question from the questionnaire is: “In physics, the truth means different
things to different people.” You will be rating items on a scale of 1-7, with 1
being completely disagree and 7 being completely agree. There are a total of
69 items that should take about 10-20 minutes to complete. In addition there
are 5 demographic items. You will be asked to think out loud as you complete
the survey. After completing the survey you will be asked some questions
regarding the survey itself which may take up to 30 minutes. An example
question is: “What are your overall impressions of the questionnaire?” You
will be audiotape recorded. You may decide to terminate your participation at
any time.
Confidentiality All information collected in the study is confidential, and your name will not
be identified with your responses at any time. A numeric code will be used as
identification on data collection materials. Once data are collected, this code
will be used for maintenance and analysis of data. Only aggregate data and
pseudonyms will be used in publications and conference papers. Survey
questionnaire materials will be viewed only by Dr. Roger Azevedo and Jeff
Greene (the student investigator) in the College of Education). All materials
will be kept in a locked storage area in the Cognition and Technology Lab
(Benjamin Building, Rm. # 0313) to which only Dr. Azevedo and his
graduate research assistants have keys. Only the investigator and his graduate
student will have access to the audiotape, and this audiotape will be kept for
three years before being destroyed.




This experiment is not designed to help you personally, but the investigators
hope to learn more about people’s views of knowledge. Your participation in
this research is completely voluntary. You may choose not to take part at all.
If you decide to participate in this research, you may stop participating at any
time. If you decide not to participate in this study or if you stop participating
at any time, you will not lose any benefits to which you otherwise qualify.





Department of Human Development
3304 Benjamin Building, room 3304E






Department of Human Development
3304 Benjamin Building, room 3304E
College Park, MD 20742
Tel: 301-651-9210
E-mail: jgreene@umd.edu
Contact Information of Institutional Review Board:
If you have questions about your rights as a research subject or wish to report a research-related
injury, please contact: Institutional Review Board Office, University of Maryland, College Park,
MD 20742; (e-mail) irb@deans.umd.edu; (telephone) 301-405-0678
Printed Name of Participant: ______________________________
Signature of Participant: ______________________________
Date: ______________________________
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Appendix E: Dissertation Version of the Epistemic and Ontological Cognition
Questionnaire
The final dissertation version of the EOCQ that follows is annotated to illustrate which
dimension and content area each item assesses. After each item is a code representing the
dimension that is being measured: simple and certain knowledge (SC), justification by
authority (JA) and personal justification (PJ). Items that are reverse-coded are indicated
with an (RC).
The Academic Beliefs Questionnaire
1) In math, the truth means different things to different people. (SCRC)
1 2 3 4 5 6
Completely Mostly Somewhat Somewhat Mostly Completely
Disagree Disagree Disagree Agree Agree Agree
2) To know math well, you need to memorize what you are taught. (SC)
1 2 3 4 5 6
Completely Mostly Somewhat Somewhat Mostly Completely
Disagree Disagree Disagree Agree Agree Agree
3) In math, what is a fact today will be a fact tomorrow. (SC)
1 2 3 4 5 6
Completely Mostly Somewhat Somewhat Mostly Completely
Disagree Disagree Disagree Agree Agree Agree
4) Mathematicians’ knowledge of the facts about math does not change. (SC)
1 2 3 4 5 6
Completely Mostly Somewhat Somewhat Mostly Completely
Disagree Disagree Disagree Agree Agree Agree
5) Math is so complex that humans will never really understand it. (SCRC)
1 2 3 4 5 6
Completely Mostly Somewhat Somewhat Mostly Completely
Disagree Disagree Disagree Agree Agree Agree
6) If a mathematician says something is a fact, I believe it. (JA)
1 2 3 4 5 6
Completely Mostly Somewhat Somewhat Mostly Completely
Disagree Disagree Disagree Agree Agree Agree
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7) Things written in math textbooks are true. (JA)
1 2 3 4 5 6
Completely Mostly Somewhat Somewhat Mostly Completely
Disagree Disagree Disagree Agree Agree Agree
8) I believe everything I learn in math class. (JA)
1 2 3 4 5 6
Completely Mostly Somewhat Somewhat Mostly Completely
Disagree Disagree Disagree Agree Agree Agree
9) If a math teacher says something is a fact, I believe it. (JA)
1 2 3 4 5 6
Completely Mostly Somewhat Somewhat Mostly Completely
Disagree Disagree Disagree Agree Agree Agree
10) In math, everyone’s knowledge can be different because there is no one absolutely right answer.
(PJ)
1 2 3 4 5 6
Completely Mostly Somewhat Somewhat Mostly Completely
Disagree Disagree Disagree Agree Agree Agree
11) In math, if you believe something is a fact, no one can prove to you that you are wrong. (PJ)
1 2 3 4 5 6
Completely Mostly Somewhat Somewhat Mostly Completely
Disagree Disagree Disagree Agree Agree Agree
12) In math, what’s a fact depends upon a person’s point of view. (PJ)
1 2 3 4 5 6
Completely Mostly Somewhat Somewhat Mostly Completely
Disagree Disagree Disagree Agree Agree Agree
13) Mathematical knowledge is all factual and there are no opinions. (PJRC)
1 2 3 4 5 6
Completely Mostly Somewhat Somewhat Mostly Completely
Disagree Disagree Disagree Agree Agree Agree
14) In history, the truth means different things to different people. (SCRC)
1 2 3 4 5 6
Completely Mostly Somewhat Somewhat Mostly Completely
Disagree Disagree Disagree Agree Agree Agree
15) To know history well, you need to memorize what you are taught. (SC)
1 2 3 4 5 6
Completely Mostly Somewhat Somewhat Mostly Completely
Disagree Disagree Disagree Agree Agree Agree
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16) In history, what is a fact today will be a fact tomorrow. (SC)
1 2 3 4 5 6
Completely Mostly Somewhat Somewhat Mostly Completely
Disagree Disagree Disagree Agree Agree Agree
17) Historians’ knowledge of the facts about history does not change. (SC)
1 2 3 4 5 6
Completely Mostly Somewhat Somewhat Mostly Completely
Disagree Disagree Disagree Agree Agree Agree
18) History is so complex that humans will never really understand it. (SCRC)
1 2 3 4 5 6
Completely Mostly Somewhat Somewhat Mostly Completely
Disagree Disagree Disagree Agree Agree Agree
19) If a historian says something is a fact, I believe it. (JA)
1 2 3 4 5 6
Completely Mostly Somewhat Somewhat Mostly Completely
Disagree Disagree Disagree Agree Agree Agree
20) Things written in history textbooks are true. (JA)
1 2 3 4 5 6
Completely Mostly Somewhat Somewhat Mostly Completely
Disagree Disagree Disagree Agree Agree Agree
21) I believe everything I learn in history class. (JA)
1 2 3 4 5 6
Completely Mostly Somewhat Somewhat Mostly Completely
Disagree Disagree Disagree Agree Agree Agree
22) If a history teacher says something is a fact, I believe it. (JA)
1 2 3 4 5 6
Completely Mostly Somewhat Somewhat Mostly Completely
Disagree Disagree Disagree Agree Agree Agree
23) In history, everyone’s knowledge can be different because there is no one absolutely right answer.
(PJ)
1 2 3 4 5 6
Completely Mostly Somewhat Somewhat Mostly Completely
Disagree Disagree Disagree Agree Agree Agree
24) In history, if you believe something is a fact, no one can prove to you that you are wrong. (PJ)
1 2 3 4 5 6
Completely Mostly Somewhat Somewhat Mostly Completely
Disagree Disagree Disagree Agree Agree Agree
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25) In history, what’s a fact depends upon a person’s point of view. (PJ)
1 2 3 4 5 6
Completely Mostly Somewhat Somewhat Mostly Completely
Disagree Disagree Disagree Agree Agree Agree
26) Historical knowledge is all factual and there are no opinions. (PJRC)
1 2 3 4 5 6
Completely Mostly Somewhat Somewhat Mostly Completely
Disagree Disagree Disagree Agree Agree Agree








28) Please indicate your sex: Male, Female
29) Please indicate your age:
30) Please indicate your current overall GPA:
31) Please circle what grades you usually get in math classes:
Almost All A’s
Mostly A’s with some B’s
Almost All B’s
Mostly B’s with some C’s
Almost All C’s
Mostly C’s with some D’s
Almost All D’s or F’s
32) Please circle what grades you usually get in history classes:
Almost All A’s
Mostly A’s with some B’s
Almost All B’s
Mostly B’s with some C’s
Almost All C’s
Mostly C’s with some D’s
Almost All D’s or F’s
33) Please indicate your major (if you are a college or graduate student):
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1 4.10 1.146 -.732 .969
2 4.48 1.331 -1.117 .637
3 4.63 1.296 -1.104 .704
4 3.72 1.462 -.240 -.877
5 2.31 1.389 .950 .133
6 4.31 1.106 -.857 1.035
7 4.43 1.159 -.783 .233
8 4.83 1.189 -.982 .556
9 4.76 1.052 -.908 .956
10 3.65 1.660 -.163 -1.150
11 2.73 1.428 .388 -.816
12 3.59 1.386 -.231 -.561
13 3.85 1.464 -.276 -.783
14 4.65 1.090 -1.034 1.504
15 4.54 1.233 -.902 .682
16 4.30 1.460 -.566 -.589
17 3.56 1.531 -.210 -1.009
18 2.93 1.398 .290 -.830
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19 4.54 .949 -.471 .155
20 4.54 1.045 -.520 .087
21 4.64 1.081 -.650 179
22 4.69 1.012 -.704 .291
23 3.88 1.360 -.304 -.747
24 3.18 1.397 .221 -.665
25 3.61 1.436 -.112 -.885






1 2.97 1.471 .228 -1.017
2 4.32 1.234 -.602 -.305
3 4.84 1.150 -1.001 .556
4 3.67 1.393 -.346 -.808
5 3.43 1.463 1.161 -.912
6 3.85 1.299 -.426 -.430
7 4.24 1.050 -.470 -.115
8 4.24 1.33 -.782 .119
9 4.22 1.207 -.745 .219
10 2.69 1.349 .557 -.518
11 2.20 1.099 .705 -.142
12 2.42 1.257 .638 -.400
13 4.39 1.279 -.619 -.367
14 4.94 1.214 -1.309 1.376
15 4.49 1.113 -1.013 1.254
16 4.24 1.506 -.642 -.612
17 2.72 1.452 .541 -.627
18 2.99 1.581 .430 -.962
19 3.81 1.141 -.118 -.564
20 3.84 1.244 -.269 -.823
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21 3.97 1.289 -.512 -.371
22 4.02 1.110 -.407 -.372
23 3.97 1.426 -.389 -.682
24 2.69 1.223 .386 -.640
25 3.99 1.368 -.434 -.474






1 2.55 1.302 .529 -.799
2 4.08 1.329 -.602 -.469
3 4.71 1.111 -1.217 1.364
4 3.80 1.320 -.221 -.815
5 2.87 1.279 .436 -.544
6 4.05 1.098 -.677 .161
7 4.38 .907 -.893 1.648
8 4.39 1.038 -.600 .419
9 4.20 1.049 -.884 .864
10 2.60 1.165 .755 .196
11 2.25 1.030 .813 .806
12 2.39 1.088 .851 .524
13 4.14 1.204 -.442 -.390
14 5.00 .952 -.969 .949
15 4.29 1.139 -.699 .498
16 3.65 1.455 -.070 -.904
17 2.72 1.293 .583 -.378
18 3.12 1.298 .301 -.538
19 3.50 1.084 -.219 -.282
20 3.65 1.064 -.326 -.109
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21 3.55 1.153 -.285 -.391
22 3.78 1.047 -.486 .278
23 4.18 1.258 -.462 -.408
24 2.66 1.120 .232 -.703
25 4.23 1.215 -.517 .079






1 3.07 1.485 .144 -1.357
2 3.76 1.204 -.389 -.745
3 4.19 1.249 -.821 .060
4 3.26 1.222 .139 -.611
5 2.71 1.214 .714 .350
6 3.71 1.170 -.487 -.501
7 4.14 .907 -1.158 1.583
8 4.05 1.176 -1.175 1.028
9 3.98 .927 -.786 1.231
10 2.79 1.176 .767 .406
11 2.24 1.081 .704 -.093
12 2.75 1.199 .238 -1.050
13 3.07 1.323 .152 -.746
14 5.16 .894 -1.078 1.425
15 3.91 1.247 -.395 -.270
16 2.86 1.395 .415 -.623
17 2.12 1.283 1.025 .028
18 3.35 1.316 .044 -.544
19 2.97 .991 -.154 -1.090
20 2.89 .994 -.573 -.657
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21 2.66 1.101 .488 .222
22 2.97 1.184 -.260 -.863
23 4.36 1.210 -.620 .476
24 2.66 1.278 .737 .120
25 4.41 1.325 -.909 .668
26 1.79 .913 1.003 .887
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Glossary
Adaptive: a term adopted in this dissertation to capture development through the model,
intended as an alternative to “availing” (see below)
Availing: literally means helpful or beneficial; used by Muis (2004) as a term for the
upper ends of continua describing epistemological beliefs, it has the benefit of not being
tied to age or development as other terms used to describe the advanced ends of these
continua, such as “mature” or “sophisticated”
Defeasible: falsifiable; used in reference to knowledge claims, it is the idea that one can
claim ‘knowledge’ of something, with all the attendant privileges of claiming
‘knowledge’ but also acknowledge that that knowledge is potentially incorrect pending
additional information
Epistemic Cognition: a term put forth by Kitchener (2002) that he feels more accurately
describes the work of personal epistemology, epistemological beliefs, and
epistemological theories researchers
Epistemology: literally the study of knowledge; a branch of philosophy that deals with
how people go about determining what is knowledge (Pollock & Cruz, 1999; Williams,
2001)
Epistemological Beliefs: a model put forth by Schommer (1990) that personal
epistemology is a multidimensional phenomenon comprised of five independent factors
Ill-structured Problem: a problem that has no single, clear answer; a problem that is more
subjective than objective; a problem on which reasonable people can disagree
(Frederiksen, 1984)
Ontology: a branch of philosophy that examines what actually exists and the categories or
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classes of that which exists (Pollock & Cruz, 1999)
Personal Epistemology: a field of research based primarily in educational psychology that
explores “how individuals come to know, the theories and beliefs they hold about
knowing, and the manner in which such epistemological premises are a part of and an
influence on the cognitive processes of thinking and reasoning” (Hofer & Pintrich, 1997,
p. 88).
Relativism: a term with different meanings in psychological and philosophical;
epistemology research:
a) Psychological Relativism: one scheme within Perry’s (1970, 1999) model of
personal epistemology that emphasizes that knowledge claims can be evaluated
relative to some set of standards and/or criteria
b) Philosophical Relativism: the belief that “knowledge” is only true for a
particular person or culture; knowledge as an objective truth cannot and does not
exist (Williams, 2001)
1) Philosophical Relativism most resembles Perry’s Multiplicity position,
not his Relativism position
Skepticism: the philosophical view that “knowledge” cannot be known by humans and
that it may indeed not even exist; skeptics also doubt the value of objective
knowledge, claiming that local understandings are more useful (Williams, 2001)
Theory of Mind: an area of research that explores how young children move from a naïve
understanding of the world as objectively and directly known to a more nuanced view of
the world that can include false beliefs, interpretation, and constructivism (Chandler et
al., 2002)
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Well-structured Problem: a problem that has a single, clear answer; a problem that is
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